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Chapter 1
Hope for the World: Copying God
If, as Walter Lowe has stated, theology in [the 
twentieth] century was born amid the darkness of war,”1 it 
would be difficult to find a person more representative of 
theology’s struggle to emerge from this darkness than 
Jürgen Moltmann. The influence of his work can be traced, 
in part, to the fact that Moltmann’s thought possesses an 
acute awareness of the darkness of the past century and of 
the godforsakenness of the present. But Moltmann is not 
willing to leave us in the dark. In the midst of this 
darkness and godforsakenness, there is reason to speak of 
light and God’s presence. It is this hope of the coming God 
that penetrates every part of Moltmann’s theology. 
In his tenacious holding to hope in the face of 
darkness, Moltmann "has been willing to force us 
theologically to imagine our world eschatologically."2
Moltmann's ability to "imagine eschatologically" has 
presented us with vital contributions in almost every 
                                                
1 Walter Lowe, Theology and Difference (Bloomington, In: Indiana 
University Press, 1993), 1.
2 Stanley Hauerwas, “No Enemy, No Christianity: Theology and Preaching 
Between the “Worlds,”” The Future of Theology, ed. Miroslav Volf, 
Carmen Krieg, and Thomas Kucharz, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 26.
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aspect of theology.3 Among the most important are his 
interpretations of the doctrine of the Trinity, his 
Christology and his understanding of the relationship 
between God and suffering. Throughout all of his writings 
there are two characteristics of Moltmann's thought that 
are particularly striking. First, there is a remarkable 
consistency in his thinking. Whether he is writing about 
the Trinity or the problem of suffering, his 
eschatologically-oriented framework can be seen as 
directing the development of his thought on the given 
topic. Repeatedly, we will have occasion to observe this 
feature. 
Secondly, the central impulse of Moltmann's work is 
practical. He characterizes his work as not concerned "so 
much with what is always right, but more with the word 
which is addressed to us here and now; not so much with 
correct doctrine but with concrete doctrine; and therefore 
not so much with pure theory but with a practical 
theory"(HTG 167).4 Thinking eschatologically is never for 
                                                
3 Richard Kearney distinguishes between desiring God onto-theologically 
and desiring God eschatologically “Desire of God,” God, the Gift, and 
Postmodernity, ed. John Caputo and Michael Scanlon (Bloomington, In: 
Indiana University Press, 1999). This distinction is helpful in 
considering Moltmann. His use of eschatological thinking appears to be 
very onto-theological at times. I think Kearney too quickly identifies
Moltmann in the line of the “eschatological notion of the possible” in 
The God Who May Be (Bloomington, In: Indiana University Press, 2001).
4  See also Jürgen Moltmann, Hope for the Church: Moltmann in Dialogue 
with Practical Theology (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1979)
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Moltmann empty speculation, nor is eschatology a way of 
escape into the future. Moltmann's pastoral concern for the 
church directs his approach in doing theology. Whether he 
is thinking about the intricacies of the doctrine of the 
Trinity or the proper understanding of revelation, his 
ultimate concern is to offer a counsel of hope for the 
church as the people of God. 
In Moltmann's thought, the church must think 
eschatologically if it is to live faithfully in the 
godforsaken present. Only the in-breaking of the future 
into the forsaken now offers hope; only by experiencing the 
current conditions with the hopeful eyes of the future can 
the church find direction for living with blessing and 
grace. Moltmann attempts to help the church take seriously 
both the darkness of our age as well as the promise of the 
age to come.     
As the body of Moltmann's work continues to grow, his 
influence continues to grow.5 And, in the words of, Douglas 
Meeks, we can expect this trend to continue. Although he 
has already "More than any other contemporary 
theologian…provided a wealth of resources for 
                                                
5  A helpful resource for seeing the breadth and influence of Moltmann’s 
work is James Wakefield, Jürgen Moltmann: A Research Bibliography 
(Lanham, MD.: Scarecrow Press, 2002). 
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reconceptualizing the church,"6 Moltmann's "contributions 
will become all the more crucial…as theology turns its 
attention in a more concentrated way to the question of the 
church's faithful existence and even survival in a market 
society."7
My examination of Moltmann’s thought finds resonance 
in his own project of helping the church to be faithful. To 
that end, I gratefully acknowledge Jürgen Moltmann’s 
humility, creativity, commitment and witness as examples 
for my life. When I first discovered Theology of Hope, I 
was, to quote Kant, “shaken from my dogmatic slumber.” The 
combination of passion, concern for the church, and 
theoretical depth captured me. Beyond his theological work, 
from prisoner of war, to student, to pastor, to scholar, 
Moltmann’s life has been a wonderful witness to the hope of 
the Gospel. In spite of the need to be mindful of 
godforsakenness, Moltmann taught me to counter the 
awareness of the darkness of our age with the promise of 
God's presence. Whatever criticism I may bring against his 
thought in this thesis, it is important to confess that it 
                                                
6 Douglas Meeks, “The Future of Theology in a Commodity Society,” The 
Future of Theology, 253.
7 Meeks, “The Future of Theology,” 253. Given Volf's assertion that 
Moltmann is the most influential theologian in the last fifty years and 
Meeks surmising that his influence on the church is going to grow, it 
becomes clear the analysis of Moltmann's practical "wealth of resources 
for reconceptualizing the church" is 
a project which must continue.” 
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is far outweighed by my indebtedness to the creativity and 
energy he has personified in his writing over the years.8
1a Introduction
The broader interest from which my thesis emerges is 
my concern, after Barth’s critique of natural revelation9
and the philosophical critique of foundationalism, to help 
shape a post-foundational ethic. After being pushed to the 
margins of the western Christian tradition by 
demythologization and modernization, the doctrine of the 
Trinity, surprisingly, has re-emerged as a source for re-
imagining and grounding the moral life.10 A growing number 
of theologians assert that the human community is called 
“to copy God.”11 The internal and external relationships of 
the Father, Son, and Spirit have become fertile ground for 
                                                
8 For an insightful overview of the people who influenced Moltmann’s 
early career see Robert Cornelison, “The Reality of Hope: Moltmann’s 
Vision for Theology” The Asbury Theological Journal 48 (1993), 109-119.   
9 Samuel Powell, The Trinity in German Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 198, notes the connection: “Moltmann shares 
with Barth the opinion that the basis for our knowledge of the Trinity 
is Jesus Christ.” Powell maintains that Moltmann’s modification of 
Barth’s thought is not “anti-Barthian” but a “natural development.” 
Powell also understands Pannenberg’s work as an extension of Barth’s 
thought, 233ff.
10 The list of contemporary theologians who have written on the Trinity 
is extensive and ranges from feminist models, personalist philosophies, 
liberation theologies and creational approaches. The danger, which is 
recognized by several of these thinkers, is that Trinity simply becomes 
a screen upon which the theologian projects her version of what would 
happen in the human sphere.
11 Miroslav Volf "'The Trinity Is Our Social Program': The Doctrine of 
the Trinity and the Shape of Social Engagement" Modern Theology
14(1998), 403. 
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speculating about who we are as human persons-in-relation 
and for recasting a vision of a shared life.12
With the publication of The Crucified God, The Trinity 
and the Kingdom of God and several essays, Moltmann helped 
to re-establish the doctrine of the Trinity as a vital area 
for theological exploration.13 As Volf muses, "Perhaps no 
single other theologian of the second half of [the 
twentieth] century has shaped theology so profoundly as 
Jürgen Moltmann."14 And much of that shaping has been 
centered in the task of envisaging the Trinity in terms of 
social relations. An important connection in Moltmann’s 
work happens when he links divine social relations and 
human intersubjectivity. In making this important move, 
Moltmann grounds ethics in the very life of God.   
My aim in this thesis is to explore Moltmann’s 
contention that the Trinity provides a moral and ethical 
                                                
12  For an overview of the landscape of Trinitarian thought see chp.1, 
“Trinitarian Theology Today” in Colin Gunton, The Promise of 
Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991).
13 See John Loeschen, The Divine Community: Trinity, Church, and Ethics 
in Reformation Theologies (Kirksville, Mo.: The Sixteenth Century 
Journal Publishers, 1981) for an overview of Luther and Calvin’s use of 
the Trinity in ethics. Another important source for an introduction to 
contemporary Trinitarian thought are the essays collected in Christoph 
Schwöbel, ed., Trinitarian Theology Today (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995).
14Miroslav Volf "A Queen and a Beggar: Challenges and Prospects of 
Theology," The Future of Theology, ix.
 The sheer quantity of articles, books, and dissertations published in 
response to the work of Jürgen Moltmann suggests the aptness of Volf's 
evaluation of Moltmann's influence. For an extensive bibliographic 
listing of the books and theses spawned by this work see Dieter Ising, 
et. al., Bibliographie Jürgen Moltmann (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1987). 
Also see the Richard Bauckham’s bibliography at the end of The Theology 
of Jϋrgen Moltmann (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995).   
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program, or what he often calls a social program for life 
in this world. On a philosophical/theological level, I want 
to investigate how Moltmann understands the life of the 
Trinity to be the ethical blueprint for life.
It is Moltmann’s desire to develop “practical” rather 
than “pure” theory that sets the direction and produces the 
trajectory for this study. I will be asking if Moltmann’s 
trinitarian ethics does, in fact, do what he intends. Does 
his theory provide practical guidance for human life? Does 
living according to this understanding of the Gospel guide 
us to experiencing fullness and meaning, authenticity and 
blessing in our life as creatures on this earth? Or is the 
ethical fall-out of Moltmann’s thought far less helpful and 
even, sometimes, guilt-inducing? 
1b  Conditions for Imitations   
In making trinitarian relations a guide for human 
intersubjectivity Moltmann is arguing that a proper 
understanding of the inner relationships of the Trinity 
grounds and makes available the ethical vision for being 
human. The foundational role the Trinity plays in showing 
the church how to live faithfully is evident in the 
adaptation of the phrase "the Trinity is our social
program."  Here Moltmann emphasizes that creation in 
17
general and humans in particular are, to use Volf's phrase, 
to "copy God." 
While the notion of copying God has a heritage in 
theology, the very idea of a creature being or acting like 
its Creator raises two questions: "In what way are we to 
copy God?" and "What conditions make it possible to copy 
God?" Moltmann's answer to the first question can be 
sketched rather easily; though much more will need to be 
said about the way in which he develops this position. In 
summary fashion, we can say that for Moltmann divine life 
functions as an ideal and norm for human life as human 
relationships are to mirror the relationships found within 
the Trinity. Humans are to copy the divine relationships of 
inner-trinitarian life in the way they relate with one 
another, with creation, and with God.15
Moltmann sets up a sophisticated analogy, which he 
identifies as an analogia relationis, between the relations 
of intra-trinitarian life and the differentiated relations 
of human life.16 As the analogy is fully explicated, the 
                                                
15 Conor Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism (London: Routledge Presss, 
2002),  offers clarity in his discussion of analogy, particularly that 
of Thomas. 
16 The theological use of the analogy of relationality includes G.C. 
Berkouwer in Man: The Image of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), 
72ff. Moltmann appeals to Bonhoeffer as the source for “analogia 
relationis” in Two Studies in the Theology of Bonhoeffer (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967), 53 ff. See also Eberhard Jüngel, The 
Doctrine of the Trinity: God’s Being is in Becoming (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1976).
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Trinity becomes understood as both an inviting community in 
which a refilled creation is called eschatologically to 
participate and the ethical ideal which the church is 
called to embody in the forsaken creation of the present.17
For Moltmann, there is an inextricable link between the 
being of the godhead and the ethical norms of human 
relationality.18 But questions arise about this link because 
the intra-trinitarian life exists as the interchange 
between “same” Others, an exchange that is characterized by 
familiarity, constancy, and predictability. However, action 
between and among humans is not intra-human, but inter-
human. Not only is there not the same kind of 
predictability, constancy, and reliability in human inter-
subjectivity, human relationships are further complicated 
by the violence of sin and evil.
Tension heightens in Moltmann’s answer to the second 
question -- what conditions must exist in order for 
creation to be able to copy God. As we shall see, his 
theology of hope begins with a radical difference between 
Creator and creature in terms of an initial rupture between 
                                                
17 Colin Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 42ff., in his 
sketch of the history of the Trinitarian analogies puts Moltmann in 
contrast to Augustine where the human mind is the focal point of the 
analogy between God and humanity. Moltmann’s analogy is certainly more 
holistic in comparison. 
18 See Robert Jenson, On Thinking the Human: the Resolutions of 
Difficult Notions (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003).
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the two. The result is that creation finds itself always 
already godforsaken. Without access to God, creation as a 
non-copy, can only repeat its own disastrous relationships. 
The conditions for embodying divine-like relationships do 
not exist in the creatio originalis. The hope of creation 
comes from the promise of God to overcome the rupture. 
In the revelation of Jesus Christ, divine life is 
available to be copied. As such, Jesus Christ is not merely 
the means of revelation, but the content as well as he 
makes visible the perichoretic relationships of the 
Trinity. The imitation of Christ morally is preceded by the 
transformation of creation from a godforsaken non-copy into 
an ontologically similar copy. God's in-breaking into 
godforsaken creation changes the conditions of the 
relationship between Creator and creation. The difference 
which was initially understood as rupture is redeemed in 
God’s movement toward creation from the future. As God’s 
presence replaces his absence, the “same” otherness of 
divine relationality is duplicated as creational 
difference. Moral imitation is possible because creaturely 
life becomes a replica of inner-trinitarian life. 
But how does this overcoming of difference allow for 
the possibility of an ethic if creation is absorbed into 
divine life? Here I want to investigate Moltmann's 
20
trinitarian ethics by analyzing the conditions of reality 
that exist in the interplay between the difference/rupture 
of the present and the unity/overcoming of the future. In 
the end, I will suggest that Moltmann's attempt to ground 
human mutuality in trinitarian life is problematic because 
the unity which characterizes divine mutuality, when all is 
said and done, trumps and brackets creational integrity and 
difference. 
I will be suggesting that in Moltmann’s thought 
ethical direction for creation comes at too high of a 
price. Reduced to its fundamentals, creation exists in 
paradox: To truly be creation it must become like God, yet 
in becoming like God, it ceases to be creation. God's 
overcoming of the rupture between creation and himself is 
not fully realized in the here and now as creation still 
awaits the totality of God's redemption. Until that time, 
the difference and forsakenness of creation is held in 
tension with the unity and indwelling of the future. And 
caught between the difference of current experience and the 
sameness of eschatological unity, creation is called to 
anticipate the future by embodying perichoresis in all its 
relationships. At the point of God's arrival from the 
future, creation will be filled with divine life. At that 
time the conditions for creaturely relationships to imitate 
21
perfectly divine relationships will be met. The rupture 
will be healed. But this movement gives rise to some 
nagging questions: What remains of the difference between 
God and creation?  Is there a danger that the differences 
in creation are blurred, and perhaps, eclipsed?  And like 
Plato in the Timaeus, does the suggesting of creation as a 
divine copy taint creation with lack? Are sin and 
redemption to be understood as part of creation from the 
beginning? 
1c  Methodological Issues
My thesis is located in the current discussions of 
philosophical theology rather than in systematic theology 
proper. While the lines between these disciplines are not 
all that clear-cut and sometimes even blurry, when I say 
the temper is philosophical I mean that my discussion will 
not focus on  specific theological doctrines, as for 
example, the doctrine of the Trinity or the doctrine of 
Christ. Rather, my primary concern will be to search out, 
trace, and explore the underlying ontological structure of 
Moltmann’s work and the concomitant ethical impulses which
flow from this theological cosmogony. 
22
Furthermore, my chief aim is not exegetical.19 While I 
acknowledge the importance of such a work for the life of 
faith,20 I do not find it necessary in this present effort 
for two reasons. First, Moltmann’s ethical insights do not 
rely directly upon such exegesis. Rather, they emerge from 
his understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity, itself 
more a construction than a result of exegesis.21 Since the 
Scriptural givens about the Trinity are rather sparse, and 
even fewer about what the interior life of the Trinity may 
look like, exegetical work will do little to help us 
understand Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity and his 
subsequent ethics.22 Of course, the argument can be made 
that the revelation of Jesus Christ grants us insight into 
intra-trinitarian relationships, but any attempt to read 
                                                
19 A notable example of this type of work is Michael Gilbertson, God and 
History in the Book of Revelation: New Testament Studies in Dialogue 
with Pannenberg and Moltmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003).
20 Here for an example, I would point to the New Testament ethics in
Richard Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1997) and N.T. Wright’s work such as Jesus and the Victory of 
God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996).
21 Christoph Schwöbel, “Christology and Trinitarian Thought” in 
Trinitarian Theology Today describes the relationship between Scripture 
and the doctrine of the Trinity in a provocative way: “I am … not 
claiming that we can offer scriptural proof for a developed doctrine of 
the Trinity…however…we detect in the expressions of Christian practice 
in worship, proclamation, reflection, and action an underlying proto-
trinitarian depth structure”(127). 
22 The scarcity of biblical references regarding trinitarian 
relationships is a source for my concern that an in depth description 
of inner-trinitarian life is presumptuous.  The issue of the 
limitations of theoretical thought, even theological ones, is properly 
a concern for philosophy. See Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of 
Theoretical Thought vol. 1, tr. David Freeman and William Young, 
(Jordan Station, On.: Paideia Press, 1984), especially p. 82ff.  
23
passages regarding the life of Christ in this way would 
rely first on the construction of a doctrine of the Trinity 
which would function as an exegetical lens.23
Second, Moltmann’s references to Scripture are more in 
the form of proof-texts for his particular philosophical 
position than sustained exegetical analysis.24 Moltmann 
takes statements like “God will be all in all” to be 
philosophical descriptions of reality and not the 
confessional metaphorical language of faith. While deciding 
upon the boundaries between confession and theoretical 
articulations is difficult, I want to suggest that any time 
our theological knowledge is taken as comprehending and 
articulating a confessional mystery, we need to be wary.  
As will slowly become evident, in the end I will not 
be able to hide my concern about Moltmann’s ability to 
ground a normative social program in the Trinity. Although 
my argumentation and approach is perhaps more philosophical 
than Richard Bauckham, a leading interpreter of Moltmann, I 
                                                
23 While Trinitarian theology has helped to produce a “trinitarian 
hermeneutics,” I am not aware of a movement towards “trinitarian 
exegesis.” Or to put it another way, the current concern with 
trinitarian thought flows from particular issues in systematic theology 
and not directly from exegetical interests. While this by no means 
settles the legitimacy of trinitarian theology, it does suggest which 
issues are fundamental.   
24 Cornelius Plantinga in the introduction to Trinity, Incarnation and 
Atonement: Philosophical and Theological Essays, ed. Cornealius 
Plantinga and Ronald Feenstra, (Notre Dame, In.: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1989), 23, suggests that Moltmann’s theory of the social 
Trinity “sit loose to Scripture.”
24
certainly share his summary description, “Moltmann is 
trying to hold together two rather different ideas: that 
(a) the life of the Trinity is an interpersonal fellowship 
in which we, by grace, participate, and (b) the life of the 
Trinity provides the prototype on which human life should 
be modeled.”25 And, in the end, I also share Bauckham’s  
conclusion in doubting “whether the combination is really 
successful.”26
My hesitation in accepting Moltmann’s theory of the 
social Trinity, while affirming much of what he has to say 
about justice, violence and ethics in general,27 is also 
strengthened because of my fear that Moltmann’s ruminations 
about the inner life of God cross the line into 
speculation, or as it is often referred to today,  
ontotheology.28 There is a fine line between testifying 
                                                
25 Richard Bauckham, “Jürgen Moltmann and the Question of Pluralism,” 
The Trinity in a Pluralistic Age: Theological Essays on Culture and 
Religion, ed. Kevin Vanhoozer, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 160.
26 Bauckham, “Jürgen Moltmann and the Question of Pluralism,”. 160.
27   Or as Emmanuel Levinas, “Ethics of the Infinite” in Richard Kearney, 
Debates in Continental Philosophy: Conversation with Contemporary 
Thinkers (New York: Fordam University Press, 2004), explains, “The 
ethical situation is a human situation, beyond human nature, in which 
the idea of God comes to mind” (76).
28 See Merold Westphal, “Overcoming Onto-theology” in God the Gift and 
Postmodernism.  Here Westphal warns us “to determine just where and to 
what degree God-talk becomes the arrogant humanism that puts God at our 
disposal”(161). The analogies of Trinitarian theology can, at times, 
make God too available conceptually.  See also Martin Heidegger’s 
lecture “Theology and Theology,” The Piety of Thinking tr. James Hart 
and John Maraldo (Bloomington, In.: Indiana University Press, 1976) and 
his essay “Overcoming Metaphysics” The End of Philosophy, tr. Joan 
Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). See also John Caputo, 
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about the Trinity as revealed by Scripture and an ideology 
rooted in a metaphysical construct.29
    
1d Divergent Readings
Any thesis – and mine is such a thesis — which seeks to 
deepen our insight into Moltmann’s overarching ontological 
structure or theological cosmogony faces the reality that 
interpreters are far from one mind in describing Moltmann’s 
fundamental position. There is no disagreement about the 
fact that for Moltmann the eschatological hope of life 
in/with the Trinity is set in opposition to the despair of 
godforsaken existence. The differences arise in that some 
argue that Moltmann stresses the discontinuity between the 
God-filled future and the godforsaken present, while others 
see him highlighting the continuity. 
The emphasis on the future as God's dwelling place 
led, it is said, to a denial of any experience of God in 
the present as the divide between God and creation was seen 
                                                                                                                                                
Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington, In.: Indiana University Press, 
1993). 
29 In James Olthuis’ essay in Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed 
Tradition, ed. James Olthuis and James K.A. Smith, (Grand Rapids: 
Baker, 2005) raises the question in this manner: “what then is the 
nature of legitimate theologizing about the Trinity, and when is the 
boundary to metaphysics or ontotheology crossed. That is a complex 
question…” Olthuis chooses to emphasis the kingdom of God as a point of 
departure for theorizing about the moral life in contrast to the inner 
life of the Trinity. Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, tr. Thomas 
Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 143, warns that 
“to do theology is not to speak the language of the gods or ‘God.’”
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as intrinsic to creation being creation.30 Early critics 
asserted that creation and new creation are so 
discontinuous in Moltmann that any continuity of creation 
into the eschaton is impossible and; therefore, creatio 
originalis is void of meaning. 
In Langdon Gilkey's early reading of TH, the openness 
that results from creation's kenosis is necessary because 
of the lack of any presence in creation. In creation’s 
kenosis, creation is merely emptying itself of that which 
does not belong, which is everything. The absolute 
disjuncture between the future and the present undercuts 
any notion of continuity. In Gilkey's assessment, 
Moltmann's God of the future negates and violates creation. 
Far from being a "turning to the world," Gilkey alleges 
that in Moltmann "the divine presence... is the negation of 
the world in the cross."31 Gilkey further explains that in 
Moltmann there is a "radical denial of the importance of 
the doctrines of God's present activity through creation, 
                                                
30 See Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 23ff. Early critics 
viewed TH as a horizontalized version of Barth's dualism which 
maintained the rupture between revelation and experience. See also 
Douglas Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope (Philadelphia: Fortress, 
1974), 16-19 and Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making 
(Basingstoke: Marshall Pickering, 1987), 5.
31 Langdon Gilkey, "The Contribution of Culture to the Reign of God" The 
Future as the Presence of Shared Hope, ed. Maryellen Muckenhirn (New 
York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 36.
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and so of the relevance of culture, secular or otherwise, 
to theology and our understanding of God."32
While for Gilkey, "eschatology depends…on a positive 
relation of faith to present culture, and thus on an 
understanding of the activity of God in the present 
saeculum,"33 for Moltmann it is history that ultimately 
depends on eschatology. In Theology of Hope that which can 
be "experienced, remembered, and expected as 'history' is 
set and filled, revealed and fashioned, by promise" (TH 
106/DH 95). Gilkey's criticism addresses the contingent 
character of human history. The presence of God stands over 
against the rupture of creation. 
Along similar lines, the questionableness of creation 
for Moltmann leads to serious problems in his ethics 
according to James Gustafson. Gustafson argues that in 
Theology of Hope "the contingency of the creation rather 
than its orderliness is stressed... It is difficult to get 
much particular moral guidance from contingency."34
Gustafson reiterates and makes stronger this claim when he 
says that in Theology of Hope there are "no significant 
bases theologically, historically, or naturally for the 
                                                
32 Gilkey, "The Contribution of Culture to the Reign of God" 36.
33 Gilkey, "The Contribution of Culture to the Reign of God," 39.
34 James Gustafson, Theology and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1981), 45.
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guidance of human action."35 Gustafson understands that for 
Moltmann "ethics must be designed in such a way that it 
takes into account historical changes and the processes by 
which moral choices are made."36 Yet, Gustafson argues, 
there must be some continuity or stability in the 
principles that guide this process. Moltmann acknowledges 
this need, but it is "only in terms of a concrete future 
(that) ethical instants acquire continuity."37  This move 
does not solve the problem for Gustafson because this 
concrete future "is simply and only a relativization of all 
present things."38 The result is that Moltmann's ethic of 
kenosis ends up producing only an "empty openness"(HP 122). 
Gustafson believes that in the end Moltmann can only tell 
us that "things are not immutable; they can be changed. 
God, the future, makes possible hope and courage."39  
As Moltmann’s primary concern is for a practical 
theory, Gustafson’s critique, if on track, would be very 
disconcerting. If Moltmann’s thought offers little more 
than a rejection of the forsaken here and now, the moral 
direction of his theory would be difficult to uncover. In 
this reading, the necessity of creation's rupture to 
                                                
35 Gustafson, Theology and Ethics, 48.
36 Gustafson, Theology and Ethics, 46.
37 Gustafson, Theology and Ethics, 47.
38 Gustafson, Theology and Ethics, 47.
39 Gustafson, Theology and Ethics, 48.
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provide the opening for God's presence in Moltmann is a 
devaluation of creation. The anticipation by creation for 
the filling of the openness with the kingdom of God is 
illusory because the eschaton has been robbed of all its 
meaning in creation's negation. The negation of creation 
leads to a denial of God's presence in creation and the 
loss of any positive role for ethics. In Moltmann’s 
thought, the emptying of creation to make room for the 
coming of creation's Other is understood by Gilkey and 
Gustafson to be an abandonment of creation. The 
overwhelming presence of God in the future does not 
compensate for his absence from the present. 
Contrary to Gilkey's and Gustafson's reading of the 
eschatological openness of Theology of Hope is the emphasis 
Douglas Meeks places on Moltmann's understanding of the 
forsakenness of creation as a necessary step in a real 
process of reconciliation. In arguing that the doctrine of 
reconciliation is foundational to the theology of hope, 
Meeks counters Gilkey and Gustafson by holding that there 
is continuity within the discontinuity for Moltmann. Meeks 
sees Moltmann as pointing to the work of Christ as creating 
a space in which intimacy between God and creation can be 
established. Meeks asserts that "(h)ope, eschatology, 
promise, the future, the resurrection, the cross: from any 
30
particular perspective any one of these subjects might be 
considered the comprehensive designation of or the 
undeniable key to the theology of hope. None, however, is 
more than a crucial component of the overall dialectic of 
reconciliation." 40 Meeks maintains that for Moltmann "the 
event of the cross and resurrection creates a real process 
of reconciliation. Thus history... will be conceived as 
open to the coming reconciliation in the 'future of Christ' 
in God's kingdom."41 The revelation of Christ confronts 
creation in its tendency to close itself down to the 
possibilities of the future. The promise of Christ opens 
reality to the coming of the kingdom of God."42 The 
confrontation of creation by Christ means, as Bauckham 
asserts, "God's promise is not for another world, but for 
the new creation of this world" (emphasis his).43
When Meeks argues that "…creation is good. But it is 
full of possibilities for becoming worse or better, 
destroyed or perfected,"44 he is referring to creation's 
potential to be filled with its Other in intimacy or to 
isolate itself in narcissistic vanity. Only in remaining 
open can reality expect its fulfillment. The resurrection 
                                                
40 Meeks, Origins, 2.
41 Meeks, Origins, 98.
42 Meeks, Origins, 98.
43 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 9.
44 Meeks, Origins, 115
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of Jesus "is not already the eschatological fulfillment of 
reconciliation. Rather, it points beyond itself to 
something not yet realized or present."45 Jesus' 
resurrection is a promise to creation that it too will be 
redeemed from death. Meeks explains that for Moltmann 
"resurrection is... a term that has reference to the future 
realization of God's creative power over nonbeing."46 Hence, 
creation exists in the 'not yet' time of the present 
awaiting its perfection. 
It is this idea that the fulfillment of creation 
totally arrives from the future that prompts the concern 
over continuity. Here Meeks sees Moltmann’s position to be 
that "both a total distinction and a total identity between 
eschatology and history lead to meaninglessness and 
resignation."47 In other words, the contradictory movements 
of both differentiation and identity need to exist 
simultaneously. Hence, Meeks argues that for Moltmann new 
creation is new, but somehow creatio originalis continues 
within the newness. Meeks summarizes that in "the visions 
of the new acts in terms of the old acts of God always 
bring to life more than was present in the old acts."48
There was continuity within "the experience of the radical 
                                                
45 Meeks, Origins, 102.
46 Meeks, Origins, 98.
47 Meeks, Origins, 118.
48 Meeks, Origins, 75.
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contradiction... because God accomplished a faithful act of 
identification in it."49 Even creation's identity comes from 
the future. The openness of creation is the receptacle into 
which God "overspills” identity. However, creation itself 
is not lost as it empties itself of fragmentary fulfillment 
and opens itself to "the penetration of all things by the 
glory of God."50
Because God directs the process of reconciliation and 
brings identity and fulfillment to creation, Meeks does not 
understand Theology of Hope to be a complete devaluation of 
creation. The faithfulness of God assures creation's 
particularity. Lyle Dabney picks up on this reading when he 
contends that Theology of Hope is rooted in the later 
Barth's 'turn to the world' where Barth's earlier emphasis 
on the disparity between God and creation is complemented 
with a view of "God and creature standing together in 
Jesus."51
Both Meeks and Dabney see Moltmann as turning to 
creation in Theology of Hope. Both hold that in Moltmann's 
view of reconciliation Christ does not re-establish some 
                                                
49 Meeks, Origins, 78.
50 Meeks, Origins, 106. 
51 D. Lyle Dabney, "The Advent of the Spirit: The Turn to Pneumatology 
in the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann," The Asbury Theological Journal
48:1, Spring 1993, 83. In a similar statement, Meeks, Origins, affirms 
that "behind all of Moltmann's theology of hope is Barth's recovery of 
the reformed tradition's conception of reality in terms of covenant. 
According to this tradition, knowing God entails doing God's will"(43).
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line of continuity of being between God and creation.52 The 
person of faith must accept the promise of God's coming 
presence and live in anticipation of creation's renewal. 
Moltmann turns to creation because he affirms the necessity 
of creation's continuity in the new creation. Yet, this 
very promise of the future perfection of creation leads to 
the distrust of present creation and the feeling of 
homelessness. As persons trust in this promise, their ties 
with the God-forsaken world become loosened. Hope becomes 
"the unquiet in the heart of man" (TH 21/DH 17) which 
protects creation's openness. In the light of the promise, 
human history is revealed to be transitory and provisional. 
As a result, "those who hope in Christ can no longer put up 
with reality as it is, but... contradict it" (TH 21/DH 17). 
For Meeks, this means "from the point of view of 
faith... one finds the creative love of God only when he no 
longer creates himself out of status and achievement, but 
                                                
52 Eberhard Jüngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 
Press, 1976), 1, argues that Barth's discussion of God's being "takes 
place doubtless in the Christology of the Church Dogmatics, which 
therefore on this account not only determines the whole Dogmatics but 
accompanies it in the form of fundamental paragraphs. That part of the 
Church Dogmatics which especially deals with Christology is the 
doctrine of reconciliation."  Walter Lowe, Theology and Difference, 
contends that it is ethics' problematic nature in Barth which "can 
effect or reflect the 'great disturbance.' That is, ethics does not 
initiate the point of contact between God and creation. Rather, it is 
in the "persistent asking of questions" and the denial of answers, that 
ethics for Barth maintains a tension and ambiguity. Only in a context 
of such questionability can ethics refer to God”(137).
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recognizes himself in the miserable of the earth.”53 The 
conflict between hope and bodily reality expands and 
broadens creation's receptivity as it awaits complete 
fulfillment. In understanding Moltmann's ethics as pointing 
to the "questionableness of the world," (TH 86/DH 77) 
neither Meeks nor Dabney view Moltmann as rejecting 
creation. In stressing God's desire to indwell creation, 
Moltmann is seen as giving new value to the cosmos. For 
Moltmann, creation is valued, but only for what it can 
become through its Other. Creation has received the promise 
of offspring from God. 
Moltmann’s ability to talk both in an affirming and 
rejecting way about creation has led some to see a 
fundamental shift between his earlier stress on 
discontinuity in Theology of Hope between the creatio 
originalis and creatio nova and his apparent emphasis on 
continuity is his later works. William French follows 
Gilkey’s reading of the early Moltmann as rejecting 
creation, but French draws a line somewhere between the 
Moltmann of Theology of Hope and the Moltmann of God in 
Creation. In the earlier Moltmann there is a polarization 
"of history against nature, of eschatology against 
                                                
53 Meeks, Origins, 144. See also Meek's, Origins, statement that "for 
Moltmann, it is only in terms of the covenant otherness of God that man 
becomes aware of the profound misery in himself and his world"(153).
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creation, christology against cosmology, and the 
existentialist focus on decision, act and event against 
metaphysics and natural law."54 The result of this radical 
distinction between present and future has "led to 
destructive distortions of our notions about God's action 
in the world, the status of creation and our theological 
picture of the human person."55  In his review of God in 
Creation, French argues that when this book is "read 
against Moltmann's earlier works, this book displays a 
grand reversal of theological direction and sensibility, a 
seismic shift from a focus on history, eschatology, and 
'openness to the future' to one on nature, creation, and 
respect for 'dwelling' within the present."56  
French highlights the change he sees in Moltmann by 
contrasting passages from earlier works and God in 
Creation: "Where once [Moltmann] challenged us not to live 
in 'the world' as our 'home,' Moltmann now in God in 
Creation shifts direction to hold that the 'messianic 
promise' is that 'the world should be home.'"57 While 
holding in Theology of Hope "'all reality' is 'inadequate' 
                                                
54 William French, "Returning to Creation: Moltmann's Eschatology 
Naturalized" Journal of Religion 68, Jan. 1988, 78. See also Viggo 
Mortensen, "Schöpfungstheologie und Anthropologie" Evangelische 
Theologie 47, Sept.-Oct. 1987, 466-472 and Kjetil Hafstad, "Gott in der 
Natur" Evangelische Theologie 47 Sept.-Oct. 1987, 460-465.
55 French, 78.  
56 French, 79.
57 French, 80.
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and 'surpassable'" and describing “the world as 'Godless,' 
and reality as 'corrupt,'"58 later in God in Creation, 
Moltmann argues that "human history 'must be brought into 
harmony with the laws of life and the rhythm of nature.’"59
French concludes that in spite of "deep continuities," 
there is a "great sea of change that separates God in 
Creation from Moltmann's earlier agenda."60 In fact the sea 
of change is so great that French brings his analysis to a 
climax with his claim that "if Moltmann is right now, he 
was wrong then."61 Moltmann has substituted a new creation-
friendly cosmogony for the old cosmogony that devalued 
creation. 
To follow French's reading we would essentially have 
to say that there are two distinct positions in Moltmann's 
work, separated by a “great sea of change.” But such a 
reading, we will argue, fails to account for the underlying 
consistency throughout his entire corpus of central themes, 
first developed in the theology of hope.  Even if there may 
be something to the criticism that Moltmann lacks 
"philosophical analysis and logical rigor,"62 which could 
                                                
58 French, 81.
59 French, 81.
60 French, 81
61 French, 78.  
62 Bauckham, ,“Jürgen Moltmann” in The Modern Theologians: An 
Introduction to Christian Theology of the Twentieth Century, vol. 1, 
ed. D.F. Ford, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 308.
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easily lead to possible confusions, opting for French’s 
“seismic shift” in Moltmann fails to recognize the 
consistency by which Moltmann employs oppositional pairs to 
capture the dynamic nature of reality. These oppositional 
pairs -— or themes in “radical contradiction” as Meeks 
describes –- represent an essential differentiation of 
reality, but a differentiation which, at the same time, 
exhibits both an originary and consummatory unity. So while 
Moltmann may at times, for example, emphasize philia (love 
of like for like) over agape (love for the different) or 
divine absence over divine presence or creatio nova over 
creatio originalis, such points of emphasis do not in the 
least deny that both philia and agape are, however 
contradictory, movements of a single divine love. In this 
reading, I differ from McDougall’s recent interpretation of 
Moltmann’s view of love. She pays little attention to 
philia and instead focuses on agape as “the biblical 
principle of love.”63 She is more concerned with the 
distinction of “creative love” and “crucified love” in 
Moltmann’s conception of agape. In so doing, she under-
emphasizes the dialectical structure of Moltmann’s thought.
                                                
63  Joy Ann McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love: Moltmann on the Trinity and 
Christian Life, (Oxford: AAR/Oxford University Press, 2005), 44.
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In contrast, Richard Bauckham (as well as Meeks) does 
acknowledge the play between opposites when he asserts 
"apparent major changes of direction in Moltmann usually 
turn out, on closer study of his work, to be deeply rooted 
in an essentially continuous development of his thought."64
Moltmann himself talks about his work in this way. While he 
readily acknowledges the tension between early and later 
works and even within a given work, he certainly does not 
understand any shift in emphasis to be a radical departure 
from his theology of hope.65 Nowhere does Moltmann admit to 
departing from a theology of hope. Moltmann views any shift 
in focus as necessary in his attempt to adequately describe 
the nature of reality. For example, the shift from Theology 
of Hope’s emphasis on the forsakenness of creation to God 
in Creation’s emphasis on creation as home is explained as 
necessary because "always to stress only the distinction 
                                                
64 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 214. 
65 See Moltmann's reflection on his theological career in History and 
the Triune God in which he declares "I did not attempt to write these 
books as theological textbooks, informative on all sides, balanced in 
judgment and reassuring in wisdom. In them I wanted to say something 
specific in a particular cultural, theological and political situation, 
and took sides" (HTG 173). As stated in the introduction of this work, 
Moltmann considers his work in three phases, not as three separate 
theologies. The wide range of topics and conversational partners 
results in different emphases. Some inconsistency, or lack of rigor, 
results because, to use Rorty's distinction, Moltmann is a 'world-
revealer' and not a 'problem-solver.'
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between God and the world in the doctrine of creation is to 
adopt a one-sided approach…"(HTG 133).66
1e Contradictory Monism
My own take on this state of affairs is that it is a 
unique trait of Moltmann’s position that he stresses 
simultaneously both continuity and discontinuity. As Meeks, 
I believe rightly noted, Moltmann believes that emphasizing 
both “total distinction and total identity between 
eschatology and history lead to meaninglessness and 
resignation.”67 Rather both the distinction of discontinuity 
and the continuity of identity need to be held on to in and 
through their contradiction. It is this simultaneous 
opposition and harmony – unity in opposition – that is the 
characterizing and integrative feature of Moltmann’s 
cosmogony. For Moltmann the reality of the cosmos is 
inherently contradictory. Indeed, I want to suggest that 
Moltmann’s complex thought especially comes into coherent 
and fruitful focus when it is seen as a cosmic coincidence 
                                                
66 Dabney, “Advent” picks up on this reading when he contends that 
Theology of Hope is rooted in the later Barth's 'turn to the world' 
where Barth's earlier emphasis on the disparity between God and 
creation is complemented with a view of "God and creature standing 
together in Jesus”(83).
67  Meeks, Origin, 118.
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of opposites, a position that in this thesis I will call 
“contradictory monism” following the lead of the Dutch 
historian of philosophy D.H.T. Vollenhoven. According to 
Vollenhoven, as Calvin Seerveld helpfully elaborates, 
“contradictory monism” (coincidentia oppositorum) is a type 
of thought that has a long history in western thought, 
recurring in various thinkers such as Heraclitus, Cusanus, 
Eckart, and Hegel.68
In contradictory monism, reality is, as James Olthuis 
explains, caught up in "the cosmic process (that) is 
inherently contradictory and eternally recurring."69 There 
are two horizontal currents continually and eternally 
occurring. The movements concurrently run counter as "the 
universal cosmic law realizes itself in a process of 
differentiation" even as "there is the process in the 
opposite direction of a return to the universal origin and 
unity."70 In contradictory/harmonic monism, the direction of 
differentiation is usually considered to be "the direction 
                                                
68 See Calvin Seerveld’s “Biblical Wisdom Underneath Vollenhoven’s 
Categories for Philosophical Historiography.” Philosophia Reformata 38, 
1973, 127-43, for a helpful presentation of contradictory monism 
understood historically. In understanding Moltmann through these 
categories I am following the work of Brian Walsh in "Theology of Hope 
and the Doctrine of Creation: An Appraisal of Jürgen Moltmann." 
Evangelical Quarterly LIX, 1 (January 1987) and in his review “Jürgen 
Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God,” Christian Scholar’s 
Review XII, 3 (1984).
69 James H. Olthuis, Models of Humankind in Theology and Psychology, 
(Toronto: ICS, 1990) 29.
70 Olthuis, Models, 29.
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of time, of immediate experience, and of ordinary life.”71
The originary unity mutates into a plurality within 
temporal reality. The dynamic processes of time result in 
the differentiation of the universal into the particulars. 
The second concurrent movement is towards unity. In this 
direction, the experience is of the "wholly other, of a 
different direction, eternal, trans-personal and sacred.”72
The direction of the eternal manifests the originary and 
ultimate unity that makes this position monistic. When the 
movement of unity is revealed within differentiated reality 
"ordinary human experience becomes something else, divine, 
yet it remains itself."73 The issue at hand in 
contradictory/harmonic monism is the relationship between 
the two movements. The model of reality allows for, even 
emphasizes, a recognition of unity and plurality and of 
sameness and difference, the plurality/difference exists 
for the sake of a greater unity/sameness.    
  In this thesis, faced with the kind of interpretive 
conundrums and puzzles that beset readers of Moltmann’s 
corpus, I will set out to show how understanding Moltmann’s 
thought (in its own unique way) as a cosmic coincidence of 
opposites, not only is able to help reconcile divergent 
                                                
71 Olthuis, Models, 29.
72 Olthuis, Models, 29.
73 Olthuis, Models, 29.
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readings, but positively delivers a consistent and coherent 
reading of his theological cosmogony. A preliminary list of 
opposing realities is given here as a guide to the 
development of our argument:
Moltmann’s Coincidence of Opposites
godforsaken present      God-filled future
creatio originalis       creatio nova
abandonment fulfillment
futurum adventus
sending gathering
difference sameness
kenosis theosis
agape philia
Figure 174
1f Outline of Chapters
Consequently, chapter two will concentrate on 
explicating Moltmann’s critique of classical monotheism and 
the various attempts to make sense of the Trinity from a 
starting point which (over)stresses unity and immutability. 
After rejecting what he calls the “god of Parmenides,” 
Moltmann begins to craft a relational model of God 
appealing to a dynamic understanding of reality which 
                                                
74   This list is adapted from Nicholas Ansell, The Annihilation of Hell: 
Universal Salvation and the Redemption of Time in the Eschatology of 
Jürgen Moltmann, Ph.d. thesis, Vrije Universitat-Amsterdam, 2005. My 
reading of Moltmann draws upon Ansell’s understanding of  Moltmann’s 
‘theocosmogony.’
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manifests itself in perichoresis. In chapter three, the 
notion of perichoresis as divine love is unfolded. 
Moltmann, again using his ability to assert contradictory 
states of affairs, differentiates between two types of 
divine love, philia (love of the same) and agape (love of 
the different). This distinction allows Moltmann to stress 
both the safe, ongoing relations among the “same” members 
of the Trinity and the need for God to create a “different” 
other which comes to be in a forsaken place. Hence, 
creation is simultaneously within the perichoretic divine 
community and abandoned by God. 
Chapters four and five examine forsaken creation’s 
movement away from God which is concurrently God’s 
eschatological movement towards creation and the 
(re)filling of creation with his presence. Chapter four 
does so by looking at Moltmann’s doctrine of Jesus Christ 
and his take on the incarnation, crucifixion and 
resurrection. In the revelation of Jesus Christ, Moltmann 
most clearly sees the oppositional movements of reality. 
From the historical direction, Jesus Christ is the 
crucified God who displays the Hell of abandonment. From 
the eschatological direction, Jesus Christ is the risen Son 
who gives the promise of life to a creation which now lives 
in anticipation of God’s final arrival. In chapter five, 
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God’s arrival in creation as a cosmic perichoresis is 
scrutinized. While reality is described by two 
simultaneous, oppositional movements, in this chapter I 
argue that, in the end, he gives privilege to the unifying, 
eschatological movement. Problems surface as Moltmann faces 
difficulties in asserting that there is room for creational 
differences as he had previously argued that such
differences were only possible if God withdrew and thereby 
ceded a space within the divine community. Without an 
adequate account of difference, the analogy between divine 
subjectivity and human subjectivity is severely weakened. 
Chapter six is concerned with the ethical implications 
drawn from intra-trinitarian life. Moltmann’s understanding 
of the church’s call to witness through an anticipatory, 
self-sacrificing, non-violent life is rooted in his model 
of God, his view of creation and the (dis)connection 
between them. However, his ethic allows for the possibility 
of self-assertion and even violence. When and how such acts 
are permissible is, to say the least, ambiguous. Even more 
unclear is how such acts are to be reconciled with the 
analogia relationis he has worked so hard to establish.
In the final chapter, I attempt to bring together the 
questions and concerns which have emerged throughout the 
study. In a world of violence and hatred, how does one 
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embody the kenotic relations of the Trinity? When faced 
with violence, we are to give ourselves sacrificially away 
to the violent other not knowing what to expect. Such a 
counter-cultural move is the only way to work towards the 
reclamation of the (violent) other.
However, for Moltmann, sometimes in the mess of daily 
life and its violence, we can choose to be guilty and not 
be sacrificial. But when? Moltmann’s proposal of copying 
God provides, I propose, precious little detail here. 
In spite of the many genuine insights and helpful 
critiques in Moltmann’s work, in the end, attempting to 
locate a social program for human life within trinitarian 
life appears to create more problems than it solves. 
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Chapter 2
Mutual Perichoresis: 
From Divine Apathy to Divine Passion 
Jürgen Moltmann’s “theology of the divine passion” (TK 
57) is founded in John’s assertion that “God is love” (I 
John 4:16). “Love is self-evident for God,” which means 
that “we have to say that the triune God loves the world 
with the very same love that he himself is” (TK 151). At 
the heart of the gospel of love are the sufferings and 
death of Christ for the reconciliation of the world. 
Indeed, to separate the love of God “from the event on 
Golgotha” is to make it “false” (TK 160). Christians are 
people who, in faith, believe in God for Christ’s sake. And 
in so doing, they believe that “God himself is involved in 
the history of Christ’s passion” (TK 21).75
However, as Moltmann looked at the history of 
Christian theology he was troubled that, in the main, “most 
theologians have simultaneously maintained the passion of 
Christ, God’s Son, and the deity’s essential incapacity for 
suffering – even though it was at the price of having to 
talk paradoxically about the ‘sufferings of the God who 
                                                
75 Here it is evident that Moltmann is indebted to Barth. See David L. 
Mueller, Foundation of Karl Barth's Doctrine of Reconciliation: Jesus 
Christ Crucified and Risen, Toronto Studies in Theology, vol. 54 
(Queenston, On: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990). See Moltmann’s critique 
of Barth as “not sufficiently trinitarian” (CG 203ff.).
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cannot suffer’” (TK 22).76 For Moltmann, this is a startling 
“contradiction,” an unsatisfactory contradiction that 
remains to this day – one that he set out to remedy. “If 
God is incapable of suffering, then… God is inevitably 
bound to become the cold, silent and unloved heavenly 
power”77 (TK 22). For “a God who cannot suffer cannot love 
either.78 A God who cannot love is a dead God” (TK 38). To 
avoid such an end, Moltmann believes that “Christian 
theology is essentially compelled to perceive God himself 
in the passion of Christ, and to discover the passion of 
Christ in God” (TK 22).
                                                
76 P.S. Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1988), identifies four major influences leading to divine suffering 
becoming a focal point for contemporary theology: These theological 
trends include reflection upon: 1) The passion of Christ. 2) The nature 
of divine love. 3) The problem of human suffering. 4) Viewing the world 
as process. Each of these is be readily identifiable in Moltmann’s 
work.
77 The rejection of God as essentially apathetic involves a significant 
departure from the western theological tradition for Moltmann. While 
the notion of a suffering God is not unknown in western thought, it has 
never been widely accepted. See the first chapter of A. van Egmond, De
Lijdende God in De Britse Theologie van De Negentiende Eeuw (Amsterdam: 
VU Uitgeverij, 1986) for an overview of the various theopaschitic 
movements in the Christian tradition.  It is interesting to note that 
two of the four movements identified by van Egmond have occurred 
recently; one in Britain at the turn of the century (Newmann, Maurice, 
McLeod Campbell and Gore) and the other in contemporary modern theology 
in Germany (Barth, Bonhoeffer, Sölle, Jüngel, and Moltmann). See also 
Marcel Sarot, “Het Lijden Van God?,” Nederlands Theologisch Tildschift
44 (1990), 40-50.
78  Hans Boersma, Violence, Hospitality and the Cross (Grand Rapids: 
Baker, 2004) has an excellent introduction to the postmodern concerns 
regarding God and violence. Boersma examines traditional atonement 
theories in light of these concerns. Moltmann’s work, I think, would be 
subject to some of the postmodern concerns regarding violence as 
articulated by Derrida and Levinas even though he moves away from the 
traditional atonement theories  
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In other words, Christian theology needs to start 
“from the axiom of God’s passion” (TK 22).79 Understanding 
“the scriptures as the testimony to the history of the 
Trinity’s relations of fellowship”(TK 149)—“from the three 
Persons of the history of Christ” (TK 149) – Moltmann 
argues that Christian theology is called to develop a 
“trinitarian hermeneutics” (TK 19) fully and firmly founded 
in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. “If 
one conceives of the Trinity as an event of love in the 
suffering and death of Jesus –- and that is something which 
faith must do – then the Trinity is no self-contained group 
in heaven, but an eschatological process open for men on 
earth, which stems from the cross of Christ” (CG 249).80
                                                
79 Compare Wolfhart Pannenberg in Theologie und Reich Gottes, 
Gütersloher, 1971 and Systematic Theology v. I-II (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1991, 1994) for similarities in his use of divine love as the 
starting point for his discussion of divine life. In chapter 3 of his 
Relationality and the Concept of God (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), Henry 
Jansen offers an excellent comparison and contrast between the two 
thinkers. He concludes that Pannenberg understands love in ontological 
terms while Moltmann uses a psychological understanding. 
80  In the chapter “The Unchangeableness of God,” T.F. Torrance, The 
Christian Doctrine of God, One Being Three Persons (Edinnburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1996), has an excellent discussion on the passibility of God. 
Here he summarizes Moltmann’s view of the active suffering of God 
(248): “In his overflowing love he allies himself with his people in 
their afflictions and takes them upon himself in order to reverse their 
suffering and redeem them from it.” Torrance points to a comparison 
with Isa. 63:9ff. But in the passage as a result of Israel’s rejection 
of the Spirit, God becomes Israel’s enemy. Moltmann could make sense of 
this rejection by appealing to the two contradictory movements, but in 
this view Moltmann argues for a redemption of and through evil not a 
redemption from evil.
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To develop an understanding of the Trinity as an 
“event of love” has been – and is – the passion and genius 
of Moltmann’s thought.
In this chapter, we will begin to lay out the general 
contours of Moltmann’s trinitarian hermeneutics. However, 
to sharpen our sense of the distinctiveness and creativity 
of Moltmann’s “social doctrine of the Trinity,” it is 
important to attend to the historical doctrines of the 
Trinity that he believes need to be discarded and replaced: 
the “trinity of substance,” and the “trinity of subject.”81   
2a Trinity of Substance
“The Western tradition,” so judges Moltmann, “began 
with God’s unity and then went on to ask about the trinity” 
(TK 19). This in effect is to start “from the philosophical 
postulate of absolute unity” (TK 149) which leads to 
considering the unity of God to be a “homogeneous 
substance” or an “identical subject” (TK 19). 
                                                
81 See Ted Peters, God as Trinity (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 
1993). Chapter two, “A Map of Contemporary Issues” is especially 
helpful in identifying the significant issues in current trinitarian 
thought. See also Roger Olson and Christopher Hall, The Trinity (Grand 
Rapids, MI.: Eerdmans, 2002) and David Coffey, Deus Trinitas: the 
Doctrine of the Triune God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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This preference for unity is rooted in theology’s 
acceptance of the pre-Socratic notion of ousia.82 For
Moltmann the absolute unity of ousia eliminates the 
possibility of the differentiation of ultimate reality, and 
without such a differentiation the doctrine of the Trinity, 
and with it Christology, becomes unthinkable. Another 
difficulty for Moltmann in depicting God as ousia is found 
in Greek monotheism’s preference for actuality, which 
conceives the divine being as essentially static. For 
Moltmann, such an understanding closes down the future. And 
resulting from the closure of the future is the loss of 
hope. The inability to reconcile ousia with what Moltmann 
conceives as the biblical view of God leads him to 
overthrow the ontology of the actual.83
Greek monotheism begins with a conception of God 
rooted in an analogia entis which Moltmann understands as 
placing God and humanity on a continuum of being. An 
                                                
82 See Colin Gunton’s discussion of the relationship of unity and 
diversity in The One, the Three and the Many: God, Creation, and the 
Culture of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) in 
which he offers a slightly different critique of the philosophical 
tradition.
83 For a postmodern critique of the idea of God as actual see Richard 
Kearney’s, The God Who May Be (Bloomington, In.: Indiana University 
Press, 2001), argument that it may be more helpful to think of God as 
the possibility of the impossible. Kearney appeals to an eschatological 
notion of the possible.  The openness he suggests towards that which 
should be is more ambiguous than Moltmann’s guarantee of divine 
fulfillment. Also see Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, trans. Thomas 
Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) who hesitates to 
think of God as Being, even a relational one.
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analogy is developed between divine ousia and created 
ousia.84 In spite of understanding both divine and non-
divine realities as forms of being, divine nature is 
conceptualized by emphasizing the difference between divine 
being and the cosmos. By not beginning with the self-
revelation of the divine being, the descriptions of divine 
nature found in Greek monotheism are arrived at by negating 
“certain characteristics of the finite cosmos” (TK 11). The 
experiences of the cosmos in terms of change and plurality 
are rejected as unworthy of the divine. Greek monotheism 
privileges an other-worldly unity and immutability. The via 
negativa of Greek thought leads to understanding the divine 
nature as “one, necessary, immovable, unconditional, 
immortal, and impassible” (TK 11).
The notion of the God given here is static. The 
description of the divine being is arrived at by using a 
negation of the cosmos.  Moltmann expands what he means by 
calling the divine being “the God of Parmenides” (TH 28). 
The divine being is cast in terms of the present, of that 
which “’is’ all at one and in one” (TH 28). Here in 
emphasizing the actuality of God, God becomes thinkable, 
but “non-existence, movement and change, history and future 
                                                
84 Powell, The Trinity, 198, argues that Barth and Moltmann both reject 
“the speculative-analogical approach to the Trinity…”
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become unthinkable” (TH 28). The God who is understood as 
totally present is a thing “that has no past or future” (TH 
29).85  
Early Christianity’s adoption of Greek monotheism was, 
at least partially, a consequence of granting natural 
theology a priority in describing God.86 In this approach, 
first comes "general, natural theology; the special 
theology of revelation comes afterward" (TK 17).87 When 
Christianity adopts this methodology, the effect is that 
natural theology "draws the special Christian picture of 
God" (TK 17). Supplementing the picture of God given by 
natural theology is not easy as, "natural theology's 
definitions of the nature of the deity quite obviously 
become a prison for the statements made by the theology of 
revelation" (TK 17).
                                                
85 Kearney’s, The God Who May Be (83ff.), reading of Aristotle’s 
category of the possible is helpful here in thinking about God as other 
than actual.
86 William Rusch, The Trinitarian Controversy (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1980) examines the doctrine of the Trinity as it develops in the 
early church beginning with the apostolic fathers. The tensions already 
present in conceiving the Trinity are evident. Roger Olson’s The Story 
of Theology: Twnety Centuries of Tradition and Reform (Downers Grove, 
Ill.: Intervarsity Press, 1999) also underscores the issues around the 
impact of Greek thought on the Trinity is a more popular way.
87 LaCugna, God for Us (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991), 34ff. gives 
us a picture of the early church’s struggle with these issues in her 
discussion Arius’ view.  See also Michael Hanby, “Desire: Augustine 
beyond Western subjectivity” in Radical Orthodoxy (London: Routledge, 
1999). Augustine view of the Trinity is much debated on the issues of 
unity and possibility. Gunton understand him to be the source of many 
of the problems that have plagued the Trinity. Hanby has a more 
favorable view.  
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The priority given to the categories of natural 
theology by classical monotheism results in: "the 
metaphysical characteristics of the supreme substance are 
determined on the basis of the cosmological proofs of God" 
(TK 17). Such an effort is rooted in a privileging of 
sameness so that such knowledge of God "only advances these 
correspondences of being to correspondences in knowledge" 
(TK 210). Beginning considerations of God by emphasizing 
connections between God and creation implies a shared 
participation by God and creation in the same overarching 
category of being or substance. According to Moltmann, in 
monotheism, the differentiation between God and creation 
only comes after the initial acknowledgment of unity. 
Distinguishing divine substance from created substance then 
makes possible the differentiation between God and 
creation. The consequence is "what is divine is defined by 
certain characteristics of the finite cosmos, and these are 
marked by negation. That is the via negativa"(TK 11). The 
distinction is made in a manner in which it can be said 
"that the world is dependent on God, but that God is not 
dependent on the world"(TK 158). A metaphysical opposition 
is set up between God and the world in which "the world is 
evanescent, God is non-evanescent; the world is temporal, 
God is eternal; the world is passible, God is impassible; 
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the world is dependent, God is independent" (TK 158).88
Moltmann concludes “it is obvious that these distinctions 
in the metaphysical doctrine of the two natures are derived 
from experience of the world, not from experience of God” 
(TK 23). 
The order in approaching divine ousia from the diverse 
and changing finite reality is clear: "first of all come 
the proof and the assurance that there is a God and that 
God is one" (TK 17). By starting with natural theology, the 
                                                
88 Henry Jansen, "Moltmann's View of God's (Im)mutability: The God of 
the Philosophers and the God of the Bible" Neue Zeitschrift für 
systmatische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 36 (1994), 284-301, 
discusses Moltmann's case against 'strong' immutability. Jansen 
concludes from his study that "arguments for or against any version of 
'strong' immutability depend on grounds other than an appeal to 
scripture” (300-301). The argument directed against Moltmann appears 
again in Relationality and the Concept of God (139ff.). Jansen argues 
that Moltmann's claim that the idea of immutability does not reflect 
'the God of scripture' is not self-evident. Christopher Morse, The 
Logic of Promise (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), like Jansen, 
notes in describing Moltmann's constancy that "...in revelation it is 
not God's transcendent selfhood which is revealed but God's self-
sameness in historical faithfulness was articulated in the ideas of 
impassibility and immutability faithfulness." In classical monotheism, 
the very distinction which is necessary to maintain the difference 
between Creator and creature is lost if God is understood to be capable 
of change and suffering.  Bauckham explains "(c)riticism of Moltmann's 
doctrine of God has claimed that, in rejecting the traditional 
doctrines of divine aseity and impassibility, he compromises the 
freedom of God and falls into the 'Hegelian' mistake of making world 
history the process by which he realizes himself" ("Moltmann" 308). In 
this tradition, losing the oppositional attributes of divine substance 
and created substance means losing the difference between God and 
creator as substance becomes homogeneous. Given such a framework, God's 
essentially differentiated would be a God who has fallen from the 
eternal realm and could not be distinguished from mutable, diverse, 
created substance. In attempting to define God as dynamic, it is 
interesting to see how the notion of unchangeability creeps back into 
the discussion. God is not viewed as occasionally or arbitrarily 
dynamic but permanently dynamic. As Lowe, Theology and Difference,
explains "the banished vocabulary is thus reintroduced as clarification 
or supplement at the very center of the purportedly purified domain" 
(14). 
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characteristics of “one, necessary, immovable, 
unconditional, immortal, and impassible” (TK 11) become the 
prison in which divine nature must reside. As a result, 
Christianity is forced to build its understanding of inner-
Trinitarian life upon the foundation of the Parmenidian 
one. In this tradition, there is great difficulty, even 
impossibility, in moving from God as one and actual to 
understanding the differentiation of divine being into 
Father, Son, and Spirit. In allowing natural theology to 
define the nature of God, Christianity has uncritically 
accepted monotheism’s inability to be essentially 
Trinitarian. This failure yields a truncated perspective of 
divine life.89
While he acknowledges the impetus, and even 
usefulness, for the early churches' adoption of 
monotheistic language, the concern now is for the danger 
Greek monotheism poses for Christianity.90 The influence of 
                                                
89 The fear, on the other hand, of not privileging unity in concepts of 
God is the emergence of a tritheism. H. Blocher, “Immanence and 
Transcendence in Trinitarian Theology” in The Trinity in a Pluralistic 
Age (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997) points out that “the trend toward 
“social’ views of the Trinity looks dangerously unaware of the gravity 
of tritheism” (107). The charge of tritheism has been leveled against 
Moltmann. For example, see T. Peters’, “Trinity Talk: Part I.” Dialog 
26 (1987), 44-47, discussion on this point. This discussion also 
appears in God as Trinity (109ff.). Peters suggests that Moltmann's 
anti-monotheism may be fostering a misunderstanding that is pushing him 
unnecessarily toward the non-existent tritheistic camp. 
90 As LaCugna, God for Us, points out “Kaspar and Moltmann think that 
modalism or a weak theism, not latent tritheism, is the dominant danger 
in today’s theology of God” (254).
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Greek monotheism must be challenged as "once it is 
introduced into the doctrine and worship of the Christian 
church, faith in Christ is threatened"(TK 131). The church 
needs "to see monotheism as the severest inner danger" (TK 
131). The danger of monotheism for Christianity is that it 
"obliges us to think of God without Christ, and 
consequently to think of Christ without God as well" (TK 
131) and, in light of his more recent work, we could also 
say it obliges us to lose the Spirit.
The church’s adoption of monotheism, understood in 
terms of ousia, manifests itself in the doctrine of the 
Trinity articulated by the early church fathers. 
Tertullian’s classic formulation una substantia – tres 
personae has been the most influential in western thought. 
With the attempted synthesis of the Greek static God and 
the dynamic nature of the Trinity, problems arose. The 
unwarranted privileging of unity and actuality is the basis 
for Moltmann's rejection of Tertullian's formulation of God 
as supreme substance, as both the Son and Spirit are 
ultimately subordinated to the Father. Moltmann maintains 
that while Tertullian did argue for a trinitarian 
differentiation, the differentiation did not hold, as "the 
Father is at the same time the whole divine substance" (TK 
138). Moltmann interprets Tertullian as holding that "the 
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original One would then only differentiate itself in a 
trinitarian sense, in order to complete and perfect itself 
into the All-One" (TK 138).  Tertullian's position resulted 
in a view in which "God is only to be thought of in 
trinitarian terms where his creative and redemptive self-
communication is concerned and not for his own sake" (TK 
138). 
Starting with a monotheistic conception of God means 
the Trinity can only be understood to be accidental to 
God's nature. God "as he really is" is one. The trinitarian 
differentiation only takes place in God's 
creative/redemptive relationship with creation. In 
Tertullian's understanding of God, as in any version of 
monotheism, "the category of unity prevails over the 
triunity"(TK, 138). Western Christianity's acceptance of 
Tertullian's substantial formulation of the Trinity has led 
to Christian theology's constant struggle in 
differentiating between the members of the Trinity. The 
result is that classical Western Christianity has lifted 
the Father above the Son and Spirit. The inability of 
western Christianity to differentiate between the biblical 
attestations of Father, Son, and Spirit follows from this 
adoption of monotheism because in monotheism the divine 
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oneness can "neither be parted nor imparted. It is 
ineffable" (TK 131).
In this case, the unity of God is thought of as 
“neuter, as the terms ousia or substantia suggest” (TK 
149). However, when the unity of the three distinct persons 
lies in the “homogeneity of the divine substance, which is 
common to them all “(TK 149), there is a huge problem that 
leads “unintentionally, but inescapably to … [an] abstract 
monotheism” (TK 17). In terms of biblical testimony, the 
unity of the three Persons must be understood “as a 
communicable unity… an open, inviting unity, capable of 
integration” (TK 149). However, the “homogeneity of the 
divine substance is hardly conceivable as communicable and 
open for anything else, because then it would no longer be 
homogeneous” (TK 150). 
For Moltmann, the problem of the homogeneity of the 
divine substance most poignantly shows up in the fact that 
it led the tradition to adopt the “axiom of God’s apathy
which “exclude[s] difference, diversity, movement and 
suffering from the divine nature” (TK 21). 
Insoluble problems arise for Christianity when it 
attempts to understand the Trinity from a basis that 
privileges oneness because "the strict notion of the one 
God makes theological christology impossible"(TK 131). In 
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the strict unity of monotheism, the Son's suffering is kept 
from the Father's inner life. Therefore, strict monotheism 
must hold that the Father was not fully present with the 
Son on the cross. 
2b Monotheism and the Loss of Christ
Flowing from the problem of early Christianity’s 
overemphasis on unity and actuality is a concern about 
relationality. Moltmann asks the poignant question: "How 
can Christian faith understand Christ's passion as being 
the revelation of God, if the deity cannot suffer?"(TK
21).91 As a result of the adoption of monotheism by 
Christianity, "Christ must either recede into the series of 
prophets, giving way to the one God, or he must disappear 
into the One God as one of his manifestations" (TK 131). In 
either case, the suffering of Christ is kept from the inner 
being of God. Monotheism prevents suffering from entering 
inner-trinitarian relations and thereby places indifference 
at the heart of divine being. Moltmann rejects this 
apathetic conception of God offered by classical monotheism 
as it stands in contradiction to the God who is revealed 
through Christ in salvation history. For classical 
                                                
91 The theology of the cross demands the conclusion that "the passion of 
Christ also affects God himself and becomes the Passion of 
God"(“Passion” 23).
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monotheism to incorporate salvation history the cross must 
lead to a deep division within God and yet must maintain an 
immutable unity. The result is the paradox "God died the 
death of the Godless on the cross and yet did not die. God 
is dead and yet is not dead" (CG 244).
The problem with a Parmenidian God is not only that it 
fails to correspond to the inner-trinitarian life of the 
biblical God. The failure is replicated when one attempts 
to speak about the relationship between God and creation in 
such a model. The non-relationality of the static God loses 
the dynamic connection between God and creation. As God 
becomes “thinkable,” creation and its history become 
unthinkable. Because reality is closed down as the 
actuality of the divine being is stressed, “this god does 
not make a meaningful experience of history possible, but 
only the meaningful negation of history” (TH 29). The 
significance of creation, and particularly humanity, fades 
as God is only understood through their negation. With a 
static notion of God, human faith and love are “timeless 
acts which remove us out of time” (TH 30).  
In the end, for Moltmann, both the biblical God and 
creation are lost when the God of classical monotheism 
fails to account for differentiation and thereby to account 
for relationality. Moltmann attempts to rescue 
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relationality for both God and creation by rejecting the 
notion of divine ousia and the analogia entis built upon it 
as the starting point for a model of the biblical God.92
2c Trinity of Subject
Since Hegel, surmises Moltmann, the Trinity has been 
largely conceived in terms of the “absolute subject: one 
subject – three modes of being” (TK 17).93 However, 
stressing the unity of the absolute subject leads once 
again “unintentionally but inescapably to… monotheism” (TK 
18). For “the sameness and the identity of the absolute 
subject is not communicable either, let alone open for 
                                                
92 Jansen, Relationality and the Concept of God, 
concludes that in Moltmann “one philosophical 
understanding of God has been substituted for another” 
(148). Heraclitus has replaced Parmenides. This allows 
Moltmann to rightly highlight some aspects of God but as 
Jansen points out “the Scriptural account of God is more 
ambiguous than Moltmann would have it” (148). Also see 
R. Otto, “God and History in Jürgen Moltmann.” Journal 
of the Evangelical Theology Society 35 (1992), 81-90. If 
"faith means ... to cross over the boundaries of given 
reality and to live in the project of hope" -- that is, 
to transcend toward the possible -- and if "the 
opposition of hope and experience, consciousness and 
being, essence and reality is always the driving force 
of ethical thought and historic action, then it becomes 
extremely difficult to see what significance God and 
Christ can possibly have in Moltmann's theology. Marxism 
has clearly propounded a philosophy of history in 
virtually the same terms without any use of "God"”(383).
93 In TK, Moltmann has an extended section on Barth’s view of the 
Trinity as an example of the absolute subject. See also Bauckham’s, 
“Jürgen Moltmann and the Question of Pluralism” (156ff.), for an 
examination of Moltmann’s critique of Barth and Christian monotheism. 
W. Waite Willis’ chapter on the “The Eschatological Trinity” in Theism, 
Atheism, and the Doctrine of the Trinity (Atlanta: Scholars Press
Atlanta, 1987) is also helpful on this point. LaCugna, God For Us,
traces the relationship between Barth and Moltmann’s thought in her 
discussion of persons in relation (253ff.).  
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anything else, because it would then be charged with non-
identity and difference” (TK 150).
Biblically speaking, this is again problematic for 
Moltmann. For the “absolute subject of nominalist and 
Idealist philosophy is… incapable of suffering; otherwise 
it would not be absolute” (TK 21). Once again we have an 
“[i]mpassible, immovable, united and self-sufficient” (TK 
21) deity. However, for Moltmann, only an inclusive concept 
of unity that is open and inviting is true to the biblical 
witness. The Bible reveals a suffering God who is the same 
“as he is in his saving revelation as he is in himself” (TK 
151). 
Moltmann’s conclusion is clear: “If philosophical 
logic is the starting point, the enquirer proceeds from the 
One God” (TK 149) and we end with a flock of problems. 
“If,” on the other hand, “we search for a concept of unity 
corresponding to the biblical testimony of the triune God, 
the God who unites with himself, then we must dispose with 
both the concept of the one substance and the concept of 
the identical subject” (TK 150). Heretofore theologians 
have “simply added together Greek philosophy’s ‘apathy’ 
axiom and the central statements of the gospel” (TK 22). It 
is time for this to stop. We need to stop making “the axiom 
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of God’s apathy our starting point,” and begin instead 
“from the axiom of God’s passion” (TK 22).
2d The Social Trinity  
For Moltmann (along with many other recent Trinitarian 
theologians) the concept of sociality or relationality has 
been embraced as a welcome alternative to a metaphysics of 
substance in which God was conceived to be a solitary 
single individual in splendid isolation, disengaged, and 
incapable of suffering. In contrast to understanding the 
Trinity as an abstract speculative construction of the
interior of a distant deity, the doctrine of the Trinity as 
the story of God’s threeness-in-oneness is the story of 
God’s intimate relation with creation, time, and history.94
The cross and the resurrection are not only the supreme 
acts of reconciliation; they are the acts of God’s self-
constitution within history as triune. In summary, “[w]hat 
happened on the cross was an event between God and God. It 
was a deep division in God himself, in so far as God 
abandoned God and contradicted himself, and at the same 
                                                
94 John Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 33, notes the eschatological, and therefore 
dynamic, nature of God for Moltmann when he summarizes that God’s 
becoming in Moltmann “points forward to a Trinity at the end in 
glorification.” See also Gerald O’Collins, The Tripersonal God: 
Understanding and Interpreting the Trinity (New York: Paulist Press,
1999).
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time, a unity in God in so far as God was at one with God 
and corresponded to himself” (CG 244).
2e Love as the Giving of Oneself
The development of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity 
as an event of love is founded in the tenet that God is 
love. For Moltmann, exegeting the phrase "God is love," 
means God is "engendering and creative love. He 
communicates himself to his like and to his Other” (TK 59). 
As such, “love is the power of self-identification” and 
“self-differentiation” (TK 57). In defining love this way, 
Moltmann emphasizes its relational nature. Love is “the 
self-communication of the good. It is the power of good to 
go out of itself, to enter into other being, to participate 
in other being, and to give itself for other being” (TK 
57). Love involves the donation of and by the self. Hence, 
“love cannot be consummated by a solitary subject” (TK 57). 
Love involves an exchange between self and Other. For 
donation involves not only the giver but also the 
recipient. To understand God as love requires more than a 
divine self who “is” one. Rather, to be love God must be 
both self and Other so that the exchange of gifts can take 
place. The love between members of the godhead is “the love 
of like for like, not the love for one who is essentially 
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different” (TK 58). This engendering love is “necessary 
love, not free love” (TK 58). On the other hand, love as 
creative goes out of itself freely to the Other who is in 
essence different. In this movement, “[God] communicates 
himself to his like and to his Other” (TK 59).  
Love then implies a fundamental differentiation for 
Moltmann. In terms of the Trinity, the distinct 
personalities are not accidental to the divine being. God 
is to be understood in terms of relationality. God must be 
“the one who communicates and the communicated…If God is 
love he is at once the lover, the beloved and love itself” 
(TK 57). Yet, the foundational nature of differentiation 
and relationality for ultimate reality does not imply a 
tri-theism. Sociality and personality are held in tension.  
In the monotheistic schema personality and sociality are 
viewed as polar opposites. To become social is to lose 
individuality and vice versa. However, Moltmann appeals to 
John Damascene’s doctrine of circumincessio to develop his 
notion of perichoresis to describe the play between unity 
and differentiation and personality as sociality. 
2f Perichoresis
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Perichoresis95 refers to the eternal circulation 
between members of the Trinity that characterizes divine 
life. The circulation is “an exchange of energies” (TK 
174). Love is the energy that flows in a reciprocating 
manner amongst Father, Son, and Spirit.96 The exchange of 
energies between the three persons in inner-trinitarian 
life is so intense as to produce a unity in which they live 
in one another and dwell to such an extent that they are 
one.97 Divine love is “a process of perfect and intense 
empathy” (TK 175) that enables each person to dwell in the 
Others and to be indwelt by the Others. Understanding 
ultimate reality as love simultaneously demands in one 
direction a differentiation in order for love to be given 
and received while in another direction love unites by 
making the boundaries between the divine persons permeable. 
As Moltmann puts it, “the very thing that divides them 
becomes that which binds them together” (TK 175). Neither 
                                                
95 As noted by Jansen, Relationality and the Concept of God (110), 
Moltmann borrows the term perichoresis from John of Damascus. The term 
circumincession is used in a synonymous manner. LaCugna, God for Us 
(72), details the concept’s use by the Cappadocians, particularly 
Gregory of Nyssa. Cyril of Alexandria called the movement “reciprocal 
irruption.” The idea was subsequently picked up by Pseudo-Dionysus. 
LaCugna says the idea of perichoresis was an “effective defense both 
against tritheism and Arian subordinationism” (270). See also Lucian 
Turcescu, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005).
96 See Stanley Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self 
(Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 2001), 43ff.
97 Powell, The Trinity, 232, understands Moltmann’s view of person and  
“concomitant concept of love…(avoids) the perils of subordinationism, 
tritheism, and modalism.”
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person nor relation is prior, but both come into being 
simultaneously.98
The unity found in perichoresis is not a 
characteristic of a shared divine substance.99 Such a unity 
would “abolish the personal differences” (TK 175).100 “The 
unity of the trinitarian Persons lies in the circulation of 
the divine life” (TK 175), the unity must be of their tri-
unity.101 In the circulation of divine life, each member of 
the Trinity “fulfil[s] their relations to one another” (TK 
175).102 In the perichoretic unity, the relations are equal 
as “they live and are manifested in one another and through 
                                                
98 See Leonardo Boff, Trinita e Societa (Assisi: Citadella, 1987) who 
maintains “the risk of tritheism, present in this orientation, is 
avoided by the perichoresis and the eternal communion which has always 
existed among the persons. We should not think that the three exist, 
each one for himself, separated from the others and only subsequently 
enter into communion and perichorectic relations. Such a representation 
is equivocal because it considers the union as a later result and as 
the fruit of the communion. Rather from all eternity and without 
beginning the persons are intrinsically inter-related with one another. 
They have always co-existed and never have existed separately” (12). 
99 See J.J O'Donnell, “The Trinity as Divine Community” Gregorianum 69 
(1988), 5-34, where he views Moltmann’s trinitarian unity as only a 
moral union. This understanding of divine unity fails in its account of 
one divine nature. The fear is that Moltmann “dissolves” the Trinity 
into history. 
100 T.F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, One Being Three 
Persons, 247, describes Moltmann’s position as a “tritheistic 
understanding of the unity” but does little to back up his claims this 
“damages” Moltmann’s insight into the suffering of God on the cross.
101See Roger Olson’s, “Trinity and Eschatology: The Historical Being of 
God in Jϋrgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg” Scottish Journal of 
Theology 36 (1983), 213-227, for excellent overview of Moltmann view of 
divine unity. See also Tersur Akuma Aben, Moltmann’s Social 
Trinitarianism (1992).
102 In “The Eschaological Roots of the Doctrine of the Trinity” 
Trinitarian Theology Today (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 152, Ingolf 
Dalferth argues that “Moltmann so stresses their personal agency of 
Father, Son, and Spirit that it becomes difficult to see how it can be 
said to be one and the same God.”  
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one another” (TK 176). In perichoresis, "personalism and 
socialism cease to be antitheses and are seen to be derived 
from a common foundation"(TK 199).
Below I have represented perichoresis by using a 
diagram of contradictory monism that attempts to capture 
the two fundamental directions in Moltmann’s thought. Here 
we can see both the differentiating and unifying movements. 
In perichoresis divine love is both agape and philia.    
   
Coming Eternity     Theosis   Unifying     ontological precedence of the future
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2g Conclusion
The perichoretic unity of the tri-unity is what 
Moltmann also refers to as the social Trinity or the 
community of God. At its heart, the social Trinity is a 
different vision of reality. Rather than reducing all of 
reality to a static Parmenidian one that stresses 
actuality, reality is understood as dynamic as it is said 
                                                
103  This diagram is adapted from Nicholas Ansell, The Annihilation of 
Hell, 155. As he notes, the coincidence of opposites illustrated by the 
‘loop’ should be ‘located’ at the point of bifurcation/convergence of 
the movements but has been separated for visual clarity. 
coincidence of
      opposites
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to be both plural and unified. However, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, the dynamic character manifest by 
emphasizing the relationality of God does not yet imply 
openness. To understand reality in terms of openness and 
possibility requires the differentiation of love itself.
Moltmann is concerned, as we reminded ourselves at the 
beginning of this chapter, that theology has contradicted 
itself by talking about the “sufferings of God who cannot 
suffer.” Paradoxically, as we shall have opportunity to 
notice in some detail, Moltmann seeks to eliminate that 
contradiction by introducing “contradiction” into the heart 
of God and; consequently, into the heart of the cosmos. 
Indeed, since in God, “essential self-love must become the 
creative love for the Other, that is to say selfless love” 
a “contradiction or a reversal of love” (COG 326) is 
introduced into God himself.
At the same time, when we accept this fundamental 
contradiction or reversal in God, we make a breakthrough 
and do not, Moltmann argues, end up in a logical 
contradiction. For “it is only in a Trinitarian concept of 
God that selfless love and divine completion can be thought 
together without contradiction” (COG 326).
 For Moltmann, the most satisfying way of conceiving 
of this inherently contradictory-yet-harmonious threeness-
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in-oneness is to talk of the “perichoresis of the divine 
persons.” In a perichoretic unity, the “at-oneness of the 
triune God,” is not presupposed, nor brought about. The 
“unitedness, the at-oneness, of the triunity is already 
given with the fellowship of the Father, the Son, and the 
Spirit.” Furthermore, “God and the world interpenetrate 
each other in mutual perichoresis.” God’s “own infinity and 
the finitude of the world are eternally distinguished by 
their difference; but in this difference they are at the 
same time eternally united” (COG 327). “The indwelling of 
God calls into being a kind of cosmic perichoresis of 
divine and cosmic attributes” (COG 295). This is 
perichoresis: “mutual indwellings… world in God and God in 
the world” (COG 307).  
Chapter 3
Divine Love: Philia and Agape
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In this chapter, the differentiation of love is our 
theme. We will analyze Moltmann’s concept of love as God 
longs for the different Other. In so doing, the differences 
between philia and agape104 will be center stage. For 
Moltmann, “God is love” means that “[God] is in eternity 
this process of self-differentiation and self-
identification” (TK 57).105 The play between the similarity 
and dissimilarity of philia with agape is used by Moltmann 
to mark the difference between these two kinds of love; and 
respectively, the two sets of communion. The difference 
between philia, which is characteristic of inner-
trinitarian communion, and agape, which is characteristic 
of the divine-creaturely communion, is vital in 
establishing Moltmann’s description of reality as open to 
the possible.106 This is crucial because although the love 
                                                
104 For a historical overview of the development of agape, particularly 
in the Christian tradition, see Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. 
Philip Watson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). Nygren 
argues for agape as a self-less form of love. Theologians have been 
hesitant to use eros to describe divine love because it connotes need. 
In using philia, Moltmann can set up a dialectic within love as the 
play between philia and agape suggests a need for otherness which is 
not a need. Drawing upon the work of Jüngel and Brümmer, P. Fiddes, 
Participating in God (210ff.), argues for divine love to include 
eros/need-love. Alan Soble, ed., Eros, Agape and Philia: Readings in 
the Philosophy of Love (New York: Paragon House, 1989) is an excellent 
source for key writings in the (Greek) philosophical discussion of 
love. 
105 For an exploration of the relationship between love and hope see 
Jürgen Moltmann and Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendell, Love: the Foundation of 
Hope, ed. F. Burnam, C. McCoy, and D. Meeks (San Francisco: Harper and 
Row, 1988).
106 Peters, God as Trinity, suggests we may have been misled by 
“classical ontology into assuming that absoluteness consists of 
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in Trinitarian perichoresis allows for a more dialectical 
understanding of the relationship of plurality and unity in 
ultimate reality, it does not yet allow for an openness 
which yields possibility. The permeable boundaries of 
Father, Son, and Spirit suggest for Moltmann a shared 
sameness. While the sameness is not predicated upon a 
common divine substance, there remains a predictability and 
fail-safeness to inner-trinitarian love as the giving and 
receiving by each member is obligatory. There is still no 
space for a real difference that allows for the possible.107
Consequently, Moltmann’s ontology of love needs more than 
the mutual reciprocity of same Others found in perichoretic 
relations to account for the dynamic nature of reality.108
Love requires a different Other.109
3a Philia and the Divine Communion
Divine love is unified, but as it seeks to 
communicate the good it must "presuppose the capacity for 
                                                                                                                                                
unrelatedness… the classical philosophical understanding of 
absoluteness when applied to the God of the Bible will not do…”(179).
107  See Colin Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 170ff. for a
helpful discussion on otherness and relation. His point that 
“Otherness…is important both for the contingency of the created order 
and for the freedom of the human person”(171) questions Moltmann’ s use 
of philia.
108 See Julia Kristeva, Tales of Love trans. Leon Roudiez (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1987).  In her chapter “God is Love” she 
examines Christian love (agape) as disinterested love. 
109  See also Mary Timothy Prokes, Mutuality: the Human Image of 
Trinitarian Love (New York: Paulist Press , 1993). 
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self-differentiation" (TK 57).110 The differentiation of 
love is evident in Moltmann’s discussion of inner-
trinitarian life. As early as TH, Moltmann had begun 
distinguishing between philia and agape as differing types 
of love. The concern in TH is the distinction between the 
hopelessness of creatio originalis and the promise of the 
future. Following his rejection of the Parmedinian God that 
is too present, Moltmann turns the discussion to the future 
as the place of possibility and hope. The source for the 
focus on the future is his reading of the New Testament use 
of ‘expectation’ in terms of “adventus Christi” and not 
“praesentia Christi” (TH 31). The thrust of Christianity is 
not on seeing Christ as an “epiphany of the eternal 
present” (TH 84). Rather, the resurrected Christ is 
revealed as the “apocalypse of the promised future of the 
truth” (TH 84). The promised future, however, cannot be 
said to exist. Emphasis is placed on the future as possible 
and not actual. Hence for Moltmann, one cannot say the 
future is. Instead, the future dynamically breaks into 
current existence. 
The play between present and future and between 
existence and promise gives rise to the distinction made 
                                                
110 Compare with E. Jüngel’s, God as the Mystery of the World (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983) statement that God “alone can begin to love 
without any reason, and always has begun to love”(327).
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between philia and agape. Following Aristotle, philia is 
defined as a love of the similar. But Moltmann further 
refines this definition by understanding philia to be the 
type of love that is directed to “the existent and the 
like” (TH 32). We can imply from the argument that philia
as love is located in the here and now; it is the love of 
what is. When Moltmann places the life of the Trinity at 
the heart of reality in TK, the identification of philia 
with actuality gives him a category by which he understands 
the divine communion. Originally, there is God's love for 
himself manifest as self donation and reception. Inner-
trinitarian life ‘is’. Even with the movement of 
reciprocity between the members of the Godhead, there is 
still not a sense of becoming. 
The differentiation of Son and Spirit from the Father 
results in a relationship characterized by presence, as 
each person exists in and for the Other. Within the 
Trinity, philia means that "in eternity and out of the very 
necessity of his being the Father loves the only begotten 
Son. He loves him with the love that both engenders and 
brings forth"(TK 58).111 It is this generation of the Son 
                                                
111 Here Moltmann differs significantly from Thomas who agrues for a 
strict separation of De Deo Uno and De Deo Trino.  As LaCugna, God for 
Us, points out, “The net effect is that Thomas posits an intradivine 
self-communication that is really distinct, if not really separate 
from, whatever self-communication may take place in creation”(166). See 
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that is the premise for the procession of the Spirit from
the Father. From the inner pleasure of the Father's love 
(as self-communicating and desirous of receiving 
communication), the demarcation of the divine Origin into 
Father, Son, and Spirit takes place. Yet, philia brings 
forth only that which is similar in the differentiation. 
The nature of philia explains why "the Son is other than 
the Father, but not other in essence"(TK 58). Because the 
Spirit "has from the Father his perfect, divine 
existence"(TK 186), we can also conclude that the Spirit is 
other, but same in essence.
In saying that philia is "not the love of the other” 
perichoresis is distinguished as “not the love for one who 
is essentially different"(TK 58). While the members of the 
Trinity are distinct persons, they are “alike divine 
beings” (TK 58). The Father communicates his love to the 
Son and Spirit as different persons sharing the same 
essence. By same essence Moltmann is not referring to the 
participation by members of the Godhead in divine ousia and 
sharing the same actualized being. The divine essence is 
relational and dynamic. The divine communion is a communion 
of discrete persons who exist in and for their same Other. 
                                                                                                                                                
also Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the 
Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishing, 
2004).
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Inner-trinitarian participation in one another is the 
source of unity for divine life. Given his working 
definition of philia in TH, the natural move is to identify 
philia with the permeating love of perichoresis. As 
perichoretic, "inner-trinitarian love is the love of like 
for like, not love of the other"(TK 107). 
In philia the self-communicating and self-donation can 
be portrayed as expected, even ‘fail-safe.’ The divine self 
can expect full acceptance of his donation and a reciprocal 
return from his same Other. In his relational unity, each 
member of the Trinity exists in and for the Other. There is 
no room for anything but perfect acceptance and complete 
giving given the permeable boundaries marking the 
relationships. Perichoresis is an eternal flow. As utterly 
in and for the Other, philia breeds a certainty and 
predictability in inner-trinitarian relationships. The 
expected reciprocity of perichoresis is cast in terms of 
necessity. Even in considering the Father as Origin of the 
Son and Spirit, Moltmann sees the differentiation of 
persons as a compulsory act as "the Father begets and bears 
the Son out of the necessity of his being"(TK 167). Being 
of the same divine essence determines the Son’s (and 
Spirit’s) response as; it is "out of the very necessity of 
his being that the Son responds to the Father's love 
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through his obedience" (TK 58). To summarize, philia is 
"necessary love, not free love" (TK 58).
 As philia, the gifts of the Father, Son, and Spirit 
exist in the divine communion and are protected by the 
necessity of response. The relationships are failsafe. The 
response of the same Other to the self's gift is a given as
each member's nature is essentially self-donating and self-
receiving. Philia guarantees that each divine person will 
always find a receptive Other who is in and for all 
partners in the divine communion.
3b Agape and Divine Creativity
However, in Moltmann’s understanding of reality, love 
of the like is never enough; it must become a love of the 
different. Divine love as only philia is too limiting as, 
"inner-trinitarian… is not yet creative love" (TK 107).112
For divine love to communicate itself exhaustively, it must 
become creative.113 Creativity is a different movement than 
the begetting of other distinct divine persons by the 
                                                
112 See Jansen, Relationality and the Concept of God (108ff.), for his 
discussion of Moltmann’s distinctions of divine love.
113 Lacugna, God for Us, notes that “in order not to collapse the 
‘infinite qualitative distinction’ between God and the world, in order 
not to reduce God to creation, or to treat finite creation as if it 
were God’s love object, or merely a necessary extension or emanation of 
God’s nature, Christians have been careful to emphasize that while the 
nature of God is to love in a way that issues forth in creation, still, 
creation is the result of divine freedom, not metaphysical 
necessity”(355). Moltmann argues that it is both a result of divine 
freedom and an ontological (of love) necessity.
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Father as "it is only in and through its Other that love 
becomes creative love"(TK 117).114 Creativity involves 
allowing a space within the perichoretic unity for 
difference.115 Counter to philia’s sameness and necessity, 
this space makes possible the realization of “God's longing 
for 'his Other' and for that Other's free response to the 
divine love"(TK 106).116
It follows from the nature of philia that such love 
cannot make free the space required for difference. Agape 
becomes the preferred term to refer to a love that makes 
room for the Other.  Creativity finds its source in agape
that is a love for that which "is different, alien and 
ugly"(CG 28). Returning to initial distinction in TH, the 
emphasis of the overarching argument in the book is clearly 
placed on giving priority to the future and its 
possibilities over against the here and now and its 
impossibilities. God’s love and its openness to the future 
                                                
114 Compare with See Pannenberg, Systematic Theology 1, 429, who 
maintains that “the coming forth of the Son from the Father is the 
basic fulfillment of divine love.”
115   In her argument, McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love, 44ff., makes too much 
of the contrast between philia as “the Hellenistice concept of love” 
and agape as “the biblical principle of love.” In the end, she 
overlooks the continuity of philia found within the life of the  
Trinity.  
116 Ron Highfield, “Divine Self-Limitation in the Theology of Jürgen 
Moltmann: A Critical Appraisal,” Christian Scholars Review 22:1 (2002): 
49-71, notes the difficulty in Moltmann’s distinctions between the 
loves when he points out that “the world is inherent in the Father’s 
love for the Son. And the Father’s love for the Son is not free but a 
necessary love. If so, it seems that Moltmann has fallen into 
emanationism”(65 n.108).
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rely upon setting agape in tension with philia.  The power 
that makes the space for creation possible is agape. Agape
is “the magic power that brings the [non-existent] into 
being” (TH 32). This power refuses to look at the future as 
a continuation of the godforsaken present which is plagued 
by death and suffering. Instead, agape “surveys the open 
possibility of history” (TH 32). In distinguishing agape
from philia, Moltmann defines agape as “love to the non-
existent, love to the unlike, the unworthy, the worthless, 
to the lost, the transient and the dead” (TH 32). 
Agape is the power to create out of nothing and the 
power to bring the dead to life. A vital step in 
differentiating agape is the rethinking of “creator ex 
nihilo” (TH 31). In Theology of Hope creation out of 
nothing does not merely refer to the original act of 
creation, but also refers to God’s relationship to the 
future. In creatio ex nihilo, God calls the non-existent 
future into existence. Agape’s creativity as bringing the 
future into existence in Theology of Hope refers 
predominantly to a re-creating or a redemptive, 
resurrecting love. While we will later return to agape’s 
role in redemption, we now turn to agape’s role as a 
description of creatio originalis as found in The Trinity 
and the Kingdom and God in Creation. In calling the result 
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of agape’s first creative act “creatio originalis,” 
Moltmann is making a distinction that will receive much 
attention later. Creatio originalis is distinguished from 
“creatio nova” (GC 193).117 Creatio nova is “the new 
creation still to be consummated” (GC 193) whose movement 
stands in opposition to the forsaken creatio originalis. At 
the same time, creatio nova, itself, further needs to be 
distinguished from the eschatological arrival of the 
“universal indwelling of God” (COG 262) in creation and the 
establishment of the “eternal Sabbath” (GC 288).   
3c Is There Room for Original Creation?
Understanding creatio originalis as God's desire for 
an Other means that "the idea of the world is inherent in 
the nature of God himself from eternity"(TK 106).118 Divine 
love was destined to transform from philia into agape 
because God "desires response in freedom"(TK 59).119 But 
that does not mean there is some constraint outside of God 
                                                
117 Moltmann also distinguishes “creatio continua” (GC 193) as God’s 
continuing activity in creating.  
118 For futher analysis on the models of relating God to creation see 
Keith Ward, Religion and Creation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
119 The work of Greek Orthodox theologian John Zizioulas is important for 
understanding this use of love. In Being as Communion (Crestwood, NY: 
St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985) he argues that “love is identified 
with ontological freedom”(46). See also John Zizioulas, “The Doctrine 
of the Holy Trinity” in Trinitarian Theology Today. An interesting 
comparison between the Eastern tradition and Barth can be found in Paul 
Collins, Trinitarian Theology, West and East: Karl Barth, the 
Cappadocian Fathers, and John Zizioulas (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001).
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forcing him to create. God's desire to share his love with 
a different Other provides the unity between the world that 
is passing away (original creation) and the world that is 
coming (new creation). Both are acts of God's creativity. 
Yet there is a definite logical order in reflecting upon 
these simultaneous, opposing acts of creation.120
Once the divine community has resolved to create, the 
necessary conditions for the creation of the different 
Other must be established. Establishment of the necessary 
conditions, which is the transformation of philia into 
agape, involves two steps: "In Act One God acts on himself, 
inwards, before in Act Two he goes out of himself and 
creates something other than himself"(CE 282). Here again 
Moltmann sets himself apart from classical theology that 
has typically distinguished between God for himself and God 
for creation. In classical theology "God has an inner, 
self-sufficing life. Creation is an act of the triune God 
in his unity directed outwards"121 (TK 108). The result is a 
                                                
120 Jansen, Relationality and the Concept of God, surmises  that “by 
utilizing the biblical and theological notions of God as love, the 
Trinity, kenosis, and combining them with Hegelian dialectics and 
modern relational thought, Moltmann has constructed a concept of God 
that is very different from the classical concept”(119).
121 An important article for understanding Moltmann and the other 
Trinitarian theologians debt to Barth in discussing this problem is 
Paul Molnar "The Function of the Immanent Trinity in the Theology of 
Karl Barth: Implications for Today," Scottish Journal of Theology 42, 
367-399. Also Olson, "Trinity and Eschatology,” who argues that the 
conflation of economic and immanent Trinity results in a “Trinity so 
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division between the immanent and the economic Trinity, 
“between the inner life of God and an act of God outwards, 
in creation, incarnation and redemption"122(TK 108). 
Classical theology’s stress on the separation of 
inward and outer results in the inward acts of God being 
reduced to the justification for the outward acts. As such, 
there is only the unilateral flow from philia into agape. 
Moltmann summarizes this position by saying that "it is 
only as causa sui that God can be causa mundi" (TK 108). 
Moltmann’s counter to the unidirectional movement of 
creation begins by considering God's inward act to be more 
than the validation of creation’s existence. There is not 
merely the willing of creation “outside” by God, but an 
ontological transaction taking place “in God” (TK 109). In 
moving creatively outward, God’s movement is, at the same 
time, inwardly creative in making space for the different 
Other within the perichoretic unity. 
Moltmann poses the question whether an "omnipotent and 
omnipresent God [can] have an 'outward' aspect at all?"(TK 
108). If the traditional division of inward and outward 
                                                                                                                                                
open as to be threatened with loss of transcendence by being dependent 
upon the contingencies of history”(222).
122 In God as Trinity Peters describes the result of this division: "What 
we end up with in this scheme is an eternal Son in eternal relationship 
to an eternal Father, rendering external the birth, teaching career, 
sufferings, and death of the historical Jesus. Despite sincere and 
authentic attempts to combat the docetic and gnostic challenges of the 
ancient Greco-Roman context, such Trinitarian Christologies risked 
sacrificing the intimate God on the altar of the beyond"(21).
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acts of God is maintained, "then we must assume, not only 
God's self-constitution in eternity, but an equally eternal 
non-divine or counter-divine entity, which would be 
'outside'"(TK 109, see also GC 86ff.). In Moltmann’s spatial 
understanding of divine presence, such an assumption 
challenges God's omnipresence. Space is understood in 
exclusionary terms in which God’s being in a space 
prohibits an Other’s existence in that space and vice 
versa.  For a realm 'outside' of God to be one in which he 
acts means something exists which is not God. How is this 
possible for an all-encompassing Being? Moltmann solves his 
riddle by talking about God's self-limitation. He states it 
as follows: "And if [because of creation out of chaos and 
creatio ex nihilo] we have to say that there is a 'within' 
and a 'without' for God -- and that he therefore goes 
creatively 'out of himself,' communicating himself 
creatively to the one who is Other than himself -- then we
must after all assume a self-limitation of the infinite, 
omnipresent God, preceding his creation"(TK 109). Or in 
other words, there really is no ‘without’ for God, but an 
ontological transaction inside of God. Without merely 
refers to the space ceded within the omnipresent God for 
his Other.123
                                                
123Peters, God as Trinity, points out that Moltmann’s description of ‘God 
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This point suggests more directly what has already 
been implied regarding the relationship between philia and
agape.  The transformation of philia into agape takes place 
within the exercising of philia by the divine communion. 
Philia is not superceded by agape; rather they are 
simultaneous movements of love in the Trinity. For 
creation, as God’s Other, to exist divine philia must 
concurrently flow in perichoresis and agape must creatively 
move ‘inward’ and ‘outward.’ The movement of God inward and 
then outward "is made possible and determined by the fact 
that 'in the depth of that life emerges the divine mystery, 
the inner suffering thirst of the Godhead, its inner 
longing for its 'Other,' which for God is capable of being 
the object of the highest, most boundless love" (TK 45).
Agape’s inward movement is what Moltmann describes as 
a "primordial self-restriction"(GC 281) of God. Original 
creation as creatio ex nihilo assumes there was a time 
before creation existed. Relying upon a spatial 
understanding, the argument is that when only an 
omnipresent God existed, reality was filled with a divine 
presence. Philia would have characterized this existence. 
It is this overwhelming presence of God that creates the 
                                                                                                                                                
is love’ “eliminates the need for correspondence between the immanent 
and economic Trinity. In fact, it comes close to eliminating the need 
for the immanent Trinity itself”(107).
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problem of creation for Moltmann. Unless there is a 
difference between Creator and creature, which depends upon 
a space for difference, "...creation cannot be conceived of 
at all"(GC 89).  The first move of God in creating is a 
creating of room for creation. So in willing himself to be 
Creator, God "acts inwardly on himself" before he "issues 
creatively out of himself"(GC 86). The necessity of God's 
first act in creating being directed towards the 
perichoretic community exemplifies Moltmann's understanding 
of "the doctrine of creation as a doctrine of God"(TK 105).  
The first act of creation is creating a more 
definitive boundary between the communion of divine persons 
and the communion between God and his Other/s. This 
boundary allows the different Other to freely respond to 
the gift of divine love. This act of self-restriction is 
described by Moltmann, following Luria's doctrine of 
zimzum, as God's withdrawal into himself.124 It is this 
withdrawal "which gives that nihil the space in which God 
then becomes creatively active"(TK 109). The withdrawal of 
God into himself is a "concentration and contraction" (TK 
109, see also GC 87.), a kind of taking in a deep breath 
                                                
124 See Ron Highfield, “Divine Self-Limitation in the Theology of Jürgen 
Moltmann: A Critical Appraisal,” for his helpful examination of Lakoff 
and Johnson’s understanding of spatial metaphors to evaluate Moltmann’s 
use of zimzum. Moltmann rejects the notion of God being with creation 
because there cannot be a shared space. Creation in its original state 
is competion with God for space.  
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and holding it. Through this "inversion of God" there is 
set "free a kind of 'mystical primordial space' into which 
God -- issuing out of himself -- can enter and in which he 
can manifest himself"(TK 110). In this space "God withdraws 
himself from himself to himself" (GC 87) so that his Other 
can come to be.
The coming into being of the space of God's different 
is paralleled by the perichoretic community ceasing, at 
least temporary, to be all in all. A new communion has 
emerged. God’s creation of an Other is simultaneously a 
development of philia and a violation of philia. Philia may 
need to, as it were, transmute, or ‘flip,’ into agape in 
order to become creative, but "with the creation of a world 
which is not God, but which none the less corresponds to 
him, God's self-humiliation begins" (TK 59). In 
perichoresis, philia consists of a kind of reciprocity of 
equals. With the presence of a different Other, instead of 
reciprocity we see agape as sacrifice: "divine kenosis 
which begins with the creation of the world"(TK 118). The 
consequence of the necessary limitations for God in 
relating to an Other that is not divine is that "creative 
love is always suffering love" (TK 59).125 Divine 
                                                
125 See Paul Sponheim’s, Faith and the Other: A Relational Theology 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 106ff.
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humiliation is the result of the ceding of space within the 
perichoretic communion that it is a same Other. Hence, 
humiliation enters divine life prior to any response by 
creation. God's humiliation is simultaneous with the act of 
creating and communicating God-self to a different Other. 
For creation's response to God to be in a free space, God 
must first empty the space.
3d Creation as the Overflow of Divine Love
While creation requires a divine self-limitation and 
humiliation, this movement should not be understood as 
either coming from or producing divine insufficiency. In 
becoming agape, divine love has not ceased to be philia. 
Concurrently, the loves exist. Hence, while talking about 
creation as agape, Moltmann can also describe the creation 
of a different Other as emerging from the overflow of love 
from the perichoretic relationships of inner-trinitarian 
life.126 It is "[in] the free, overflowing rapture of his 
love [that] the eternal God goes out of himself and makes a 
creation" (GC 15). The love manifest by the 
                                                
126 For a positive view of the relationship between trinitarian 
theologians and the doctrine of creation see Steve Bouma-Prediger, For 
the Beauty of the Earth: a Christian Vision for Creation Care (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 120ff and his earlier book The Greening 
of Theology: the Ecological Models of Rosemary Radford Ruether, Joseph 
Sittler, and Jürgen Moltmann (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995). See also 
Joseph Bracken, The One in the Many: A Contemporary Reconstruction of 
the God-world Relationship  (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001)
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interpenetration and indwelling among the three persons of 
the Trinity cannot be contained within their relationships.  
Creation rises not from a deficiency within the Trinity, 
but from the excess of love found between Father, Son, and 
Spirit. But the excess of philia must manifest itself as 
agape. Without the transformation, or ‘flip,’ of philia
into agape only one communion exists and the excess of love 
merely circulates amongst the divine persons. 
The perichoretic overflow results in "not a step 
'outwards' but a step 'inwards'" (TK 110). At this point, 
divine love "is no longer addressed to the Other in the 
like, but to the like in the Other” (TK 57). The 
transformation of philia into agape is necessary as "like 
is not enough for like” (TK 57). Divine love is not 
satisfied with relationships among same Others. While the 
members of the Trinity are not identical, they are “not 
other in essence” (TK 58). A different Other, an Other of 
unlike essence, is needed as divine love “seeks fellowship 
and desires response in freedom” (TK 59). For inner-
trinitarian love to be fulfilled, it must become free and 
creative as "in the love which God is already lies the 
energy which leads God out of himself" (TK 58). To not 
allow philia to differentiate into agape "would contradict 
the love which God is” (TK 58). 
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In agape there can be no expected response by God's 
different Other. The relationship between God and creation 
is not guided by necessity. Rather, freedom characterizes 
any interchange between them. It follows that in agape
self-donation requires vulnerability, as rejection is a 
possible response to the gift. Divine vulnerability is 
evident in the description of creation as divine 
humiliation. God’s self-humiliation is not only a giving up 
of a space within the Trinity but also a giving up of the 
determined reciprocity. Agape as “suffering love” (TK 59) 
is kenotic in nature. In the kenosis of creation "God 
emptied himself by virtue of his love, out of the necessity 
of his being, going out to 'his Other...'(TK 107). Inner-
trinitarian love necessitates philia becoming agape, but 
the transformation of love into agape removes creation from 
the familiar, and to be counted upon, responses of inner-
trinitarian life. Agape opens possibilities.
3e Divine Absence and Presence
The creator ex nihilo empties himself in order to 
allow a nihil in which creation can come to exist. The 
indwelling love of inner-trinitarian life becomes a love 
that abandons for the sake of difference. In this movement, 
the nihil is understood not to be external to divine life, 
91
but is found within the divine communion. The divine 
withdrawal “allows creation the space for its own being” 
and "[i]t is only a withdrawal by God into himself that can 
free the space into which God can act creatively" (GC 86-
87). The precondition of divine creativity is the yielding 
of an empty space within the perichoretic communion. Within 
this model, God remains omnipresent while within God a 
nihil allows for difference. Or in other words, difference 
calls for a harder boundary within the divine life that 
resists the penetration of the divine presence. Without 
indwelling, there is no essential unity between God and his 
different Other and necessity no longer characterizes the 
relationship. The turn inwards is a divine act which 
"veils, not one that reveals"(TK 110). God's self-
limitation and subsequent abandonment of creation into that 
godforsaken space are both rooted in the divine love of 
inner-trinitarian life as "it is in his love for the Son 
that the Father determines to be the Creator of the world" 
(TK 112). Because creation flows from divine love "the 
world is, through his eternal will, destined for good, and 
is nothing other than an expression of his love"(TK 112). 
God's first act of creating space within is logically 
followed by God going out of himself and creating the other 
as "the world process is...to be understood as a two-sided 
92
one" (TK 110). Once God's primordial self-restriction takes 
place, "God issues from himself as creator into that primal 
space which he had previously released…"(TK 110). Despite 
creation resulting from the overflow of divine love, it 
must be noted that already when Moltmann says that God 
"creates by letting-be, by making room, and by withdrawing 
himself" (GC 88), he is saying something about creation. 
The original state of creation is one of distance as God 
withdraws, or veils, for the sake of freedom. While in this 
position it can be asserted that the boundary created by 
God does not demand that creation, as such, is sinful as 
"[t]he Creator and the creation are united first of all by 
his command, his injunction, his behest and his decision" 
(GC 76). It is acknowledged that creation exists in 
"response to the creating word; but it is not linked with 
that word through causality… there is no ontological link 
of this kind between the word of creation and created 
things” (GC 76-77). God's withdrawal/emptying results in a 
disconnection from creation for creation. Here the "space 
which comes into being and is set free by God's self-
limitation is a literally God-forsaken space"(GC 87). 
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This divine absence does not make God responsible for 
the realization of evil and death.127 His argument carefully 
distinguishes between the creation of the nihil and the 
actualization of the nihil. The space of creation within 
the divine communion space is a nihil "which does not 
contain the negation of creaturely being (since creation is 
not yet existent), but which represents the partial 
negation of the divine Being, inasmuch as God is not yet 
Creator" (GC 87). Moltmann wants to refrain from saying 
that creation itself is evil. The forsakenness of the nihil
exists only in potential. God's self-limitation which 
results in the nihil "does not yet have this annihilating 
character" (GC 88). Yet, as godforsaken, he does say that 
the space in which creation comes to be is "hell, absolute 
death" (GC 87). And, although creation’s abandonment by God 
is not to be equated precisely with the onset of sin, it 
would seem to make sin and evil, if not necessary, both 
existentially and contingently inevitable. 
At first, the nihil is merely a concession of the part 
of God necessary for an independent creation. But this 
limitation "implies the possibility of the annihilating 
Nothingness" (GC 88). Moltmann argues that "the stringency 
                                                
127 Schuurman,“Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics,” reads Moltmann as rooting 
“suffering in the original creation and  argues that even if the fall 
never occurred, there would still be an incarnation and redemption from 
the “limitations” of creation”(61).
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of the world's godforsakenness is not in itself enough to 
ruin it, but its ruination comes only when it abstracts the 
element of the expending and the death of God from the 
dialectical process of God and fastens on that" (TH 169). 
As God’s different Other, creation is called by God's love 
and promised future indwelling. Godforsakenness and death 
become "romanticist nihilism only when they have been 
isolated from the dialectical process and [are] therefore 
no longer engaged in the movement of the process to which 
it belongs" (TH 169). When the nihil is actualized by 
creation’s rejection of God’s promise, it “acquires this 
menacing character through the self-isolation of created 
beings to which we give the name sin and Godlessness"(GC 
88). To desire philia with the divine communion without 
fully experiencing divine agape removes creation from the 
process and isolates by closing the future that is promise. 
As creation disconnects itself from its creator through its 
rejection of the promise of its coming Messiah, these 
imminent possibilities of an annihilating nothingness are 
realized. This nothingness threatens not only creation's 
own being, but as internal to God, it also threatens God's 
being. The negative power initiated through sin overwhelms 
as "its negations lead into that primordial space which God 
freed within himself before creation" (GC 88).
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3f The Surpassibility of Original Creation
Any self-initiated response from creation that 
excludes God’s revealing and redeeming is premature and 
results in the actualization of the nihil. Any act by  
creation prior to God contradicting of the contradiction  
results in a closing down of possibilities. As forsaken, 
creation’s only hope is for agape’s (re)creative powers to 
overcome the abandonment of original creation. Creation 
waits for God's penetrating presence. Emphasizing 
creation’s forsakenness and its inescapable realization of 
the nihil leads Moltmann to describe original/present 
creation as "inadequate," transient," and "surpassable"(TH 
88/DH 78). Original creation is "corrupt reality"(TH 227/DH 
206) which is to be understood as "a God-forsaken transient 
reality that is to be left behind" (TH 18). A yet to be 
eschatological filled creation reveals the contradiction of 
its creator as "the temporality of earthly creation does 
not reflect the presence of God - it reflects his 
absence"(CE 284). 
Creation is caught in a "transitory time"(CE 282). 
Creation from its inception is headed toward the 
fulfillment of the promise that it is to be overcome and it 
is this promise that "constantly overspills history"(TH 
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106). The promise of the coming God "creates an interval of 
tension between the uttering and the redeeming of the 
promise"(TH 104). The movement in which creation opens 
itself by passing away is driven by the utterance of the 
promise. Agape demands a relational distance. Without 
agape’s further (re)creative act, creation's forsakenness 
necessarily leads to its realization of isolation, 
disconnection, and despair, as it is impossible for 
creation to create correspondences to God on its own. 
Original creation is trapped in the bind of being called to 
respond as God's Other, but only being able to respond by 
"unavoidably" sinning.128 Creation, in its hopelessness, 
simultaneously must act and must wait in hope for agape’s
(re)creation.
Summarizing our argument at this point is helpful. 
First, the difference between philia and agape allows 
Moltmann to make a distinction between the relationships of 
the divine communion and the relationship of God with 
creation. This distinction is important as philia is 
characteristic of a perichoretic indwelling that does not 
allow for the free response of the Other. Agape allows for 
                                                
128 While Moltmann argues that the nihil “only acquires this menacing 
character” through human sin and godlessness (GC 88), it is difficult 
to see how humans can avoid sinning and thereby realizing the nihil as 
they must act in a godforsaken space. Self-isolation as the condition 
of original creation must lead to a realization of annihilating 
nothingness.  
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a different Other. The space of difference comes to be by a 
divine withdrawal.129 However, the space of difference 
remains within the divine communion. Hence, Moltmann can 
simultaneously talk about a divine abandonment of creation 
and creation as an overflow of divine love.130
Second, in understanding creation as divinely forsaken 
Moltmann can reject the "now and always" view of reality. 
Neither God nor creation can simply be identified with what 
“is.” Both God and creation must be understood as dynamic 
and open to the possible. From its inception, original 
creation is identified as “the world which is passing away” 
(COG 280). Creation awaits its redemption through the 
overcoming of its condition of being godforsaken. Original 
creation is countered and surpassed by “the world which is 
coming to be.” As creative, agape calls both creatio ex 
nihilo and nova creatio into being. The presence of divine 
love as agape implies that even as godforsaken, creation is 
destined for good. It is never outside of God. Creation 
flows from and returns to the divine communion of love. In 
spite of its being originally disconnected from God, 
creation remains fundamentally "an expression of his love." 
                                                
129 See Grenz, The Social God, 42ff,
130 Jansen, Relationality and the Concept of God, wonders if  “Moltmann’s 
distinction between necessary and free love (philia and agape) is at 
all helpful in understanding the nature of love…it is difficult to 
understand how such terms would clarify the human experience of love” 
(137). 
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Just as creation is understood to spring from the 
overflow of philia, it can also be said that the Father 
"creates out of the powers and energies of his own 
Spirit"(TK 113). This pouring out of the Spirit is not the 
same as divinizing creation, or equating creation with God, 
but these are “relationships of mutuality which describe a 
cosmic community of living between God the Spirit and all 
his created beings” (GC 14).131 Creation is viewed "as a 
divine overflowing or 'emanation'" (TK 113). From inner-
trinitarian life, "the Holy Spirit is 'poured out'" (TK 
113). In this cosmic community, the Spirit relates to 
creation by “’indwelling’, ‘sym-pathizing’, 
‘participating’, ‘accompanying’, ‘enduring’, ‘delighting’, 
and ‘glorifying’” (GC 14).
 Within the godforsaken space, the Spirit is agapic:
"An intricate web of unilateral, reciprocal and many-sided 
relationships. In this network of relationships, 'making,' 
'preserving,' maintaining' and 'perfecting' are certainly 
the great one-sided relationships" (GC 14).132 The energies 
                                                
131  See Laurence Wood’s, “From Barth’s Trinitarian Christology to 
Moltmann’s Trinitarian Pneumatology: A Methodist Perspective” The 
Asbury Theological Journal 48 (1993), 49-79, analysis of the 
development of the idea of the Spirit in relation to Barth’s thought.
132 It is in these one-sided relationships that the Spirit is active in 
the movement of Dabney, “Advent,” argues that the exclusion of God from 
the world in TH results in a lack of any significant pneumatology as 
"the Spirit of God is, like the resurrected Son and the Father, shut up 
in the future and away from the present"(94). Further, Dabney says 
"central to that effort to overcome the problem of discontinuity in the 
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of the Spirit are poured into creation as the Spirit "fills 
everything with its own life" (TK 113). The Father breathes 
life into creation by "breathing forth" the Spirit. As 
such, "the Spirit is the efficacious power of the Creator 
and the power that quickens created beings" (GC 96). 
The Spirit’s presence in forsaken creation must be 
understood as agape inasmuch as "this power is itself 
creative"(GC 96). The presence of the Father's creative 
power in creation through the Spirit shows that "the 
Creator himself is present in his creation" (GC 96). But 
his presence is not a perichoretic indwelling. The Spirit 
as manifesting agape exists as that which calls non-
existent reality into being. By being present in his own 
creation, "God preserves his creation against the 
annihilating Nothingness" (GC 96). Preservation is not to 
be understood as a protection of creation’s intrinsic 
goodness; rather, Moltmann suggests that the surpassing of 
transient reality does not mean the nihil has the final 
word. The Spirit, which gives life to all of creation, also 
preserves the space of creation for God's future indwelling 
by acting "against the hardenings of sin and the 
                                                                                                                                                
tradition he (Moltmann) had inherited, was the gradual turn to 
pneumatology"(96). Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, makes a 
similar point when he writes "It was through pneumatology that Moltmann 
softened the Barthian exclusiveness of the Word..."(45).
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petrifaction of death" (SL 56). The Spirit safeguards 
creation by keeping open the possibility of the future. 
There is a linking between the Spirit's "creating, his 
preserving, his renewing and his consummating activity" (GC 
12). The presence of the Spirit in forsaken creation allows 
creation to be understood as "ontic promise and the 
ontological parable, the real promise and the real symbol 
of the coming kingdom of God" (HTG 130). The presence of 
the Spirit points to the eschatological fulfillment of the 
promise and the Father's new creative activity. Moltmann 
describes the Spirit as that which "bridge[s] the 
difference between Creator and creature, the actor and the 
act, the master and the work -- a difference which 
otherwise seems to be unbridged by any relation at all" (TK 
113).
Given our understanding of Moltmann’s view of creation 
and the concurrent, contradictory movements in the original 
act of creation and creation’s restoration, we can add the 
following elements to our previous diagram.
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Figure 3
In this chapter, I have argued that Moltmann’s 
sustained account of difference/sameness which permeates 
his entire corpus is readily displayed in his discussion of 
coincidence of
      opposites
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love. The difference between agape (love for the unlike) 
and philia (love for the like) is simultaneously accounted 
for in terms of opposition and unity. In the next chapter 
we will examine how Jesus Christ as the nexus of agape and 
philia brings the hope of a new creation through his 
crucifixion and resurrection.
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Chapter 4
Jesus Christ as Cosmic Turning Point:
Identity in Infinite Contradiction
Simultaneously, the penetrating, indwelling movement 
of philia promises a future redeemed creation that is 
coming to be and the forsaking, creative movement of agape 
produces an original creation that is passing away. Or, to 
say it another way, the initial creative act prepares the 
way for the salvific act. For Moltmann, the initial 
creative act of agape and the subsequent (re)creative act 
of philia signify the two opposing, concurrent movements 
that generate the dynamic nature of reality. Whether this 
“coincidentia oppositorium” is described as the tension 
between present and future, forsakenness and hope, or 
history and promise, each of these contrasting pairs point 
to the ways in which divine love moves. 
In this chapter we will examine how Moltmann 
understands the incarnation, Good Friday, and Easter as 
revealing Jesus Christ to be the unity of the contradictory 
movements of philia and agape, and God’s contradiction of 
creation’s contradiction. Subsequently, the role of the 
Spirit in the redemptive process will be evaluated in the 
light of the tension apparent between creation and 
(re)creation. Once again, so I will argue, we will see the 
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emergence of basic contradictory motifs in Moltmann’s 
thought and their ultimate resolution in an all-surpassing 
and all-embracing unity of God.   
4a The Incarnation for Creation
The dynamic between creation and (re)creation leads to 
a distinction among what are called the 'times' of 
creation: 
"So if 'creation' is to be the quintessence of the 
whole divine creative activity, the corresponding doctrine 
of creation must then embrace creation in the beginning, 
creation in history, and the creation of the End-time: 
creatio originalis - creatio continua - creatio nova.  
'Creation' is the term for God's initial creation, his 
historical creation, and his perfected creation. The idea 
of God's unity is preserved only through the concept of 
creation as a meaningful coherent process. This process 
acquires its significance from its eschatological goal" (GC 
55, see also chp. 5 of GC). 
The intention for original creation was never to remain 
godforsaken. Within abandoned creation, agape has the 
potential to bring into existence that which is not and 
establish connections between inner-trinitarian life and 
creation. Creaturely existence is within a forsaken space, 
yet that space remains within god. The hope of creation is 
for the redemption of the forsaken space and of the 
abandoned creation by God. In the redemptive movement, the 
philia of the perichoretic community transforms into agape. 
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But agape, having already established a space of 
difference, comes to create connections between God and 
creatio originalis by revealing "the perfected self-
communication of the triune God" (TK 116) within the nihil. 
This perfected self-communication is the second person of 
the Trinity incarnate. In the incarnation, the Father 
achieves his desire; that is, he "acquires a twofold 
counterpart for his love: his Son and his image… he 
experiences…the response of the Son, which is self-evident 
-- a matter of course -- and the free response of the 
image" (TK 121).133  
This need of original creation as God’s different 
Other for the “perfected self-communication” of the inner-
trinitarian community means "the Son of God did not become 
man simply because of the sin of men and women, but rather 
for the sake of perfecting creation. So the Son of God 
would have become man even if the human race had remained 
without sin" (TK 116). The “intention” of the incarnation 
preceded any actualization of the nihil as the Son’s 
embodiment as the self-communication of God "fulfills this 
                                                
133 Ronald Goetz, “Karl Barth,  Jürgen Moltmann and the Theopaschite 
Revolution,” in Festschrift: A Tribute to Dr. William Hordern, ed. 
Walter Freitag (Saskatoon, Saskatchewan: University of Saskatchewan 
Press, 1985), 17-28, argues that agape seems to be understood as eros 
in Moltmann’s description of the Father’s love for the Son. He 
concludes that “Creation is the inevitable love child of the eros of 
the Father for the Son”(24).
106
design of creation" (TK 117). The result is that 
"Christology is more than the presupposition for 
soteriology" (TK 115). Because creation arises from the 
Father's eternal love for the Son "it is from eternity that 
the Son has been destined to be the Logos, the mediator of 
creation" (TK 112).134
There is an indissoluble link between the Son and 
creation from eternity: "the idea of the Son's mediating 
function in creation (which is necessary for the 
trinitarian concept) stands in correlation both to the idea 
of the incarnation of God's Son, and to the idea of the 
lordship of the Son of Man" (TK 112).135 From the very 
beginning, and even though it is grounded in divine love, 
creatio originalis's relationship with the Father has not 
been immediate. The Father's withdrawal to allow the space 
of difference meant that an intermediary had to bridge the 
gap between the Father and creatio originalis. The 
incarnation is viewed as a necessary transaction linking 
the opposing movements of creatio originalis and creatio 
                                                
134Compare with LaCugna’s, God for Us, summary of Gregory Palamas’ 
position: “Union with God according to hypostasis occurs only in 
Christ” (184). Note also her insight that “the influence of Pseudo-
Dionysius is apparent in Gregory’s description…” (185). In making such 
connections with Moltmann, a pattern of influence begins to emerge, 
flowing from Heraclitus and Pseudo-Dionysus.  See also Jean-Luc 
Marion’s “In the Name” in God, the Gift and Postmodernism for his 
interaction with Dionysus.
135 See also CG 94ff.
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nova.136 As isolated from the perichoretic community, 
creatio originalis could only receive divine love by God 
becoming like the different Other. 
The Son is the bond that maintains the identity 
through the times of creation.137 Creatio originalis is the 
creation that comes to be in the forsaken space that is in 
need of fulfillment by the Son. This is the first pulse of 
agape. Creation here moves historically towards its 
“eschatological goal.” Creatio nova arrives from the future 
to overcome/complete original creation. Here the incarnate 
Son enacts the second pulse of agape and God becomes “all 
in all.” Creatio continua describes the current situation 
where both of these movements are simultaneously 
experienced. The incarnate Jesus Christ is the linchpin, 
swivel, flip, or turning point between creatio originalis 
and creatio nova as he both bears the burden of 
godforsakenness and reveals the way of overcoming such 
forsakenness.138
                                                
136 As Richard Bauckham, “Eschatology in The Coming of God,” God Will be 
All in All: The Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2001) explains “… in principle there is no necessary continuity 
from this life and this world to eternal life” (8).
137 John Gresham, “The Social Model of the Trinity and its Critics” 
Scottish Journal of Theology 46 (1993), concludes, “Moltmann’s 
rejection of a Christology from above limits his ability to describe 
adequately the Christology implied by his trinitarian theology”(338). I 
would suggest this tension is further evidence of the two contrary 
movements in Moltmann’s thought.
138 John Cobb, Jr., “Reply to Jürgen Moltmann’s “The Unity of the Triune 
God”” St. Vladimirs Theological Quarterly 28(1984) identifies a problem 
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4b Incarnation as Mediation
In the incarnation, Jesus Christ mediates between the 
perichoretic community and creatio originalis. As shown, 
mediation was necessary from the moment creation came to be 
in a god-forsaken space. Creation's rejection of God 
through its self-reliant activity, thus actualizing the 
nihil, merely changed the form in which the Son was 
incarnate, not the need for the incarnate Son. The presence 
of sin meant that Christ had to take the form of a servant 
and suffer in his incarnation. In a creation where the 
nihil has been actualized, the incarnate Son "humiliates 
himself, accepting and adopting threatened and perverted 
human nature in its entirety, making it part of his eternal 
life" (TK 121). 
Here we can begin to make fuller sense of the claim 
that “the divinity of God is kenosis" (UL 120). In 
creating, God has withdrawn into himself for the sake of a 
different Other. The expectation was always present that 
God must enter into the forsakenness, but now in a sinful 
                                                                                                                                                
with “the way in which Moltmann connects, or almost identifies, the 
history of salvation events to which the New Testament witnesses with 
an everlasting tri-unity in God”(174).
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creation divine love as agape means that the Son must 
experience the cross. In the movement of creatio 
originalis, the Son must be abandoned in order for God’s 
perfected self-communication to resonate within the 
community of creation that has never experienced the less 
distinctive boundaries of perichoresis. In the cross, agape 
again becomes creative as divine love "communicates itself 
by overcoming its opposite" (TK 107). God bears the 
suffering of rejection as "he enters into the situation of 
their sin and God-forsakenness…(and) accepts and adopts it 
himself, making it part of his eternal life. Through this 
"outward incarnation" and "inward self-humiliation" God 
overcomes the opposition” (TK 119). This act "serves the 
reconciliation and redemption of men and women" and at the 
same time "God becomes the God who identifies himself with 
men and women to the point of death and beyond" (TK 119).139    
4c Eschatology and the Ontic Reversal 
                                                
139 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, points out that for 
Moltmann in the incarnation “God is not like us but actually one of us” 
(68). However, in a more critical article Bauckham,“Jürgen Moltmann and 
the Question of Pluralism,” maintains “We do not relate to Jesus the 
incarnate Son in the same way as we relate to God the Father”(161) 
raising the questions of identity and differentiation which plague 
Moltmann’s thought.
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The cross is the perichoretic community’s 
identification with forsaken reality.140 However the cross 
of Jesus is never to be considered in isolation from the 
resurrection just as one can never consider creatio 
originalis in isolation from creatio nova.141 Any 
deliberation on the cross necessarily entails the 
resurrection and any consideration of the resurrection must 
include the cross. Each event represents the opposing 
movements of reality. In historical time; that is, in the 
movement of the world that is passing away, “Jesus first 
died and was then raised” (COG 184).142 Eschatologically; 
that is, in the movement of the world coming to be, “he 
died as the risen Christ and was made flesh as the one who 
was to come” (COG 184). Thinking eschatologically in 
relation to the cross results in “the reversal of the 
noetic and the ontic order” (COG 184).143 Noetically, the 
experience of the cross has chronological priority and the 
cross comes to symbolize the movement of history towards 
                                                
140 See Jean-Pierre Thévenaz, “Le Dieu Crucifié N’a-T-Il Plus D’Histore?” 
Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 115 (1983), 199-208.
141 Ben Wiebe, “Revolution as an Issue in Theology: Jürgen Moltmann” 
Restoration Quarterly 24 (1981), 105-120, is concerned that Moltmann’s 
“emphasis on eschatology, his concentration on the future, prevents him 
from giving full weight to the place of God’s action in Christ in the 
present” (107).
142 Olson, “Trinity and Eschatology,” maintains that for Moltmann 
“Historical events become determinative of God’s eternal being” (217).
143 For Moltmann, as T.F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, One 
Being Three Persons, notes, “it is particularly through the death of 
Christ on the cross, and his cry of godforsakenness, that our 
understanding is opened to the Trinity”(54).
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original creation’s annihilation. Ontically, the experience 
of the resurrection has a logical priority and Easter comes 
to symbolize the new creative act that overcomes creation’s 
forsakenness.
 And at the same time, along these lines, “the 
incarnation of the Son is not something transitional. It is 
and remains to all eternity” (TK 119). Indeed, it is not 
speaking anthropomorphically to say that “if…the Son’s 
incarnation is his true humanity, then the incarnation 
reveals the true humanity of God” (TK 118). It belongs to 
“the quintessence of his divinity itself” (TK 118). Jesus 
Christ is from all eternity the hinge for both God and 
creation. In the incarnation of the Son both creatio 
originalis and creatio nova are intimately connected. 
Because of the linking of sameness and difference in Jesus 
Christ, he can function as the lens or prism through which 
reality is seen in its totality. The incarnate Son is both 
the one crucified and the one resurrected. The play between 
Good Friday and Easter is significant for Moltmann.144 Good 
Friday is creation in its utter despair and forsakenness. 
Easter is creation redeemed by God. As both the movements 
                                                
144 Olson, “Trinity and Eschatology,” explains that for Moltmann “the 
event of the cross, as central and determinative as it is, is not 
exclusively determinative of the inner trinitarian life of God, but is 
dependent upon the kingdom of the Father in creation and the kingdom of 
the Spirit in the liberation and union of creation in God”(220).
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of philia and agape exist in each event, the two events can 
never be separated, they are, so to speak, two sides of the 
same coin. The resurrected one is always the crucified one, 
while the crucified one is always the resurrected one. Both 
as the same and different Other, the incarnate Son Jesus 
Christ is "wholly and utterly" God's communication of 
himself. God's desire is to communicate "himself to his 
like and to his Other. God is love. That means he is 
responsive love, both in essence and freely"(TK 59). 
In such a perspective, we can understand the claim 
that "the disciples’ proclamation that he was raised from 
the dead... arises from, and is made necessary by, the 
comparing of the two contradictory experiences which they 
have of Christ" (TH 198). Experiencing the cross of Christ 
means for them, on the one hand, "the experience of the 
god-forsakenness of God's ambassador -- that is, an 
absolute nihil embracing also God" (TH 198). Experiencing 
Christ as the one raised from the dead, on the other hand 
"means for them the experience of the nearness of God in 
the god-forsaken one, of the divineness of God in the 
crucified and dead Christ -- that is, a new totality which 
annihilates the total nihil" (TH 198). Moltmann summarizes 
that these two experiences "stand in radical contradiction 
to each other" (TH 198). But it is in this total 
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contradiction that there is a "process of identification" 
(TH 198). In a nutshell, this harmony in contradiction is 
the genius of what I am calling Moltmann’s contradictory 
monism.
4d Identity in Infinite Contradiction
God assumes the contradiction between the godforsaken 
creation and the kingdom of God. God does not turn away 
from his opposite, but embraces the crucified Jesus and 
godforsaken creation in their difference. In the 
resurrection, the raising of Jesus to life, "God created 
continuity in this radical discontinuity." 145 The incarnate 
Son is the lens into this continuity as "the fundamental 
event in the Easter appearances then manifestly lies in the 
revelation of the identity and continuity of Jesus in the 
total contradiction of cross and resurrection, of god-
forsakenness and the nearness of God" (TH 199). The result 
of the dialectic of the cross is "an identity in total 
contradiction" (TH 199). Creatio nova is both continuous 
and discontinuous with creatio originalis. Jesus' identity 
is "in, but not above and beyond, cross and resurrection" 
                                                
145 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 33.
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(TH 200). The meanings of the cross and resurrection cannot 
be conflated with one another as both are an inherent part 
of Jesus' identity.146 Moltmann insists "the Alpha and Omega 
are the same as far as the Person is concerned...But they 
are not the same where the reality of the event is 
concerned"(TH 229). Creatio originalis’s history climaxes 
on Good Friday, God counters with a creatio nova on Easter. 
Good Friday and Easter are two sides of the same coin.147
Death is the absence of life, which is indicative of 
godforsakenness, but also represents an emptiness that God 
fills. Re-establishing a relationship between godforsaken, 
creatio originalis and the God who comes from the future is 
possible because "in all the qualitative difference of 
cross and resurrection Jesus is the same" (TH 85). Even in 
the forsakenness of the cross, Jesus is the risen one. In 
the nexus of creatio originalis and creatio nova, “this 
identity in infinite contradiction is theologically 
understood as an event of identification, an act of the 
faithfulness of God" (TH 85). The identity of Jesus in the 
cross and resurrection is significant because "God reveals 
himself as 'God' where he shows himself as the same and is 
thus known as the same" (TH 116). In God's identification 
                                                
146 See Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 32ff.
147 See Pannenberg, Systematic Theology 1, 314ff..
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with Jesus, he becomes "identifiable… (as) he identifies 
himself with himself in the historic act of his
faithfulness" (TH 116). The identity of Jesus within the 
contradiction "is the ground of the hope which carries 
faith through the trials of the god-forsaken world and of 
death" (TH 85).
The cross and resurrection are the contradiction-in-
unity events par excellence for Moltmann. They manifest 
both the contradiction of philia and agape and their 
simultaneous underlying unity. Philia first transforms, or 
“flips,” into agape in order to allow for the difference 
necessary for the creation of God’s different Other. 
Agape’s second “flip” leads to creatio nova. Through 
embodying the forsakenness of agape, Jesus becomes the 
perfected self-communication to an abandoned creation. In 
this movement, identity "exists only through the 
contradiction" (TH 200). Identity is dependent upon two 
opposing, concurrent movements in an "open dialectic, which 
will find its resolving synthesis only in the eschaton of 
all things" (TH 201). 
Identity exists in the opposing movements of reality. 
Even though in the cross we see the creatio originalis that 
is passing away and in the resurrection we see the creatio 
nova of the world that is coming to be, the eschatological 
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resolution is not yet complete. From the perspective of 
history, the creatio nova has not fully arrived nor has 
creatio originalis been entirely overcome. After the Christ 
event, oppositional pairs characterize the age: the past 
and the future, the cross and the resurrection, history and 
promise. This in-between stage is creatio continua. Tension 
is located in post resurrection creation, as experienced 
historically, because the dialectical process continues. 
Knowledge of the future of creation and of Christ remains 
provisional as "the future of Christ... can be stated only 
in promises" (TH 202-03). The coming eschaton of Christ in 
which the creatio nova will be fully realized has not 
yielded noetic certainty in the creatio continua, hence
"promise stands between knowing and not knowing, between 
necessity and possibility, between that which is not yet 
and that which already is" (TH 203). 
Historically, creation is still experiencing the 
reality of the nihil in its godforsakenness and must live 
in anticipation of its redemption and the return of its 
Messiah. While, in reality’s eschatological direction, God 
has arrived in the resurrection of Jesus, God’s arrival is 
yet to be fully experienced historically. Even though God’s 
presence in creation has been manifested and promised in 
God's identification with the crucified Christ by raising 
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him to life, creatio originalis and creatio nova’s 
movements have yet to be fully reconciled. Living in the 
time of promise means awaiting the final identity of Christ 
as "all the titles of Christ point messianically forward" 
(TH 203). The dialectic of cross and resurrection continues 
as godforsaken creation awaits its redemption and as God 
moves from the future towards creation. 
In the creatio continua "the resurrection and the 
future of God must manifest themselves not only in the case 
of the god-forsakenness of the crucified Jesus Christ, but 
also in that of the god-forsakenness of the world" (TH 
169). The cosmic process is affected by the cross and 
resurrection of Jesus as "the whole world is now involved 
in God's eschatological process of history, not only the 
world of men and nations" (TH 137). The identity of Jesus 
through Good Friday and Easter results not in "a mere 
return to life as such, but as a conquest of the deadliness 
of death -- as a conquest of god-forsakenness..."(TH 
211).148
4e Creation and the Internal Suffering of the Trinity
The redemption of creation from its forsaken history 
depends, for Moltmann, upon God's ability to suffer the 
                                                
148 Peters, God as Trinity, summarizes Moltmann's answer to this question 
when he says "it is the God who is love and who suffers because of this 
love who is revealed to us in scripture"(112).
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forsakenness of creatio originalis. In identifying with 
creation through the incarnate Son, God takes the suffering 
of his different Other upon himself. God's love that bears 
the pain of creation is not only an external relationship; 
rather, "it also affects the trinitarian fellowship in God 
himself" (TK 24). We can investigate the depth of this 
suffering by once again looking at agape and philia. Agape
as like for the unlike is also a suffering love. As we 
already have examined, the movement of divine love between 
God and creation in the direction of creatio originalis is 
a transmutation of philia into agape. Agape abandons as it 
calls into being that which did not exist, God’s different 
Other. But agape is also the divine love found within 
forsaken creation. The love of the incarnate Son for 
creatio originalis has to be agape. Only the love that 
suffers and calls into being that which does not exist can 
characterize the cross and resurrection. But now the divine
suffering is described as affecting “the Trinitarian 
fellowship in God himself.” In this movement, agape
transmutes, or “flips,” back into philia and carries 
suffering into the perichoretic community.   
In agape becoming philia, "the extra-trinitarian 
suffering and the inner-trinitarian suffering correspond" 
(TK 25), a “divine passion which God suffers for us” and a 
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“divine passion between the Father and the Son in the 
Trinity” (TK 25). The suffering that God endures and 
embraces through the cross of his Son is not merely the 
pain Jesus bore in his humanity. Moltmann is not satisfied 
to speak only of the godforsakenness of the Son on the 
cross. On the cross, while the Son suffers from being 
forsaken, "the Father also suffers the forsakenness of the 
Son" (Passion, 23). Though initially the suffering of the 
forsakenness by the Son and the pain of the abandoning of 
the Son by the Father do not correspond, ultimately "the 
Passion of Christ also affects God himself and becomes the 
Passion of God" (PS, 23). 
The initial lack of correspondence between the 
suffering of the Son and the suffering of the Father 
manifests the difference between the Son’s agape and the 
Father’s philia within the divine community.149  In the 
dynamics of the Father's forsaking of the Son, the Son's 
being forsaken, the suffering of the Father in his love for 
the forsaken one in his death and the suffering of the Son 
in his love as he is forsaken by the Father, Moltmann 
argues that the pain itself is taken up into the Father's 
life and thereby into the triune community. In taking the 
                                                
149 Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives, 61, notes that in Moltmann 
there is “a trinitarian theology that combines the cross and divine 
suffering.”  Suffering is not merely present in Jesus Christ’s human 
nature, but at the heart of divine life.
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suffering into the divine community, the suffering of God 
becomes an intrinsic and necessary part of triune 
relations. The connection is so deep "we can only talk 
about God's suffering in trinitarian terms" (TK 25). The 
suffering of divine love takes place not only in "the 
redeeming acts of God outwards" (TK 24), but also within 
the divine life.150
Once pain and suffering become a necessary part of 
inner-trinitarian life, they are shared in the giving and 
receiving of philia in perichoresis. This (re)definition of 
philia in terms of a shared suffering produces a 
"retroactive effect" (TK 161) on divine life. Eschatology 
supercedes history as "the pain of the cross determines the 
inner life of the triune God from eternity to eternity" (TK 
161).151 Divine suffering is not a suffering from creation. 
Suffering does not move from the external creation into 
divine life. Rather, "the divine suffering of love outwards 
is grounded in the pain of love within" (TK 25). Creation’s 
fallenness neither initiates nor determines the divine 
                                                
150 But as Jansen, Relationality and the Concept of God, notes, “the 
question still remains as to whether the Father loves what is like in 
the suffering Son…or the unlike?”(137).
151 Ahlers, “Theory of God and Theological Method, Dialog 22 (1983), 235-
250, asks the question: "In short, it appears essential to state that 
God was present on the cross. But is it legitimate to invert this 
statement and say that the cross is also present in God?" (250). While 
Moltmann would agree that a distinction must be kept between the two 
statements, he would also affirm that God's presence at the cross means 
that the cross is part of divine life.
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suffering for Moltmann. Rather, divine suffering precedes 
and makes possible creation. In the overcoming of creatio 
originalis by creatio nova, divine life changes from what 
is into what will be, “even though the divine relationship 
to the world is primarily determined by that inner 
relationship. The growth of knowledge of the immanent 
Trinity from the saving experience of the cross of Christ 
makes this necessary." 152 In and through agape becoming 
philia, the suffering of God for the world – “extra-
trinitarian suffering” – and the divine passion between 
Father, Son, Spirit, and creation correspond.
4f The Suffering Spirit
Working with the assertion that suffering is found 
within the perichoretic community, it is not unexpected to 
find the Spirit also involved in God’s identification with 
forsaken creation.153 Divine suffering does not initiate, 
                                                
152 For an interesting article comparing Kazo Kitamora's view of divine 
suffering with Moltmann's, see Isao Kuratmatsu, "Die gegenwörtige 
Kreuzestheologie und Luther, besonders in Rücksicht auf die Theologie 
des Schmerzes Gottes von Kazo Kitamori" Kerygma und Dogma 36 (1990), 
273-283. 
153 Much recent work has been done on Moltmann’s understanding of the 
Holy Spirit. For example, see Tae Wha Yoo, The Spirit of Liberation: 
Jürgen Moltmann’s Trinitarian Pneumatology (Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2003) 
and Peter Althouse, Spirit of the Last Days: Pentecostal Eschatology in 
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rather it precedes and makes possible creation. Both the 
Father and the Son identified with creation through their
sharing of creation's suffering. For the Spirit to identify 
with creation and allow it to participate in divine life 
there must also be a sharing of creation's suffering.154
Moltmann interprets the description of the Spirit as 
"descending" upon Christ as pointing to the "self-
restriction and self-humiliation of the eternal Spirit" (SL 
61). Moltmann argues that the Spirit both leads and 
accompanies Jesus.155 In accompanying Jesus, the Spirit is 
"drawn into [Jesus'] sufferings, and becomes his companion 
in suffering" (SL 62). As Jesus' companion in suffering, 
"the Spirit is the transcendent side of Jesus' immanent way 
of suffering" (SL 62). Like the Father and the Son, the 
Spirit's suffering involves a self-restriction and self-
humiliation. Hence, "the 'condescendence' of the Spirit 
leads to the progressive kenosis of the Spirit, together 
with Jesus" (SL 62). 
                                                                                                                                                
Conversation with Jürgen Moltmann (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
2003).
154 LaCugna, God for Us, argues that “If the Holy Spirit is seen 
primarily as the intradivine bond of love between Father and Son 
(filioque), then the Spirit’s sanctifying power is seen as extrinsic to 
the creature”(297).
155 “But if the suffering of God is manifest in the separation of the 
Father and the Son, in the abandonment of the Son by the Father, how 
are these persons united so that they may constitute God?” queries 
Waite, Theism, Atheism and the Doctrine of the Trinity (Atlanta: 
scholars Press, 1987, in his analysis of Moltmann. He then answers, “It 
is the Holy Spirit that unites the Father and the Son in their 
separation” (98).
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Here again clearly the Spirit’s connection with 
creatio originalis is agape. But the kenosis of the Spirit, 
unlike that of the Father and Son, is not an end unto 
itself. The kenosis of the Spirit allows for the 
identification and involvement of the Spirit in the Son's 
suffering and "it is precisely his suffering with the Son 
to the point of death on the cross which makes the rebirth 
of Christ from the Spirit inwardly possible" (SL 68). The 
Spirit is key in the countering movement of creatio nova as 
through agape’s creative powers the Spirit "participates in 
the dying of the Son in order to give him new 'life from 
the dead'" (SL 68). Once again the reversal from the 
movement of agape as forsaking to the movement of agape as 
resurrecting is precipitated by the incarnation of the Son 
in an abandoned creation. In spite of the emphasis placed 
on the incarnation of the Son, Good Friday and Easter must 
be understood as thoroughly Trinitarian as "[the Spirit] 
accompanies Christ to his end, he can make this end the new 
beginning"(SL 68). 
Agape and its creatio originalis are kenotic. The 
cross represents the culmination of the emptying of the 
Father, Son, and Spirit for creation. This kenotic movement 
in which God empties himself is transformed in the Christ 
event as the presence of God overcomes the emptiness in 
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agape’s creatio nova. Indwelt by the Spirit of life, 
creation arises from the dead. 
4g Agape towards Theosis  
Creatio nova is not the result of a divine withdrawal, 
instead, "In the gift and through the powers of the Holy 
Spirit a new divine presence is experienced in creation"(GC 
96). Through the presence of the Spirit, "God the creator 
takes up his dwelling in his creation and makes it his 
home"(GC 96). The eschatological movement is towards a re-
filling of the godforsaken space. Creation arrives at its 
completion "in the operation and indwelling of the Spirit, 
the creation of the Father through the Son, and the 
reconciliation of the world with God through Christ, arrive 
at their goal" (GC 96). Or phrased differently, "the 
presence and the efficacy of the Spirit is the 
eschatological goal of creation and reconciliation" (GC 
96). The Spirit is understood to be "the One who gives life 
to the world and allows it to participate in God's eternal 
life" (GC 97).
The perichoretic community identifies with forsaken 
creation through a kenosis that leads to divine presence.156
                                                
156 Peters, God as Trinity, insightfully points out that Moltmann echoes 
Hegel when “he says the Trinity achieves its integrative unity 
principally by uniting itself with the history of the world” (110).
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Divine agape’s creativity in the midst of forsakenness 
reclaims creation as its own. Finally, a community between 
God and his different Other emerges. But the role of the 
different Other has been altered for the sake of the 
community. In creatio originalis “creation exists because 
the eternal love communicates himself creatively to his 
Other," whereas creatio nova "exists because the eternal 
love seeks fellowship and desires response in freedom" (TK 
59). Likewise, having a different Other freely acting was 
not the hope of creating a different Other. Creating a free 
Other is not enough because "self-communicating love...only 
becomes fulfilled when its love is returned" (TK 117). God 
is not fulfilled in the freedom of the Other, but in the 
free acceptance by the Other of God's gift of fellowship 
through mutual indwelling. In the desired perichoretic
community of inner-trinitarian and extra-trinitarian 
relations, God "only came fully to himself by virtue of 
that Other's response to his love" (TK 107). 
4h The Deification of Creation
Freedom of the different Other is transcended when God 
returns creation to himself as the very conditions of 
freedom are overcome in the warm confines of perichoresis. 
God's ultimate creative desire is not that a different 
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Other exists, but that the different Other is in community 
with him. God's intent never was for creation to remain 
disconnected from him in a forsaken space, but that through 
the opposition a greater unity would form as God (re)filled 
the space pf creation.157 The promise at the initial 
separation of God and his different Other was that God 
would delimit the space within himself and fully indwell 
the Other as the Other had dwelt within him. 
The Father's desire for community with his Other 
affirms the Other's difference while simultaneously 
overriding difference for the sake of community. His giving 
love is fulfilled when he "finds bliss in the eternal 
response to his love through the Son. . .he also desires to 
find bliss through this other's responsive love" (TK 117). 
Because God "needs" the response of his different Other in 
order to find his bliss, which is to experience intimate 
community with all of reality, opposition must be overcome. 
The overcoming of opposition is not merely a removal of 
sin’s actualization of the nihil, but an annihilation of 
the very conditions of creatio originalis. Moltmann 
summarizes, "if the misery of creation lies in sin as 
separation from God, then salvation consists in the 
                                                
157 Moltmann’s appeal to the notion of deification has a long theological 
tradition rooted in the Cappadocians; particularly in Basil, Gregory of 
Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa.
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gracious acceptance of the creature into communion with 
God. Salvation lies in this union. The union with God of 
what is separated is not just an external union" (HTG 87). 
The divine unity which is being achieved in the 
perichoretic relationships of the Trinity overflows into 
creation through God's excessive giving to/for the Other. 
The agape that was a withdrawal becomes an agape that fills 
as "the unity of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit is 
then the eschatological question about the consummation of 
the trinitarian history of God. The unity of the three 
Persons of this history must consequently be understood as 
a communicable unity and as an open, inviting unity, 
capable of integration" (TK 149). 
Through a kenosis that fills, the divine community 
draws creation closer and closer together. Creation then is 
internally joined with the divine community. This union is 
not the connection of God with creation, but the 
transformation of identity as God's different Other becomes 
part of the divine community through an "eschatological 
becoming-one-with God"(GC 229).158 This process of becoming-
                                                
158 Gregory Palamas distinguishes between divine essence (ousia) and 
divine energies (energeiai).  While God’s essence is unknowable and 
imparticible, the energies which are modalities of God action in the 
world are knowable and open to participation. See J. Meyendorff, A 
Study of Gregory Palamas (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 
1964) for a full treatment and Lacugna’s, God for Us, chp.6 for a 
concise consideration.  See also R. Williams. “The Philosophical 
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one-with-God of human beings is “theosis” (GC 229).159 That 
is, wherever God has emptied himself, he eventually returns 
to fill that space with his presence.160 This (re)filling 
simultaneously in/validates the movement of kenosis. It 
validates the kenosis by recognizing the necessity of 
opposition for the greater unity. This, after all, is the 
only way divine love exhausts its desire and achieves its 
end. But theosis invalidates the difference found in the 
oppositional space as the new community violates the 
boundaries previously established for difference. The 
divine love which was for the different Other is overcome 
as God replicates himself in his overwhelming giving. 
Perichoretic love is philia not agape. 
Divine agape for the different Other leads the Other 
back into the divine community. For true community between 
God and creation, creation must be "indwelt," 
                                                                                                                                                
Structures of Palamism,” Eastern Churches Review 9/1-2(1977), 19-26. 
Williams critiques the placing of essence above energies as “once ousia
has been ‘concretized’into a core of essential life, it will inevitably 
take on some associations of superiority or ontological priority” (34).
159 Moltmann’s use of theosis is always in conjunction with his idea of 
perichoresis.  Creation’s participation in the Trinity “make’s it 
possible to preserve both the unity and difference of what is diverse 
in kind” (COG, 278).  Similarly, Fiddes, Participating in God, notes 
that theosis as “not becoming God, but being incorporated into the 
fellowship of the divine life” (76). The question of the conditions of 
that participation has not yet been addressed. 
160 Schuurman, “Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics,” argues that “hopes for 
any sort of continuity between creation and re-creation are effectively 
smashed by predictions that whatever created beings there will be…will 
be divested of temporality, relationality, the possibility for change—
stripped of all the limitations the Creator so tenderly set about us 
and called “very good,””(50). 
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"interpenetrated," and "raised up" into divine life.161 The 
agape found in the creatio original relationship between 
God and his different Other ultimately is transformed into 
the philia of inner-trinitarian relationships. Creatio nova
is a "friend of God." 162 Despite the painstaking 
differentiation between agape and philia, in the end they 
are the same for "the love with which God creatively and 
sufferingly loves the world is no different from the love 
he himself is in eternity" (TK 59). 
But the love that God is in eternity lacks difference. 
Even in the differentiation of the Trinity, sameness 
dominates the divine community as Father, Son, and Spirit 
are of one essence. For creation as different Other to 
become part of the divine community, it must become like 
God. Moltmann describes the result of God's love for 
creation: "God's love for his Other is then in actual fact 
nothing else than the extended love of God for the one like 
                                                
161 David Cunningham, These Three are One (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1998), in his chapter (165-95) on participation in has an excellent 
discussion regarding problems surrounding the use of 
“interpenetration.”
162 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, explains that deification leads to a 
transformation of the biological as it “endow(s) the (biological) with 
being, to give it true ontology, that is eternal life” (63). Like 
Moltmann, Zizioulas wants to emphasize both a radical change in 
creation through theosis and the continuity of creation. Compare with 
Moltmann’s assertion that “through [creation’s] participation in God’s 
eschatological presence, ‘a world without end’ comes into being…”(GC
184). Hence, as LaCugna’s, God for Us, point that the struggle to live 
as Jesus Christ lived for Zizioulas “is not a flight from nature , from 
body, from eros , from world, but the hypostatization of the biological 
in a nonbiological way”(264) could also describe Moltmann’s ethics of 
discipleship. 
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himself. The deification of the world and humanity is the 
necessary conclusion..." (TK 107). In theosis, creation 
becomes deified. The divinization of creation results in a 
perichoretic relationship between God and creation: "God in 
the world and the world in God" (GC 17) in which there is 
"reciprocal indwelling and mutual interpenetration" (GC 
17).163 This indwelling and interpretation transforms the 
Other as "anyone who knows that he is eternally loved by 
God becomes God's eternal Son. So God is as dependent on 
him as he is on God" (TK 107).
4i Same, yet, Different
Creation's joining of the divine community means 
evolving from mediated connection to unmediated fellowship 
and changing from different Other to same Other. Each of 
these indicates a change for a created being. But Moltmann 
counters his assertion that creation is deified with claims 
asserting creation's difference: "What is Other in 
confrontation with God is not identical with the otherness 
of God" (TK 107). In clarifying the statement that God's 
                                                
163 There is an interesting contrast between Moltmann’s synonymous usage 
of perichoresis, interpenetration, and participation with Radical 
Orthodoxy’s use of participation which Milbank, Ward, and Pickstock 
claim as a central theological framework for their work. In Radical 
Othodoxy: A New Theology, ed. J. Milbank, C. Pickstock, and G. Ward, 
(London: Routledge, 1999) participation is understood in a Platonic way 
“because any alternative configuration perforce reserves a territory 
independent of God” Radical Orthodoxy, 3). Moltmann would be suspicious 
that such a conception is too static.  
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love makes creation God's son, the argument is made that 
divine love "does not turn the world into the Son, or make 
the Son the world" (TK 107). Rather, those who return God's 
love become 'sons of God' but not "the only begotten Son" 
(TK 107) as "the distinction between the world process and 
the inner-trinitarian process must be maintained and 
emphasized" (TK 107). 
Difference is promoted as "even in the kingdom of glory the 
world remains God's creation and will not become God 
himself" (GC 184). 
Deification does not mean that “human beings are 
transformed into gods,” but that they “partake of the 
characteristics and rights of the divine nature through 
their community with Christ” (CG 272). Here Moltmann 
attempts to protect the eschatological difference in 
similarity between Creator and creation. Again, as I have 
represented in the diagram below, the simultaneous 
assertion of contradictory statements is evident. There is 
the argument that God and creation remain distinct and the 
concurrent argument that God's presence overwhelms new 
creation in the process of deification. While holding the 
Creator and creation distinction, there is also the 
understanding that in the eschatological refilling of 
creation with God's presence, God overcomes every self-
132
limitation he previously set, and in the end, they are the 
same.   
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Moltmann highlights the tension in this contradictory 
state of affairs when he explains that "without the 
difference between Creator and creature, creation cannot be 
conceived of at all; but this difference is embraced and 
comprehended by the greater truth which is what the 
creation narrative really comes down to, because it is the 
truth from which it springs: the truth that God is all in 
all" (GC 89). This statement is consistent with Moltmann's 
privileging of unity, even as the difference continues. For 
differentiation is not the "greater truth" of Moltmann's 
thought. Rather, God's goal for the different Other is 
achieved through his delimitation whereby the relationship 
between God and creation becomes direct and a fellowship of
same Others. The greater truth points to the unity of 
perichoresis, not the differentiation found in kenosis. 
Kenosis is not the end, but the path to the goal of God's 
overwhelming presence. Theosis needs kenosis as God comes 
to himself through creation. 
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Chapter 5
The Sabbath Feast of Redemption:
Cosmic Perichoresis
As we have seen at the conclusion of chapter four, 
Moltmann argues that the unmediated correspondences and 
connections between created time and inner-trinitarian life 
result in greater ontological dissimilarity and 
eschatological similarity. It is striking because he also 
asserts, as we have also seen, that in redemption the 
relational space of creation outside of God collapses and 
“attains to its place in God” (COG 307). In God, creation 
finds its “community” through the “reciprocal indwelling” 
and “mutual interpenetrations” (GC 16) of the Father, Son, 
and Spirit as “in the triune God is the mutuality and the 
reciprocity of love” (CG 17). 
In this chapter, we will be seeking to understand, as 
precisely as possible, how Moltmann can simultaneously 
assert that God penetrates his creation thereby becoming 
“all in all” even as a greater eschatological dissimilarity 
between Creator and creation is realized.164 In pursuing our 
answer to this question, we will be examining Moltmann’s 
                                                
164 Metz, "Suffering unto God" Critical Inquiry 20(1994), 611-623,
raises the question of difference when he is critical of the apparent 
lack of space between God and creation in Moltmann. In Moltmann’s 
version of eschatological unity, Metz sees no room for difference.
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conceptualization of the kingdom of glory which he also 
calls the Sabbath feast of redemption. Within this 
discussion, the relationship between philia and agape will 
again ask for our attention. Finally, under the impact of 
Moltmann’s key references to contradiction and unity at 
crucial junctures of his theology, we will suggest that the 
fundamental structural features of his thought can be 
appropriately, and beneficially, understood as a 
contradictory/harmonic monism.
5a   Primordial Self-Restriction
        and Eschatological De-restriction
For Moltmann, we have already established that creatio 
originalis came into existence as unfulfilled.165 Creatio 
originalis is deficient as God’s complete indwelling is 
incomplete due to God’s “primordial self-restrictions” (COG 
282). From its inception creation awaits its realization 
through a divine filling.166 Such completion entails the 
                                                
165  Wood, “From Barth’s Trinitarian Christology,” claims that “No one 
writing in the area of theology has developed more clearly the nature 
of God as Creator ex nihilo”(64), but as we have noted, this only 
identifies one of the movements in Moltmann’s thought. The idea of lack 
in creation has a long history. In the neoplatonic tradition the very 
idea of love is rooted in this lack.
166 There has been much discussion in the recent years regarding the 
relationship between creation and eschaton and the issues of continuity 
and discontinuity. For example, see Douglas Schuurman, Creation, 
Eschaton, and Ethics: The Ethical Significance of Creation-Eschaton 
Relation in the Thought of Emil Brunner and Jürgen Moltmann (New York: 
Peter Land, 1991) and Volf, “Eschaton, Creation, and Social Ethics” 
Calvin Theological Journal 30(1995), 130-43.
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overcoming of the actualized nihil by God’s kenosis and by 
creation’s fulfillment by God’s theosis into the 
forsakenness of agape’s originating withdrawal.167
While God may not fully dwell in creatio originalis, 
God’s “immanence in creation” is still experienced under 
these conditions (GC 280). The simultaneity of creation’s 
lack and God’s movement of redemption towards creation are 
manifest in what Moltmann calls “the Sabbath of creation.” 
God has not yet come to complete rest in creation, but 
neither is he absent. The Sabbath represents both the 
promised presence of “the completion of creation” and “the 
revelation of God’s reposing existence in his creation” (GC 
288). This reposing existence is “not a created grace” (GC 
281) which characterizes the work of the cross, rather, the 
Sabbath here “is the uncreated grace of God’s presence for 
the whole of creation” (GC 281). 
This presence, for Moltmann, is meant to be 
experienced in the forsakenness as is evident in the giving 
of the Sabbath commandment to Israel. The Sabbath 
commandment is the way to be followed as it prepares 
creation for “its true future” (GC 276) and thereby 
anticipates the completion of creation. As revelation, the 
                                                
167  See Pannenberg, Systematic Theology 1, 384ff., for his discussion of 
the proper action of God being his his breaking into the world.
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Sabbath “manifests the world’s identity as creation, 
sanctifies it, and blesses it” (GC 276). In the midst of 
forsakenness, the Sabbath presence “preserves created 
things from obliteration” (GC 282) until God “comes to 
himself again” (GC 279).  This “true future” will be 
consummated when creation “participate[s] in God’s 
manifested, eternal presence” (GC 277) and enjoys God’s 
“eternal Sabbath” (GC 288). 
The differences noted in Moltmann’s pairing of created 
grace and uncreated grace, Sabbath as revelation and 
Sabbath as the completion of creation, again point to the 
structure of his cosmogony. The contradictory movements are 
increasingly noticeable as Moltmann works out his 
description of the Sabbath as “the identifying mark of the 
biblical doctrine of creation” (GC 276). In Moltmann’s 
words, creation was “for the sake of the Sabbath” (GC 
277).168 Concurrently, “the Sabbath represents creation’s 
redemption” (GC 277). Looking at both movements we can make 
sense of Moltmann’s claim that creation has been brought 
into being “for the sake of that redemption” (GC 277-8). 
God’s “creation of a world different from himself is the 
first step towards realizing…the essence of his nature” (GC 
80). Without creation’s original lack, creation’s “meaning 
                                                
168 See Walsh, “Theology of Hope,” 60ff.
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and destination” (GC 278) could not have been in its 
redemption.  Without the Sabbath “feast of creation,” 
creation would have remained incomplete and unfulfilled. 
The unity and harmony of these movements is evident 
when Moltmann explains that “the sabbath of God’s creation 
already contains in itself the redemptive mystery of God’s 
indwelling in his creation” and “the Sabbath of creation is 
already the beginning of the kingdom of glory” (GC 280). 
The Sabbath’s fulfillment is in the “feast of completion” 
(GC 277) when creation comes to rest in God and “becomes 
entirely God’s creation” (GC 277). Here all of creation 
experiences the “direct, unmediated presence of God” and 
“find their dwelling” (GC 282). The “feast of completion” 
is the end of time as creation “exit[s] from time into 
eternity” (COG 294). The end of time is “the converse of 
time’s beginning” (COG 294). In contrast to time beginning 
with God’s “primordial self-restrictions,” the 
eschatological moment of the feast of completion involves 
God’s “resolve to redeem“ and the “’derestriction’ of God” 
(COG 294). The results of this eschatological delimitation 
of God is the appearance of “his unveiled glory” (COG 294) 
in creation and the calling into being “a kind of cosmic 
perichoresis of divine and cosmic attributes” (COG 295).     
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 When God delimits himself in the “feast of 
completion,” creation becomes “partakers of the divine 
nature” (COG 272) which means they participate  in “the 
characteristics and rights of the divine nature through 
their community with Christ, the God-human being” (COG 
272). In this feast of redemption, we see “beyond the 
Sabbath to a future in which God’s creation and his 
revelation will be one” (COG 288). Here “we understand
redemption as both ‘the eternal sabbath’ and ‘the new 
creation’” (COG 288).     
  
5b Creatio Originalis for the Sake of Creatio Nova
Redemption, for Moltmann, seems to be merely part of 
the outworking of a genetic cosmogony. Or it may be more 
properly understood that creation is simultaneously valued 
and devalued as it exists “for the sake of redemption.”169
The intent for creatio originalis was to be overcome by 
creatio nova. The initial differentiation between God and 
creation is for the purpose of a greater identity. Both 
God’s and creation’s identity is realized eschatologically. 
Moltmann’s doctrine of the incarnation shows redemption to 
                                                
169 Walsh, "Theology of Hope," 61.
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be a predictable stage in the cosmic process. The gift of 
the Son is not a gracious response to the Fall.170 Recall 
the statements that "it is from eternity that the Son has 
been destined to be the Logos, the mediator of creation" 
(TK 112) and "the Son of God did not become man simply 
because of the sin of men and women, but rather for the 
sake of perfecting creation. So the Son of God would have 
become man even if the human race had remained without sin" 
(TK 116). 
Hence creation's redemption comes with a price. The 
space of difference is filled with God's presence in the 
coming eschaton. The incarnation is not a validation of the 
goodness of creation lost through sin. Rather, it is the 
revelation that creation is other than God. But for 
Moltmann, other-than-God means disconnected from God. 
Creation is God's opposite. If God is life, love, and 
community, then creation is death, despair, and isolation. 
The redemption of God's opposite comes through a return. 
The return of forsaken creation to God and God's return to 
forsaken creation is the overcoming of God's opposite. 
Creatio originalis was formed in the space abandoned 
by God. God’s desire for a different Other was articulated 
                                                
170 Volf, “Eschaton, Creation, and Social Ethics,” following Moltmann 
argues for a primacy of the eschaton, but notes that “Primacy is not 
monopoly” (137).
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in terms of a spatial struggle. There was an inverse 
relationship between God and creatio originalis.  Without 
God’s withdrawal, there was no room for creation. For 
creation to be, it must be surrounded by the threatening 
nihil and not God’s presence. Even if the nihil is not 
actualized until creation acts, there is essentially 
identification between creation and fall. So it makes 
perfect sense that the Son must come as incarnate whether 
or not creation “sins.” The isolation and disconnection of 
God from creation, what I would want to call evil, has 
taken place prior to the possibility of sin.171
5c  Moltmann’s Economy of Lack/Fulfillment
While Moltmann calls the original task of incarnation 
the completion of creation, such completion is necessary 
because of a lack, the lack of God’s presence.172 The 
complication in talking about a lack in creation is that 
Moltmann always also speaks of a divine presence. As we 
have seen even when creation is understood as an overflow 
                                                
171 See Nicholas Ansell, “The Call of Wisdom/ The Voice of the Serpent: A 
Canonical Approach to the Tree of Knowledge” Christian Scholars Review
31, 31-58 for his discussion of the origin of evil. Ansell’s re-reading 
of Genesis 1-3 argues that evil has a human origin as opposed to 
Moltmann’s theodicy which suggests a divine source.
172 As Schuurman, “Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics,”  points out, “The 
“negative” that is here “negated” is sin, not creation, but Moltmann 
does not carefully separate creation and sin”(49). In a similar 
insight, Walsh, “Theology of Hope,” concludes that for Moltmann “sin is 
seens as ontologically constitutive of transitory ‘burdened’ 
creatureliness…”(63).
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or excess of divine philia, the creation of a different 
Other demands a transformation of philia into agape and a 
conceding of space as “if God were omnipresent in the 
absolute sense… there would be no earthly creation” (COG 
306). In the yielding of space there is “remoteness from 
God” and a “spatial distance” which must be understood as a 
“grace of creation” (COG 306). Remoteness and distance are 
gracious because they are the conditions for “the liberty 
of created beings” (COG 306). 
In the direction of history there is a presence, but 
it is the presence of creation within God. The divine 
presence in creation is in the eschatological direction, 
here the incarnate Son has “contradicted creation’s 
contradiction” and the Spirit has been poured out and is 
indwelling creation. In the indwelling and fulfillment of 
creation by God “the distanced contraposition of the 
creator towards his creation becomes the inner presence of 
God in his creation” (COG 307). As creation becomes the 
“house of God,” the relationships between Creator and 
created beings are “without mediation” (COG 307) and lead 
to direct participation in the divine life. There is a 
“mutual indwelling of the world in God and God in the 
world” (COG 307).
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The eschatological, redemptive direction is a 
necessary counterpart that in/validates the forsaking of 
creatio originalis. The lack of God’s presence in the 
historical movement of creation prepares for the Maker’s 
necessary redemption or fulfilling. Creation’s initial lack 
requires the agape of redemption to avoid merely being 
forsaken and transient and for completion agape must 
transform into philia. 
Moltmann stresses we must take seriously "the 
difference between grace and glory, between reconciliation 
and redemption" (HTG 130). If this difference is not taken 
seriously "we make too many demands on the covenant and the 
history of God with men and women, because it is already 
meant to give what only theosis, the visible indwelling of 
God in his new creation, can give to all creatures" (HTG 
130). Exactly what does theosis give? In order for God to 
visibly dwell in new creation something fundamental must be 
new about creation. Yet, forsakenness is the path creation 
had to take to get to new creation. Forsakenness and 
disconnection were the conditions of creation coming to be 
as different Other. At the same time Moltmann insists that 
God will dwell fully in creation.173
                                                
173 Here the full force of Metz's criticism in “Suffering Unto God”  
regarding the lack of space between God and creation can be 
appreciated. Metz focuses on the identification movement in Moltmann in 
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5d  Ontological Dissimilarity and Essential Difference
In eschatological mutuality, Moltmann denies the 
conflation of God and creation: “It is neither necessary 
for the world to dissolve into God… nor for God to be 
dissolved in the world” (COG 307).174 He emphasizes that 
distinctions remain in redemption. Boundaries are 
recognized as "even in the kingdom of glory the world 
remains God's creation and will not become God himself" (GC 
184) and “they remain unmingled and undivided” (COG 307). 
As we have previously seen, in the eschaton creation is not 
“dissolve[d] into God”(COG 307). In affirming 
dissimilarity, Moltmann does not mean the difference of 
creatio originalis. Rather, as redemption results in the 
“greater truth” that God is all in all" (GC 89), we see 
Moltmann being consistent here in his advocating a unity-
in-dissimilarity position.175 In his description of divine 
life, the complete rejection of either unity or 
                                                                                                                                                
which God delimits himself and refills the once forsaken space. The 
final oneness is consummated. But in God's self-delimitation, the space 
which is necessary for a different Other to exist is overwhelmed with 
divine presence. 
174  Wood, “From Barth’s Trinitarian Christology,” suggests that if any 
theologian has protected “divine otherness from the created order, it 
is Moltmann!”(65).
175 As Pannenberg, Systematic Theology 1, 330, points out that for 
Moltmann “when all things are in God and God is “all in all,” then the 
economic Trinity is subsumed in the immanent Trintiy.”
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dissimilarity would fall short of a thorough description of 
reality, even a consummated reality. The ability to hold 
opposing pairs of concepts in tension as a means of 
describing reality is the genius of 
contradictory/harmonious monism.  
The kenosis of creation is in/validated by the 
consummating theosis that results in an expanded 
perichoresis where "all created things will participate 
directly and without any mediation in his eternal life" (GC 
64). The most consistent way to understand what is meant by 
‘dissimilarity’ as found in the perichoresis involving the 
Trinity and creation is to compare it with what is found in 
the distinction between Father, Son, and Spirit. Here we 
find a much softer boundary for the sake of 
interpenetration. The capability of both penetrating and 
being penetrated is necessary for perichoresis’s relational 
unity to exist. While creatio nova is not conflated into 
God, it is fused with the perichoretic community. As 
penetrated with God’s presence, creatio nova responds in 
the safe self-giving and self-receiving atmosphere of 
philia. The softer boundary of creation that participates 
in the perichoretic community suggests there is no longer a 
difference of essence between God and creatio nova. 
Essential difference implied opposition, contradiction, and 
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alienation for Moltmann. The dissimilarity of creatio nova
is within the similarity of the shared mutual indwelling 
which means it is not characterized by spatial distance or 
forsakenness. The community between creation and the 
perichoretic God is both ontologically dissimilar and 
eschatologically similar. In Jesus Christ whose identity 
links both Good Friday and Easter, the community consists 
simultaneously of a different Other and a same Other.    
When humanity encounters God through the cross of 
Christ, Moltmann argues the result is being involved in “a 
realistic divinization” (CG 277). In his discussion of the 
Sabbath, Moltmann points out that “the Sabbath is the day 
when God is present” (GC 280). When God is present, 
creation is completed and both God and creation find rest 
and peace. The opposition in the forsaken, different Other  
has ceased and “in the eschatological kingdom of glory in 
which people will finally, wholly and completely be 
gathered into the eternal life of the triune God and – as 
the early church put it – be ‘deified’” (TK 213). Instead 
of alien to both herself and to God, humanity will become a 
friend of God.  
In this panentheism, divine presence and divine 
absence are defined by the preposition “in.” Creation is in 
God or God is in creation. Perichoresis describes 
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relationships by giving priority to interpenetration. The 
highest level of relationality is achieved when boundaries 
are softened and there can be a mutual indwelling. Creatio 
originalis is in God. In this sense, ‘in’ means God 
contains creation. Difference is permitted as the harder 
boundaries of agape keep creation oppositionally distinct 
in God. God is in creatio nova. Creation here is not a 
container. Rather the softer boundaries of philia allow for 
reciprocity where creation is also in God. In the movement 
of reciprocity the ‘in’ points to the identification 
between the partners. Unity overcomes opposition as 
difference is transformed by the fusing power of philia.      
When Moltmann initially establishes the difference
between philia and agape he does so by distinguishing the 
object ‘for’ each type of love. Philia is ‘love for the 
like’ and agape is ‘love for the different.’ In both cases 
divine love evokes a response from the Other. In philia the 
giving of love necessitates a returning of the gift. The 
agape of creatio originalis results in a giving of love 
that cannot be returned by the Other. The agape of 
incarnation is a giving of love that demands a sacrifice of
the Other in light of the promise of theosis. In none of 
these cases is humanity’s relation to God conceived of in a 
love where God and creation are with one another. In 
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Moltmann, creation’s difference is a threat/invitation to 
God and God’s sameness is a threat/invitation to creation. 
In the end, from the one direction, the threat is 
alleviated by the relaxing of boundaries and all is well in 
the necessary love of philia. And in the other direction, 
the invitation is announced by the emphasis on boundaries 
made in the free love of agape. 
In emphasizing the inclusivity of divine love for 
Moltmann, McDougall seems to suggest that in Moltmann’s 
later thought God’s love is more unified than the 
distinction between philia and agape indicates.176
McDougall's emphasis on agape as  the unifying motif in 
Moltmann is, of course, crucially important. However, she
does this by downplaying, bracketing, even dismissing the 
fact that for Moltmann, the stress on agape remains 
counterbalanced/contradicted by his stress on philia as is 
indicated by his argument that in God’s self-glorification 
there is “a contradiction or reversal of love”(COG 326) in 
God himself. In the reversal, essential self-love must 
become creative love for the other, that is to say selfless 
love. If essential self-love is philia and creative love is 
agape, then divine love encounters the Other in two 
fundamentally different ways and in different directions.
                                                
176   See McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love, 44ff.
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Moltmann maintains that eternal love is "turned" (SL 
137ff.) in different directions - within the Trinity 
(perichoresis) and towards the world (kenosis). This 
implies that, for Moltmann. the very notions of kenosis and 
perichoresis rely upon a basic difference of philia and 
agape that cannot be lost if Moltmann’s trinitarian 
perspective is consistent. Moltmann's unity is a 
contradictory unity as we have been arguing throughout this 
thesis. In other words, McDougall’s analysis has a one-
sided quality about it which does not do justice to the 
complexity of his position. While Moltmann may not directly 
address the distinction between philia and agape in much of 
his later work, it is essential to his position. 
We have seen that Moltmann goes back and forth 
between arguing:  1) that in the differentiation of 
creation from God, creation was forsaken; and 2) arguing 
that being forsaken is part of the process of 
identification. Hence, the unity in Moltmann's thinking 
comes as a result of his holding opposite states of affair 
in tension with one another. The tension is fundamental to 
the dynamic concept of God that Moltmann offers as he 
distances himself from any understanding of God as one who 
“’is’ all at one and in one”(TH 28). Moltmann wants neither 
the “god of Parmenides” nor the God of monotheism because 
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in both conceptions the emphasis on a static nature 
produces a solitary, undifferentiated individual with whom 
a relationship is impossible. To gain a more vibrant nature 
for God, and thereby all of reality, the idea of a shared 
divine substance is overthrown. In its place Moltmann 
stresses relationality (perichoresis) with its honoring of 
difference-in-identity.
To say that Moltmann honors difference and 
relationality is not to deny the fundamental stress on 
unity -and even ultimate privileging of unity- in his 
thought. His cosmogony is built on cosmic opposition. 
Understanding reality in terms of a basic contradiction of 
difference, which nevertheless yields unity, has deep roots 
in western thought. We can bring the vitality of this 
position into more of a focus by looking at the connections 
between Moltmann’s thought and its historical precedents.  
5e  Contradictory/Harmonic Monism
Moltmann’s thought is replete, as we have repeatedly 
noticed, with unity-in-opposition: diversity/unity, 
dissimilarity/similarity, present/future, 
forsakenness/indwelling, creatio originalis/creatio nova, 
agape/philia, annihilation/fulfillment, and tragedy/feast. 
Indeed, I am suggesting that his complex thought comes into 
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coherent and fruitful focus when seen as a cosmic 
coincidence of opposites – a contradictory monism. 
Diverging motifs and contradictory assertions do not 
necessarily point to logical inconsistency or confusion. 
Indeed, contradictory assertions can be consistent and 
coherent when they are employed to articulate what is taken 
to be the fundamental contradictory constitutional make-up 
of the cosmos.
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For Moltmann’s contradictory monism reality is caught 
up in a “cosmic process (that) is inherently contradictory 
and eternally recurring.”177 There are two horizontal 
currents continually and simultaneously running counter to 
each other. Concurrently, “the universal cosmic law 
realizes itself in a process of differentiation” even as 
“there is the process in the opposite direction of a return 
to the universal origin and unity.”178 At the same time, the 
“turning point” of history is the Christ event: The 
crucified and risen Jesus is the coincidentia oppositorium. 
In the cross of Christ, everything returns to God. God 
takes “[e]vil, sin, and rejection on himself, and in the 
sacrifice of his infinite love transformed it into 
goodness, grace, and election” (SL 212).
While other commentators have not referred to 
Moltmann’s cosmogony as a contradictory monism, aside from 
Nicholas Ansell whose recent exhaustive study also 
                                                
177 Olthuis, Models, 29.
178 Olthuis, Models, 29.
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describes Moltmann’s thought as contradictory/harmonic 
monism,179 many have noted the similarities between 
Moltmann’s thought and other thinkers of contradiction such 
as Hegel. Douglas Schuurman's reading of Moltmann can be a 
helpful guide here. In his reading both discontinuity and 
continuity are recognized as having a role.  There is no 
radical departure within Moltmann, instead the "emphasis on 
the continuity of creation is a theme that Moltmann 
maintains in his more recent books..."180 But the theme of 
discontinuity is always countered by continuity. In his 
thorough examination, Schuurman exposes Moltmann's view of 
the eschaton as a coincident of opposites. A sub-section of 
one of his articles exploring Moltmann’s thought is aptly 
entitled, "Eschaton as Fulfillment and Annihilation of 
Creation."181 The "and" between fulfillment and annihilation 
in the title is very instructive. Schuurman shows the 
complexity of Moltmann’s thought by focusing on the way in 
which Moltmann concurrently holds two opposing descriptions 
of eschatological creation in tension. The working 
assumption for Schuurman’s reading of Moltmann is that the 
                                                
179 See Nicholas Ansell’s The Annihilation of Hell: Universal Salvation 
and the Redemption of Time in the Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann for 
his analysis of Moltmann’s monism. Also see Walsh’s sustained argument 
regarding the structure of Moltmann’s thought in “Theology of Hope.”   
180 Schuurman,“Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics,” 48. Volf, “Eschaton, 
Creation, and Social Ethics,” takes Schuurman’s reading of Moltmann to 
task for not taking “more seriously the stress on continuity between 
creation and the eschaton”(136 n.15) in Moltmann’s works.
181 Schuurman, “Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics,” 47.
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eschaton is, at the same time, both a realization of 
original creation and a radical overcoming of the 
boundaries of that creation. Creation becomes itself by 
ceasing to be itself.
Other critics of Moltmann have picked up on the 
importance of simultaneous negation and fulfillment in the 
structure of his thought. The similarity between Moltmann’s 
view of reality and a Hegelian model of reality has been 
noted by several commentators.182 Such a connection helps to 
confirm our suspicion regarding Moltmann’s dynamic ontology 
as Hegel has been understood as a prototype of 
contradictory/harmonic monism.183  Milbank, noting the 
difficulty of finding difference in creatio nova, argues 
that ultimately Moltmann's view of the relationship between 
God and creation portrays creation as merely a stage in the 
development of God. Milbank explains this movement by 
arguing that "his effectively tritheistic perspective 
permits him to take in a full, 'mythological' sense, the 
separation of Father from Son in the dereliction of the 
cross, and this is integrated with his developmentalism in 
                                                
182 Blocher,“Immanence and Transcendence in Trinitarian Theology,”  
surmises that when Moltmann suggests a “Trinity interpreted as the 
‘history of God’ and based on the man Jesus, Jesus qua man as the 
second Person” his thought has “unmistakably Hegelian features” 112.) 
Blocher suggests he appeals to Hegel as an attempt “to solve the 
theodicy problem after Auschwitz” (112).
183 See Calvin Seerveld’s “Biblical Wisdom Underneath Vollenhoven’s 
Categories for Philosophical Historiography” for the connections he 
makes between the thinkers in this strand. 
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so far as Moltmann presents the creation as a necessary, 
primordial suffering which must be passed through by both 
God and humanity."184 Milbank concludes that, "thus the 
Hegelian theme of a necessary alienation is still 
incorporated by Moltmann."185
Milbank’s analysis is not unique here. In his analysis 
of Moltmann’s view of the Trinity, Molnar categorizes it as 
a "Protestant Hegelian solution."186 Likewise, Griffioen 
notes the connection between Hegel's speculative Good 
Friday and Moltmann's understanding of the death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ.187 It is not a large step then 
to conclude with Jansen "at the heart of Moltmann's view of 
God lies this Hegelian dialectic."188
                                                
184 John Milbank, "The Second Difference," Modern Theology, 2 April 1986, 
223. This article can also be found in Milbank’s The Word Made Strange 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).
185 Milbank, “The Second Difference” 223
186 Molnar "Barth and the Immanent Trinity," 387.
187 Moltmann (TH 211) discusses Hegel's idea of the speculative Good 
Friday. In "G.W.F. Hegel" in Bringing into Captivity Every Thought: 
Capita Selecta in the History of Christian Evaluations of Non-Christian 
Philosophy (Lanham: UPA, 1991), Sander Griffioen analyzes Hegel's use 
of the speculative Good Friday and the historical necessity of 
secularization and its implications for theology, especially in the 
work of Moltmann. Another helpful work in understanding Hegel on this 
point is Johannes Hessen, Hegel’s Trinitatslehre: Zugleich eine 
Einfurhung in Hegels System (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1922). 
187 Peters, God as Trinity, summarizes Moltmann's answer to this question 
when he says "it is the God who is love and who suffers because of this 
love who is revealed to us in scripture."
188 Jansen, Relationality and the Concept of God, 113. See also Henk 
Geertsma’s argument that Moltmann’s view of faith is “severely 
constricted – indeed is in danger of turning into a mere intellectual 
construction – by the very way it is accounted for intellectually using 
the tools of philosophy”(321). Powell, The Trinity, 251ff., offers a 
counter argument when he differentiates between God suffering with the 
world and God being dependent upon the world. 
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Jansen explains "(o)ntologically, dialectic affirms 
the reality of the other, of what is different from 
oneself."189 However, as Jansen points out, "the hallmark of 
a dialectical cosmogony is openness to the other in order 
that one may come to self-fulfillment and completion of 
oneself."190 In spite of its affirmation of 
difference/plurality, the dialectic ultimately ends up 
giving privilege to unity.
5f  Privileging Unity
It is noteworthy that recent postmodern critics of 
Hegel have also wondered if difference and plurality are 
adequately honored in Hegel’s thought. For example, in Mark 
Taylor's consideration of Hegel's dialectical, he reveals
the dominant role that unity/sameness play in the 
dialectic. Taylor shows that Hegel’s stress on the negation 
of the negation, which is characteristic of a unity-in-
opposition position, still manifests a preference for 
unity. Despite Hegel's insistence, Taylor argues, that he 
is trying to reconcile identity and difference as well as 
union and non-union "he consistently privileges identity 
and unity at the expense of difference and non-union."191 At 
                                                
189 Jansen, Relationality and the Concept of God, 113.
190 Jansen, Relationality and the Concept of God, 114.
191 Mark Taylor, "Denegating God" Critical Inquiry 20(1994), 598.
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this point, Kelly Oliver's trenchant comment on Hegel comes 
to mind. In commenting on Kristeva’s reading of Hegel, 
Oliver points out that in Hegel “negativity takes place 
within the One… Hegel’s account erases rupture. The 
synthesis always, and in the end, emphasizes unity over 
crisis. For Hegel, negativity always collapses into unity 
and the unstable process that produces the unity is covered 
up.”192
In identifying the underlying structure of Moltmann’s 
thought as Hegelian, Milbank and others have given us a 
clue on how to read the fundamental tensions present in 
Moltmann’s thought. And the postmodern critics of Hegel 
have helped us to clarify our suspicions about the role of 
difference/plurality in Moltmann’s dialectic. In our 
reading of his account of the relationship between God and 
creation as a form of contradictory/harmonic monism, we
have established why questions regarding rupture and unity 
keep appearing. As we have seen, the rupture of the 
godforsakenness and sin of creation take place within the 
yet-to-be-fully-realized unity of inner-trinitarian 
relationships. Here as in Hegel, the “synthesis” of 
eschatological fulfillment emphasizes unity. For Moltmann 
                                                
192 Kelly Oliver, Reading Kristeva (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1993), 42.
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“being forsaken by God” is from eternity at the heart of 
God and at the beginning of creation. Likewise, being 
redeemed and reconciled by God is equiprimordially built-in 
to the dynamics of the Trinity and creation.193 The 
godforsakenness of creation is validated and invalidated 
simultaneously by its fail-safe destiny in being “full-
filled life” (CG 291) in which God is all-in-all. The 
movement of self-differentiation is simultaneously and 
inherently partnered and opposed by the movement of self-
identification.
In other words, whereas, in my reading of the Gospel, 
redemption is the surprising gift occasioned and 
necessitated by the fall, for Moltmann, redemption as re-
integration is a necessary part and parcel of the cosmic 
machinery, irrespective of the fall, from the beginning. 
For Moltmann, creation is for the sake of redemption, 
ordained to move along its path, which inherently includes 
the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ. “The son of God 
did not become man simply because of the sin” (TK 116). 
Creatio orginalis with its historical transitions was 
destined from the beginning to be overcome (in distinction 
from restored, or renewed) in the redeemed creation nova.
                                                
193Christoph Schwöbel in his introduction to Trinitarian Theology Today 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 28ff., contends that the cross of Jesus 
and the Trinity are intrinsically related in Moltmann. 
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Despite Moltmann’s strong faith affirmation of sin's 
rupture, his theological conceptualization in the end 
serves to bracket, defuse, and even erase the radical 
rupture of sin.194 The incarnation is not only or even in 
the first place God’s redemptive response to a creation 
lost through sin, but its central significance is that
revelation and creation is other than God and requires 
eschatological re-integration with God. In the Sabbath 
Feast of Redemption “the Creator no longer remains over 
against his creation” (COG 295).
    
                                                
194By trying to redeem evil Moltmann emplots it in the life of God in 
spite of, as Colin Gunton observes in The Promise of Trinitarian 
Theology, 21ff., his motivation to keep God from being responsible for 
evil.
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Chapter 6
The Ethics of Discipleship: 
Fellowship in the Trinity
Now that we have obtained an understanding of the 
fundamental features of Moltmann’s contradictory/harmonic 
monism, we are in a position to examine the ethical thrust 
of his cosmic perichoresis. Moltmann's development of a 
Christian ethic is founded upon the ontological 
(dis)similarity between the perichoretic community and 
creation. Only in agape’s creation of connections between 
divine life and human/creational life by ‘contradicting the 
contradiction’ does a positive ethic become knowable.195
Yet, it must be remembered that any comparison of God and 
creation in Moltmann is preceded and made possible by an 
initial radical difference between God and creation. The 
comparison between Creator and creature is precluded until 
God himself allows the comparison in the giving of 
                                                
195 Volf, “Eschaton, Creation, and Social Ethics,” makes the connection 
between the priority given the eschaton over creation in relationship 
to ethics when he argues that when ethical behaviour is oriented “to 
the structures of original creation as opposed to their various 
distortions through sin” the effect is to take “eschatology out of 
ethics, indeed positively barring eschatology from social ethics”(137). 
See also Gregory Jones, Transformed Judgment: Toward a Trinitarian 
Account of the Moral Life (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1990). 
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himself.196 In God's revelation of himself, creation’s 
difference from the Creator gives way as a relationship of 
correspondence emerges. In this chapter, we will examine 
Moltmann’s ethic, his conception of kenosis in particular, 
that develops as philia’s relationship of correspondence 
take shapes in contrast to agape’s relationship of 
opposition.   
6a  Divine Life as the Source for Ethics
Redemptive agape encounters a sinful humanity in the 
midst of a forsaken creation. As the incarnate and 
abandoned Christ reveals God to creation, “the principle of 
fellowship is fellowship with those who are 
different..."(CG 28). In this act, the perichoretic 
community invites the different Other into the divine 
fellowship.   Once the fellowship of God and creation is 
established through kenosis an analogy of relationality 
between divine life and creaturely life is posited.197
Difference must precede similarity as "the basis and 
                                                
196  See Pannenberg, Systematic Theology 1, 107ff.. His differentiation 
between religious experience and “the natural theology of  philosophy” 
is helpful in understanding Moltmann here.  
197 Compare with Emmanuel Levinas, Of God who Comes to Mind (Stanford, 
Ca: Stanford University Press, 1998), 3ff., where he describes ethics 
as an interrupting force which arises out of the encounter with the 
Other. Love for Levinas is understood more in terms of desire than a 
replication of relations. As a result, ethics for Levinas seems more 
creational than metaphysical.  
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starting point of analogy is this dialectic" (CG 28) 
wherein God is revealed in his opposite. And it is on the 
basis of this God-knowledge that it is possible to speak 
again of the relationship of the human creature to the 
Creator.198
Here the characteristic tension present between 
forsaken creation and God is evident. Ethics for Moltmann 
arises out of the confrontation with humanity by God's 
self-revelation. The use of the Trinity to set the basic 
direction in the development of a Christian ethic is 
consistent with the ontological tendencies we have 
uncovered. Moltmann clearly makes the link between divine 
life and ethics when he asserts "because in the systems and 
dogmatics of Christian theology the understanding of God 
was always normative for the understanding of human beings 
and the world, I began my contributions with this 
apparently abstract and remote theme of the doctrine of the 
Trinity and developed a social doctrine of the Trinity" 
(HTG 181). 
For Moltmann there is an indisputable tie between a 
doctrine of God and a doctrine of creation which then leads 
                                                
198 Volf’s After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998) is an excellent example of trinitarian 
ethics rooted in Moltmann’s approach.
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to an ethic.199  In his consideration of Barth, Moltmann 
declares that "Barth's doctrine of the Trinity is the 
blueprint of his doctrine of creation" (HTG 130). Moltmann 
goes on to conclude that "... anyone who thinks that this 
or that part of the structure of his doctrine of creation 
has to be changed must therefore be in a position to change 
his doctrine of the Trinity" (HTG 130).  Here Moltmann 
outlines the progression of his work. First was his 
rethinking of the doctrine of the Trinity in terms of 
perichoresis. Following the use of reciprocity in 
describing the interior life of God, Moltmann reconsidered 
the relationship between God and creation using 
kenosis/agape and theosis/philia to describe the 
interactions between the divine community and the 
creaturely Other. In this next step, the interplay between 
the concurrent movements between God and creation are used 
to develop an ethics of discipleship.
It follows that creation as originally forsaken cannot 
provide the basis for ethics. To attempt to do so is 
preemptive. Rather, only in God's revelation of the divine 
community in Jesus Christ do the norms for creational life 
become manifest. In the crucified and risen Jesus Christ 
                                                
199 Of course, Moltmann’s theology of hope frames his understanding of 
ethics. See Vincent Genovesi’s treatment of this relationship in his
Expectant Creativity (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 
1982).  
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inner-trinitarian life is established as the analogue to 
creaturely life. The analogy manifests "... the ethic of 
discipleship is the true consequence of the revelation of 
the Father of Jesus Christ. The ethics of discipleship 
matches the trinitarian understanding of the Father" (HTG 
16). It is only God’s absence/presence in creatio 
originalis that can serve as a source for morality, not 
creation itself. Creation is merely a parable or an image 
of the new creation. As we have seen, there is no goodness 
or source of order to be found in a forsaken creation. 
Hence, the overcoming of creation (dis)order by the work of 
Jesus Christ is the necessary condition for a life of 
discipleship.
The overcoming of creation (dis)order is evident in 
Moltmann's view of humanity as eschatologically oriented. 
Human nature is teleologically oriented as it is designed 
to move from imago Dei to gloria Dei.200 The 
continuity/discontinuity of the human being in this process 
of transformation guides Moltmann’s ethics: "human beings 
are imago Trinitas in their personal fellowship with one 
another" (GC 241). Moltmann’s distinction here parallels 
the earlier clarification regarding the relationship 
                                                
200 Compare with Pannenberg’s, Systematic Theology 1, 430ff., discussion 
of human persons.
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between creatio originalis, creatio nova, creatio continua, 
and the eternal Sabbath. In the creatio originalis, a human 
being is imago Dei which “is the original designation of 
human beings” (GC 215). This is distinct from the imago 
Christi of the creatio nova which is “the messianic calling 
of human beings” (GC 215) and the gloria Dei est homo in 
the “eschatological glorification of human beings” (GC 215) 
in the final perichoresis of God and creation.
In other words, human relations are, in the end, to 
embody the perichoretic nature of trinitarian 
relationships. Just as Moltmann understands the divine 
nature as vibrant, he also sees human nature as dynamic. 
Eschatologically understood, human beings are in transition 
from an original state of closed selves who have been 
abandoned to their own devices to full membership in the 
living giving relations of trinitarian life. This 
transition of humanity from forsaken to fulfilled depends 
upon God in Christ ‘contradicting the contradiction’ and 
founding the analogy between divine life and creational 
life that allows the reproduction of divine perichoresis
among the already fallen human community.
6b  Analogy of Relationality
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The analogy between God and humanity can be understood 
as an analogy of relationality (analogia relationis). 
Relationality has a two-fold meaning in this context. 
First, it refers to the "how" of the analogy. In Moltmann's 
dialectic of reconciliation, as evidenced by the notion of 
a godforsaken creation, disconnection is prior to 
connection in the relationship between God and creation. 
The difference between God and creation is so radical that 
no correspondences can be legitimately drawn by humanity 
until God overcomes the gap. Only from a relationship of 
difference between God and humanity can an analogy develop 
in which correspondences are drawn. 
Second, relationality refers to the "what" of the 
analogy. In the giving of himself to creation in the 
overcoming of the disconnection, God reveals himself to be 
essentially relational. God is not merely relational in his 
dealings with creation, but within himself, God is 
community. The content of God's self-revelation is that the 
Godhead is a threesome of Others who share a fundamental 
sameness eternally involved in self-giving and self-
receiving. The result is a divine community formed through 
the intimate indwelling of each Other. In the giving of 
himself in Jesus Christ, God not only reveals the inner-
trinitarian divine relations, but also establishes that 
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divine relationality is to be the model for all 
relationality. The relationship between same Others is 
perfectly exemplified in the perichoretic exchange between 
members of the Trinity. This ideal of perfect self-giving 
and self-receiving becomes the ethical norm for human 
inter-subjectivity.
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The norm is elucidated by Moltmann’s description of 
the connection between the divine community and the human 
community: "the Trinity corresponds to a community in which 
people are defined through their relations with one another 
and in their significance for one another, not in 
opposition to one another, in terms of power and 
possession" (TK 198). The analogy between the divine 
community and the human community does not begin with an 
understanding of perichoresis as perfected human mutuality. 
Rather, establishing the analogy is dependent on a primary 
radical difference between our creational experience of 
relationality and the perichoretic relations of the 
Trinity. The violence and selfishness that characterize 
forsaken humanity's relationships are the opposite of the 
vulnerability and kenosis of divine relationships. Moltmann 
does not understand the norm for human relationality to be 
an extrapolation from imperfect human community to a 
perfect divine community, rather, the revelation of inner-
trinitarian life contradicts the barrenness of present 
experience with "the model for a just and livable community 
in the world of nature and human beings" (HTG xiii).
6c  The Penetration/Overflowing of Creation 
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Any remnant of relationality that remains within 
forsaken humanity's relationality does not suffice as a 
comparison to the overflowing love existing in divine 
relations. It is only "in so far as God is revealed in his 
opposite, (that) he can be known by the Godless and those 
who are abandoned by God, and it is this knowledge which 
brings them into correspondence with God and… enables them 
even to have the hope of being like God" (CG 27-28). The 
ideal of perichoresis can only be known when God penetrates 
the forsakenness and allows creation to experience his 
fellowship.201 The incarnation of Jesus Christ shows God’s 
faithfulness inasmuch as he willingly subjects himself to 
the conditions of creatio originalis and the actualization 
of the nihil within creation.  The forsaking of creation is 
simultaneously validated and invalidated by the cross of 
Jesus. Both abandonment and violence are overcome by the 
faithfulness of the Father in Jesus Christ. The cycle of 
violence is broken through its active acceptance and the 
refusal to respond with vengeance. Through his willingness 
to endure pain, "God's faithfulness to his creatures is 
                                                
201 The re-filling of creation leads to Schuurman’s,“Creation, Eschaton, 
and Ethics,” concern: “My chief objection to Moltmann’s eschatology and 
ethics is that his vision of the eschaton includes an unwarranted 
annihilation of creation, resulting in an ethic that is inadequate with 
respect to valuations and moral directives that affirm creaturely 
life…How does the object of Christian hope “guide obedience in love on 
to the path towards earthly, corporeal, social reality”(43). 
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manifested as his indestructible love which overcomes a 
world in conflict" (HTG 52). Just as in the Trinity, "the 
divine persons are there for one another in their mutual 
Others" so also "on the cross of Christ this love is there 
for Others, the sinners, those in conflict, enemies"(HTG 
53). The cross is "an action which takes up all who believe 
in him into the eternal life of the divine life" (HTG 53). 
Yet the atonement accomplished in the cross and 
resurrection does not only counter the actualized nihil, 
but also the conditions of the original creation. 
Furthermore, atonement is not only for the oppressed. 
Atonement comes also for the oppressors "from the mercy of 
the Father through the God-forsakenness which the Son 
endures as a representative in the unburdening power of the 
Holy Spirit. A single movement of love arises out of the 
pain of the Father, is manifest in the suffering of the Son 
and is experienced in the Spirit of life...His justice 
justifies the unjust" (HTG 53). In this justification of 
the unjust, agape is manifest as something new for "in 
order to live with the past it is not enough just to atone 
for past guilt" (HTG 53). Rather, "something new must be 
created so that 'the old has passed away'" (HTG 53). Divine 
love as agape is able to bear the suffering of both victim 
and perpetrator and transform isolation into community.
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Being brought into the divine fellowship gives 
humanity this radically different model of relationality 
that they are to embody as,
"The unity of the community is in truth the 
trinitarian fellowship of God himself, of which it is 
a reflection and in which it participates. This 
fellowship with the Trinity and in the Trinity is held 
out to the community of the disciples because it is 
grounded in the prayer of Jesus, which the community 
is certain is heard by the Father. The community is 
the 'lived out' Trinity. In the community, that mutual 
love is practiced that corresponds to the eternal love 
of the Trinity" (HTG 63-64). 
The confrontation of the forsaken self by God as 
different(incarnate) Other prompts the repentance and 
reorientation of the self as God makes himself known. In 
being grasped by the revelation of the Other, the self 
becomes aware of the obligation demanded.202 The in-breaking 
of God's self-revelation is not to be understood only in 
light of its faith-oriented qualification, but also in 
terms of its ethical consequences.203 Here agape contradicts 
all the conditions of forsakenness. In agape, Jesus' 
humanity stands in judgment against the self unto itself 
                                                
202 Ward, “The Revelation of the Holy Other as Wholly Other. Between 
Barth’s Theology of Word and Levinas’ Philosophy of Saying,” Modern 
Theology 9 (1993), 159-180," compares Barth to Levinas, with links to 
Moltmann, on this point. He states "In revelation the I discovers 
itself obliged, already in service to the Other"(167). An interesting 
discussion of the discovery of obligation without revelation can be 
found in John Caputo, Against Ethics (Bloomington, In: Indiana 
University Press, 1993), 6-19.
203 Ward, "The Revelation of the Holy Other" is again helpful on this 
point. Ward talks about revelation resulting in a rethinking of the
theological and anthropological grammar which produces "new grammars of 
self and God"(168). 
172
for the sake of the self. When the self’s experience of 
separation is faced with the difference of the Trinitarian 
community as revealed in Jesus, the language of the self as 
unto itself is replaced with the language of the self 
towards another. God gives himself to the forsaken Other in 
and through Jesus Christ. In the midst of the actualized 
nihil God's fundamental disposition towards humanity is 
kenotic. Through God’s kenosis for forsaken creation divine 
love must become agape for here we find the power of 
(re)connection and (re)creation.204
The possibility of God's self-communication, and 
thereby (re)creation, is founded upon the pervasive giving 
of the self present in trinitarian life. In the reconciling 
revelation of himself, God has revealed himself as Trinity. 
And as Trinity, God must be conceived of as relational as 
the members mutually indwell and dwell with one another. 
The giving of God's self to humanity is revealed to be 
parallel to and rooted in the giving of the self of each 
member of the Godhead to each Other. The perichoretic 
nature of God is constant. Perichoresis as philia among the 
                                                
204 Ward, "The Revelation of the Holy Other," 168, points out that in 
Barth "Kenosis is the fundamental operation of the Trinity”(168). 
Jüngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity, has shown that it is this divine 
self-giving which is the ontological basis of Barth's analogia 
relationas. The analogia relationis is "founded on the doctrine of the 
Trinity by the proposition of the perichoresis of the three divine 
modes of being”(68).
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members of the Trinity precedes the giving of revelation of 
Jesus Christ to humanity. In being directed towards 
forsaken humanity, trinitarian perichoresis discloses 
itself as agape.  In this giving agape is not only the 
source of the revelation, but also the content of it. God 
as community reveals that we too are to be kenotic selves 
towards one another. The first step in becoming the glory 
of God is for humanity to practice agape and experience 
living under the obligation of giving to and receiving from 
the Other. 
6d  Imago Christi 
A (dis)similarity between God and creation is argued 
for in the analogy of relationality. Through humanity's 
'face-to-face' relation with God, the divine community is 
revealed to be the pattern for the community of creation. 
Jesus Christ is the nexus between the divine community and 
the community of creation.205 Through his kenotic sacrifice 
on the cross for the sake of the community of creation, 
Jesus Christ manifests the overabundant love of divine 
                                                
205 Meeks, Origins, explains "Moltmann maintained that the resurrection 
is not already the eschatological fulfillment of reconciliation. Rather 
it points beyond itself to something not yet realized or present...Thus 
for Moltmann, the event of the cross and resurrection creates a real 
process of reconciliation. Thus history ... will be conceived as open 
to the coming reconciliation in the "future of Christ" in God's 
kingdom. A christologically shaped view of history will be in fact 
eschatological"(98).
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perichoresis. The idea of perichoresis that unfolds in 
Moltmann's doctrine of the Trinity becomes the significant 
concept for his ethics as he refines the assertion of the 
Trinity as the social program of humanity. Ethics takes its 
departure from "a perichoretic doctrine of the Trinity 
[which] entails that the levels of relationship in 
perichoresis and mutuality within the Trinity, rather than 
the levels of constitution within the Trinity, are 
normative for the relationship of God to creation and all 
the corresponding relationships in creation" (HTG 132). The 
results of making central the notion of perichoresis are 
the same for the doctrine of creation as they were for the 
doctrine of God: just as "... the concept of community, 
mutuality, perichoresis, comes to the foreground in the
understanding of God, and takes up, relativizes and limits 
the concept of one-sided rule, then the understanding of 
the determination of human beings among each other and 
their relationship to nature also changes" (HTG 181). From 
this basis, Moltmann can assert "our starting point here is 
that all relationships which are analogous to God reflect 
the primal, reciprocal indwelling and mutual 
interpenetration of the trinitarian perichoresis" (GC 17). 
He finds "the Christian doctrine of the Trinity provides 
the intellectual means whereby to harmonize personality and 
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sociality in the community of men and women, without 
sacrificing the one to the other" (TK 199).
The forsaken Other who repents and expresses faith in 
Jesus Christ as a result of this confrontation begins her 
walk along the way of Jesus Christ as "the confession of 
Jesus as the Christ also involves a practical discipleship 
that follows the messianic path his own life took; and that 
means an ethic which has to be made identifiably Christian" 
(WJC 118).  For Moltmann, ethics is distinctively Christian 
as an "ethics of discipleship." "So what today's dispute 
over the Christian nature of Christian ethics is really 
about," argues Moltmann, "is nothing less than the 
messiahship of Jesus" (WJC 118). This serious challenge to 
make ethics identifiably Christian is a primary concern: 
"Christian ethics are not asked merely for good or better 
solutions to general problems. They are asked how far the 
way of Jesus is to be taken seriously" (WJC 118). And 
Moltmann goes on to explain why this has become such a 
pressing concern today. We can see that "in a 'post-
Christian' society, and especially in the deadly 
contradictions into which the modern social system has 
brought humanity and the earth, the special and 
identifiable Christian ethic of the discipleship of Jesus 
makes itself publicly evident"(WJC 118). Within this 
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context, "faith in Christ can no longer be separated from 
ethics" (WJC 118). The comprehensive nature of 
understanding of Christ as the Lord and Redeemer of all of 
life "means that christology and christopraxis become one, 
so that a total, holistic knowledge of Christ puts its 
stamp not only on the mind and the heart, but on the whole 
life in the community of Christ..."(WJC 119). The 
experience of faith in Jesus Christ leads to a following of 
his messianic way. 
The believer's call within fallen creation is to be 
imago Christi. As image of Christ, we are obligated to 
practice agape and to be involved in the transforming 
process whereby isolation becomes community and oppression 
becomes fellowship. Even human agape can renew. The life of 
renewal, which involves both receiving and giving, is 
linked with the traditional theological categories of 
justification, sanctification, and glorification.206 Being 
the imago Christi happens during the in-between time for 
the believer: "Between the experienced justification of the 
sinner and the hoped-for glorification of the person 
justified lies the path of sanctification, which has to do 
with 'putting on the new human being, created after the 
                                                
206  See Paul Sponheim’s, Faith and the Other: A Relational Theology, 
113ff.
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likeness of God" (GC 227). This means "likeness to God is 
both gift and charge, indicative and imperative" (GC 227). 
Receiving the revelation of God as community allows the 
previously forsaken person to be transformed by the 
experience of divine love. As a result, love calls her to 
live as a member of a "contrast-society" (WJC 122) for 
agape must first establish difference before seeking 
similarity. The recipient of the revelation of God "comes 
into harmony with himself in spe, but into disharmony with 
himself in re"(TH 91). This disharmony lies not only 
within, but "those who hope in Christ can no longer put up 
with reality as it is, but begin to suffer under it, to 
contradict it"(TH 21). In the process, the person moves 
from being forsaken and despairing in the face of the 
threat of reality to identifying with and participating in 
the divine community. This fellowship results in a 
questioning of all of reality that does not reflect the 
ideal of perichoresis as trinitarian life becomes available 
for comparison in the analogy of relationality. And yet 
this questioning of forsaken creation leads to a more 
radical giving of oneself with the hope of all things 
becoming new.      
As forsaken, present creation is characterized more by 
violence than mutuality. The Synoptic Gospels, according to 
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Moltmann, speak to the reality of this age which is between 
God’s agape made known in Jesus Christ and the complete 
indwelling of creation by God in philia. Many of Jesus’ 
actions are interpreted by the Gospels as examples of agape 
given to one's enemies: "the situations which Jesus keeps 
tackling are those of human conflict: the healthy against 
the sick, the rich against the poor, men against women, 
Pharisees against tax collectors, the good against the 
wicked, the perpetrators against the victims"(HTG 44). The 
context of Jesus' ministry of reconciliation is the 
opposition that exists between forsaken persons as "there 
is only the either-or of the friend-enemy relationship"(HTG 
45). The asymmetry of power in the friend-enemy 
relationship can (must?) produce the dynamic of perpetrator 
and victim. As stronger, the perpetrator exercises power to 
take from the weaker while the victim is forced to submit 
to the desires of the Other. There is a co-dependency 
present in the dynamics between the powerful and the 
powerless as the oppressor strives for his independence 
through his use of the victim. As the victim is consumed, 
the perpetrator must search for another self from which to 
take in order to strive for his selfish independence. In 
this cycle of violence, the paradoxical situation arises 
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where the oppressive self's search for autonomy and self-
fulfillment is always dependent upon conquering an Other. 
Moltmann argues that God, as manifest in Jesus Christ, 
is a God who executes justice for the poor and oppressed. 
Scripture attests to the divine protection of the weak as 
God chose to be one of the weak. Therefore, he asserts that 
anyone who wields power against the weak also wields power 
against the suffering God. By identifying with the victims 
(was not Christ a victim?), God reveals the way out of the 
cycle of violence. Acts against the poor and weak are re-
enactments of the brutality committed against Jesus. It is 
"God himself (who) is the victim of the violent" (HTG 47). 
Jesus' answer was not to overpower the powerful; rather, 
"he himself bears the suffering of the world" (HTG 47). On 
the cross, Jesus allowed the destructiveness of the cycle 
of violence to be borne out. Jesus' crucifixion is not to 
be understood as the origin or continuation of a cult of 
violence. Jesus' death was not merely for death's sake, but 
"by 'bearing' and enduring sins he does atonement for the 
victims of violence; he makes the violent repent and so 
restores them" (HTG 47).
6e  Responding Creatively to Violence  
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In the Son's death the Father took upon himself the 
suffering and guilt of humanity.207 Moltmann understands 
Jesus' cross and resurrection, and its Old Testament 
anticipations, as a creative response to violence. In the 
crucified Christ, the oppressed find solidarity with God.  
Christ is revealed as the one who "brings eternal communion 
with God and God's life-giving righteousness through his 
passion into the passion story of this world and identifies 
God with the victims of violence" (HTG 48). There is a 
community between God and the oppressed as "Christ 
experienced and suffered our distress so that we might 
experience his brotherhood in our distress" (HTG 48). 
Experiencing community with God means that the oppressed 
have "divine protection" (HTG 48).
Though God identifies with the poor and the victim, it 
is important to remember that both the perpetrator and the 
victim are affected when violence is committed. Moltmann 
describes the effect by saying, "Violence destroys life on 
both sides, but in different ways: on the one side through 
evil and on the Other through suffering" (HTG 49). Usually, 
it is not difficult to discern one's own suffering. Yet, 
suffering is not always visible to Others. Describing the 
                                                
207  See Miroslav Volf’s, Exclusion and Embrace, 22ff., summary of 
Moltmann’s identification of victims with God. 
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inability of perpetrators to see the result of their 
violent actions, Moltmann says, "the liberation of the 
perpetrators of violence from their injustice is not self-
evident in most cases, at any rate not for the violent who 
gain from their injustice. They do not see the sufferings 
they cause their victims. They are blinded" (HTG 49). Both 
the powerlessness of the victim and the blindness of the 
perpetrator point to the necessity of "the way to freedom 
and justice" beginning on both sides so that "the 
liberation of the oppressed from the suffering of 
oppression calls for the liberation of the oppressors from 
the injustice of oppression"(HTG 49). In Christ, God atones 
for both the guilt of perpetrators and the sufferings of 
the oppressed.208 Just as the oppressed find protection, 
rights, and community, the oppressors find judgment, 
forgiveness and the offer of fellowship.  
The path to Christ is different for the victim and the 
perpetrator as there is a difference between God's 
righteousness which "justifies" and God's justice which 
"executes justice" (HTG 46). The one who “executes justice” 
is the one who both brings judgment and “puts the weak and 
the vulnerable under his protection” (HTG 47). The bringing 
                                                
208 As Wiebe, “Revolution as an Issue in Theology: Jürgen Moltmann” 
summarizes, “the gospel is not aimed just at reversing the pecking 
order but toward bringing the whole relationship of oppressor and 
oppressed to an end”(109).
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of this justice results in an identification: “Anyone who 
violates the weak, the vulnerable violates [God]” (HTG 47). 
Executing justice, then, implies “God’s preferential option 
for the poor” (HTG 47). The suffering of the victim becomes 
God’s suffering and “Christ brings eternal communion with 
God and God’s life-giving righteousness” (HTG 48). 
Nonetheless, God also acts with a justifying righteousness 
that leads to atonement, a taking of the deserved 
punishment for the perpetrator upon himself. Here God’s 
favor is not reserved for “the poor” but Christ’s atonement 
“reconciles the hostile, sinful world” (HTG 47). As loving 
and merciful, God’s “justice justifies the unjust” (HTG 
53).  
The promise of forgiveness is very important for the 
perpetrator because she knows "that injustice can never be 
undone" (HTG 49). Forgiveness can relieve the despairing 
guilt. There is need for forgiveness as it is guilt that 
further dehumanizes the perpetrator by either creating the 
autonomous, self-justifying self or by destroying one's 
self-respect. In either case, the perpetrator becomes 
further removed from connection with the Other. Moltmann 
maintains, "there is no liberation from guilt without 
atonement!"(HTG 50). However, "atonement is not a human 
possibility, but only a divine one" (HTG 50). Only God can 
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enact atonement as "a power which liberates perpetrators 
and their descendants from self-hatred and enables them to 
live in peace" (HTG 49). In the biblical narrative it is 
only God who has the power to bear the sins of his people. 
Because "violence...against God's creatures is always also 
a violation of God himself" (HTG 50), God's love is 
violated when evil is done. If it is God's love that is 
violated, then "God must bear and sustain the pain of his 
love" (HTG 50). Sustaining his love means that God 
"overcome[s] his wrath by rising above the pain which is 
added to it" (HTG 50). In the atoning process God 
"transforms human guilt into divine suffering by bearing 
human sin" (HTG 50). Divine suffering is rooted in 
excessive, creative love. In the bearing of sin, God 
creates mercy out of wrath. Because divine love is creative 
"the crucified Christ has nothing to do with a God of 
vengeance or a divine punitive judge" (HTG 51). Jesus 
Christ taking upon himself the suffering of sin and the 
Father answering with mercy accomplishes atonement. 
"Atonement is...the form of suffering taken by the love of 
God for this world," argues Moltmann as "the love of God 
wounded by human injustice and violence becomes the love of 
God which endures pain, and the 'wrath of God' becomes 
divine mercy" (HTG 51). 
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6f  Embodying Creative Love to the Violent Other
God's righteousness is not a distributive justice but 
a creative justice.209 This righteousness is rooted in God's 
agape love that creates in difference. The community of 
believers, those following the ethics of discipleship, is 
called to embody this creative love, even in the face of 
evil. Within the community of believers “mutual love is 
practiced which corresponds to the eternal love of the 
Trinity" (HTG 64). For Moltmann the confession of Christ 
involves the manifestation of the perichoretic love of the 
Trinity. This unselfish gift of oneself is to be given even 
when the recipient is the perpetrator of violence. 
Christian ethics is a constant asking of the question, "how 
far is the way of Jesus to be taken seriously" (WJC 118). 
The totality of commitment to Christ results in following 
the way of Christ in the whole of life. As Jesus Christ has 
shown, in our brokenness this means living kenotically, the 
excessive giving of self to the Other. And this is what 
Jesus Christ has revealed to humanity. Moltmann explains, 
"taking the Sermon on the Mount seriously and following 
Christ go together" (WJC 126). In the Sermon on the Mount, 
                                                
209  See also Hans Kung and Jürgen Moltmann. ed., The Ethics of World 
Religions and Human Rights (London: SCM Press, 1990). 
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"everything depends on 'doing'" (WJC 126). Moltmann holds 
that the expectations of the Sermon on the Mount are not to 
be understood as "unreasonable," but the community of 
believers must work to fulfill it. Any attempt to deny the 
validity of the Sermon on the Mount for today "mocks God," 
"says that Jesus is wrong," and "does not know God the 
Creator" (WJC 127). The fulfilling of the Sermon on the 
Mount requires excessive giving of one's self for the sake 
of the Other. In the face of violence, the response of a 
follower of Jesus Christ is still to be kenotic. For it is 
only in the "renunciation of violence" (WJC 129) given by 
kenosis that the "vicious circle of violence and counter-
violence is broken" (WJC 129). To react through self-
assertion would deny the possibility of reconciliation as 
"counter-violence supplies evil with its supposed 
justification, and often stabilizes it" (WJC 129). Giving 
oneself to the violent Other "shows up the absurdity of 
evil" (WJC 129). 
Just as the sending of the Son was not motivated by 
God's need for retribution, but was motivated by his desire 
for community with creation, the exposure of oneself to 
violence is not the goal, but a step towards the goal of 
reconciliation with the offender. "So even 'the 
renunciation of violence,'" argues Moltmann, "is only a 
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negative paraphrase of the conquest of violence through the 
non-violent creation of peace" (WJC 129). The love that 
motivates acts of non-violence has a desire not merely for 
the absence of violence, but also for a taking of 
"responsibility for our enemies" (WJC 130). The hope 
revealed in the giving of oneself to the point of suffering 
is the freeing of the violent Other because "liberating 
power is inherent in vicarious suffering too" (WJC 130). 
The intent is to change from a power-over relationship to a 
perichoretic sharing. Only through the self's kenosis, 
following the way of Jesus, is the path towards redemption 
of the perpetrator possible. 
Peace cannot be achieved through the annihilation of 
those with whom we disagree or from whom we are in some 
sense disconnected. The reliance upon violence, potential 
or realized, to maintain peace breeds a false security. The 
dynamic of power-over is still at work. Lasting peace can 
only be achieved through "neighborly love" (WJC 130). By 
escaping the cycle of violence and its call to react, the 
person of peace can create something new. To love our 
enemies is an act of "creative love" (WJC 131). This new 
relationship embodies God's agape love. Reacting non-
violently is still attached somewhat to the cycle of 
violence as a re-action. The final step in moving beyond 
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violence is the active birthing of peace through love. 
Responding non-violently and creating peace are the steps 
taken towards reconciliation and the redemption of the 
perpetrator as the question turns from "how can I protect 
myself, and deter my enemies from attacking me?" to "how 
can I deprive my enemy of his hostility?" (WJC 131).                                                    
In his discussion of non-violent action, Moltmann 
seems to reject counter-violence as a legitimate reaction 
to the overpowering presence of a violent Other. Moltmann's 
position is that counter-violence must not be used because 
its use results in a loss of hope for the redemption of the 
enemy, and therefore the loss of community. Following 
Christ means the kenotic giving-up of oneself to the 
violence in order to break the vicious cycle. It is only 
through the suffering of the victim that the perpetrator 
may recognize the humanity that is being destroyed. Through 
the willing self-giving of the victim to the violent Other 
the absurdity of violence is revealed. In the context of 
violence, responsibility for the enemy (perpetrator) comes 
at the risk of the loss of the self. The giving-up of self-
interest is the ethical thing to do, for reconciliation and 
peace can only be achieved by the redemption of the Other. 
To live kenotically, for Moltmann, means to choose an 
"ethic of responsibility for our enemies" over an "ethic of 
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self-assertion" (WJC 131). In relationship to enemies, the 
call is to embody agape.  As Moltmann has previously 
maintained, agape brings into existence that which is not. 
To respond to violence non-kenotically, that is, with 
counter-violence, would not be creative. The lack of 
creativity results in the propagation of the fallen status 
quo. Instead, agape seeks to bring new connections to life 
between enemies and victims. The only possibility forward 
towards new connections begins with the self-sacrifice of 
agape. These creative responses are to be anticipations of 
the new creation promised by God. Through this creative 
love "we draw our enemies into our own sphere of 
responsibility, and extend our responsibility to them" (WJC 
131). Self-sacrifice in agape is intended to do what self-
assertion cannot do -- establish the conditions of 
mutuality.
Agape leads to the possibility of a perichoretic 
community in which the self constantly gives to and 
receives from the Other. However, the sympathy of agape
requires a constant self-giving, even if there is no 
reciprocity. The endless giving hopes for a return. From 
initial opposition, agape anticipates the forming of 
correspondences. If the enemy responds favorably to the 
self-gift, the perichoresis of redeemed inter-human 
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relations begins to emerge. In community, agape flips into 
philia as "out of the understanding empathy arises a 
connecting sympathy" (Knowing, 171). The love of the enemy 
leads to a love of a friend as the giving of oneself 
kenotically to an Other leads to the reciprocating exchange 
between the former enemy and victim.
For Moltmann, there is an either/or of self-assertion 
or self-sacrifice for the self in the face of the violent 
Other. The only redemptive move is self-sacrifice because 
in this move lies the possibility of reconciliation. If the 
enemy responds with further violence, agape requires 
further giving. To stop giving of oneself to an enemy is to 
stop loving. Within the oppositional disconnection of 
godforsaken creation the self is obligated to the Other. To 
stop loving the Other, even the violent Other, is to be too 
self-centered.
6g  The Power of Compassion
God’s kenotic presence confronts the immorality of a 
forsaken creation that has realized its nihil. Divine life 
is shown to be the way of all life, even the life of a 
creation which is not yet filled with God’s presence. In 
Moltmann’s criticism of philosophical monotheism we find 
not only a move towards a dynamic ontology, but also its 
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ethical pulse. The refining of the doctrine of the social 
Trinity suggests an ordering to the creaturely community. 
Human relationships are both normed and evaluated in terms 
of and in accordance with the social Trinity.210 The divine 
community as norm allows Moltmann to evaluate critically 
the abuse of power for the sake of unity. If God is no 
longer viewed as the supreme ruler over all that is, but as 
a divine community, then any hierarchy, whether it is 
within the Trinity, between God and creation, or in 
creation, is challenged. Moltmann argues "the expansion of 
the doctrine of the Trinity in the concept of God can only 
really overcome this transposition of religious into 
political monotheism, by overcoming the notion of a 
universal monarchy of the one God"(TK 197).211 Without this 
theological backing, the power-over model must look to 
itself for justification. Developing the perichoretic, 
future-oriented view of divine unity makes it "impossible 
to form the figure of the omnipotent, universal monarch, 
                                                
210  For discussions regarding power, political order and the church in 
Moltmann, especially in relationship to the Anabaptist tradition, see 
Geiko Müller- Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power: the Theology of 
Jürgen Moltmann (London: SCM Press, 2000), Nigel Wright, Disavowing 
Constantine: Mission, Chruch and the Social Order in the Theologies of 
John Howard Yoder and Jürgen Moltmann (Carlisle, U.K.: Paternoster 
Press, 2000), and Arne Rasmusson, The Church as Polis: From Political 
Theology to Theological Politics as Exemplified by Jürgen Moltmann and 
Stanley Rasmusson (Notre Dame, In.: Notre Dame University Press, 1995).
211 In the end of TK, Moltmann uses his conception of the Trinity to 
critique perceived errors in the structure of the family, the church, 
and the state.
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who is reflected in earthly rulers, out of the unity of 
this Father, this Son and this Spirit" (TK 197). The Father 
is not "the archetype of the mighty ones of this world" (TK 
197). Rather, the Father is "almighty because he exposes 
himself to the experience of suffering, pain, helplessness 
and death...what he is is not almighty power; what he is is 
love" (TK 197). 
The glory of God, as revealed in his suffering love, 
is manifest in humanity as "the glory of the triune God is 
reflected, not in the crowns of kings and the triumphs of 
victors, but in the face of the crucified Jesus, and in the 
faces of the oppressed whose brother he became" (TK 198). 
With the trinitarian God as the point of departure, it is 
no longer the powerful and privileged few who represent 
God, but those who are found living in community. Such 
solidarity is found in "the fellowship of believers and of 
the poor" (TK 198). The suffering and oppressed people are 
the community of Christ. The notion of the sovereign ruler 
has been replaced by a suffering God. God is not sitting 
atop the hierarchy, but he is below bearing the weight as 
the many support the few. The doctrine of the social 
Trinity challenges not only institutional hierarchy; the 
Trinity is the social program for humanity.
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6h    Beyond Imago Dei through Imago Christi to Imago Gloria
God reveals true humanity to forsaken humanity by 
identifying himself with the suffering of forsakenness and 
by manifesting himself to be absolute love not absolute 
power. If God himself is suffering love, then the imago Dei
of humanity must be understood in these terms. Moltmann 
argues for just this connection. Humanity bears God's image 
when it embodies suffering love in its relationships. 
Divine love is revealed in the godforsakenness as that love 
which undertakes suffering for the sake of the Other. This 
is the agape love which empties itself for the Other. The 
self-emptying of God in agape for the sake of creation, 
both as the divine withdrawal and the incarnation, defines 
a God whose "divinity… is kenosis" (UL 120). Through God's 
constant kenotic activity, the divine community 
opens/empties itself for the Other. It is this very 
opening/emptying of God for the Other which invites 
community-through-kenosis. And this love as self-emptying 
becomes the image to be born by humanity in a forsaken 
world. God as community-through-kenosis means that "it is 
not...the solitary individual which is thought worthy to 
correspond to God and participate in God's eternal being 
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but the human fellowship of persons" (HTG 62). Community 
through self-giving overcomes self-assertion and self-
determination as ideals. In this perspective, it is human 
fellowship that is "the image of the triune God, not just 
as the image of his rule but also as the image of his inner 
being" (HTG 63). 
Moltmann develops, as we have emphasized, this social 
understanding of the imago Dei in terms of an analogy of 
relationality. To speak of a human being's likeness to God 
"first of all says something about the God who creates his 
image for himself, and who enters into a particular 
relationship with that image, before it says anything about 
the human being who is created in this form" (GC 220). 
Moltmann concludes from this assertion that "the nature of 
human beings springs from their relationship to God" (GC 
220). But it must be remembered that "the true likeness to 
God is to be found, not at the beginning of God's history 
with mankind, but at its end..." (GC 225). The likeness is 
only as goal "present in that beginning and during every 
moment of that history" (GC 225). As godforsaken, humanity 
in original creation lacked God's true likeness. Humanity 
at creation awaited fulfillment, a fulfillment that became 
more difficult for God when creation actualized the nihil
through its loss of hope. In spite of the disconnection 
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between God and creation, the likeness of God exists as the 
goal. It is the promised relationship between a lacking, 
and therefore desiring, creation and the coming God that 
defines human nature. The fundamental position of 
creation's lack and God's promise means "the God who 
creates for himself his image on earth finds his 
correspondence in that image" (GC 220). From the notion of 
God finding his correspondence in the image that he has 
created, Moltmann derives his understanding that "human 
likeness to God consists in the fact that human beings, for 
their part correspond to God" (GC 220). God must empty 
himself for the sake of the Other in order for the Other to 
join the divine fellowship.  
Because God corresponds to humanity and humanity to 
God, humanity as the image of God "becomes an indirect 
revelation of his divine Being in earthly form" (GC 220). 
As God's image, humanity participates in "three fundamental 
relationships: they rule over other earthly creatures as 
God's representatives and in his name; they are God's 
counterpart on earth, the counterpart to whom he wants to 
talk, and who is intended to respond to him; and they are 
the appearance of God's splendour, and his glory on earth" 
(GC 221). It is the whole existence of the person that is 
involved in these relationships. Yet, Moltmann maintains 
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that "there is apparently one point at which God's 
relationship to human beings is manifested and can be 
recognized: the human face" (GC 221).212 Divine likeness "is 
expressed in concentrated form in the person's face" (GC 
222).213
Moltmann's contradictory dialectic is evident even in 
this discussion of the face. Humanity as original creation 
lacked something in being designated imago Dei and would 
only be perfected in the direct encounter with God. As 
imago Dei, humanity does not participate in the intimate 
fellowship of trinitarian life. Moltmann views the imago 
Dei as a promise pointing to the future when humanity is 
perfected through God's direct and complete presence. 
At the same time "the human being's original 
designation to be God's image already implies the 
eschatological promise of perceiving God 'face to face'" 
(GC 222).This process is described by Moltmann: "The 
restoration or new creation of the likeness to God comes 
about in the fellowship of believers with Christ: since he 
is the messianic imago Dei, believers become imago Christi, 
and through this enter upon the path which will make them 
                                                
212 Compare Moltmann’s of ‘the face’ discussion with that of Emmanuel 
Levinas in various works. For example, Emmanuel Levinas and Richard 
Kearney, “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas,” in Face to Face with 
Levinas, ed. R.A. Cohen (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986), 13-33. 
213 See Paul Sponheim’s, Faith and the Other: A Relational Theology, 
54ff., discussion of Levinas and Moltmann on the face.
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gloria Dei on earth" (GC 226). When direct fellowship with 
God is consummated through God's coming from the future to 
indwell creation, there will no longer be a need for an 
image because all of creation will be penetrated with his 
being. Moltmann understands humanity's likeness to God to
be "a historical process with an eschatological 
termination; it is not a static condition" (GC 227). As 
caught up in the eschatological process, "[being] human 
[not only] means becoming human...(GC 227)it also means 
being “gloria Dei on earth.” Human beings as the imago Dei
concurrently point to God's partial presence in creatio 
originalis and the promise of God's overflowing presence in 
the future. At creation, human beings did not fulfill their 
destiny. Rather, the imago Dei revealed the need to become 
imago Christi in order to realize their destiny as gloria 
Dei. True human likeness to God depends on the 
contradictory but harmonious process in which there is a 
simultaneous differentiation/identification of human beings 
with God. In other words, human beings participate in the 
process of deification, reaching their eschatological 
destiny by becoming similar to God in their perichoretic 
relations, while at the same time, there is growing 
ontological dissimilarity. 
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6i   Becoming Human in Community
The characteristic (love of difference) relations of 
agape point to love’s necessary transformation, or “flip,” 
into an eschatological philia (love of the like) as "in 
history, the messianic becoming-human of the human being 
remains incomplete and uncompletable" (GC 227). As long as 
human beings are disconnected from God’s complete 
indwelling as is necessarily the case in creatio 
originalis, human beings can never become true humanity. 
This inability of human beings as different to reach their 
end highlights the dynamic nature of Moltmann's 
understanding of reality. From humanity's creation in a 
godforsaken space, there has been from the beginning the 
need for redemption. Humanity's task was impossible – even 
without human rebellion- from the start because its goal 
could only be reached by being in the full presence of God. 
Yet, this is exactly what the act of creating a different 
Other prevented. Differentiation precedes and makes 
possible unity. In the case of creation, differentiation 
meant disconnection because of the need for relational 
space between God and his different Other. Humanity 
necessarily had to go through the trauma of being isolated 
from God, and thereby historically impotent, in order to 
reach its eschatological goal of fellowship with God. 
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Reality, as long as it is not yet fully indwelt by God, 
must reflect its forsaken, isolated nature and face the 
constant threat of annihilating nothingness. 
The lack inherent in creatio originalis explains why
Moltmann   calls the believer to live in contrast, actually 
in contradiction, to present society. As part of the 
differentiating movement, society can only reflect its 
godforsakenness. The believer reflects the perichoretic 
community to a hopeless reality. The follower of Christ 
cannot expect reality in its forsakenness to reveal God's 
presence until the forsakenness is overcome by God's 
presence. Hence, in the given context of forsakenness, the 
norm for the follower of Jesus is to live sacrificially in 
contrast to fallen reality as a way of pointing to the 
promise of the future coming of God. The antithesis between 
the forsakenness of creation and the follower of Christ and 
its resultant tensions will remain ever evident until the 
promise is fulfilled as "it is only the eschatological 
annihilation of death, the redemption of the body on a new 
earth and under a new heaven, which will consummate the 
'becoming' process of human beings, thereby fulfilling 
their creaturely destiny" (GC 227). As we have seen, the 
destiny of creatio originalis, including humans, is a
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becoming one with God through theosis while at the same 
time becoming increasingly ontologically dissimilar.  
Moltmann's understanding of the 'becoming' nature of 
humanity is further evidenced by his view on the dominium 
terrae. The promise given to human beings regarding 
dominion over creation is interpreted eschatologically. He 
argues, "Under the conditions of history and in the 
circumstances of sin and death, the sovereignty of the 
crucified and risen Messiah Jesus is the only true dominium 
terrae" (GC 227). It is important to again note Moltmann's 
linking of the condition of history with sin and death. If 
we return to TH, we see that Moltmann remains consistent in 
his understanding of history: "The stage for what can be 
experienced, remembered and expected as 'history' is set 
and filled, revealed and fashioned, by promise" (TH 107). 
The promise of creatio nova plays a central role in looking 
at human history because of the separation and forsakenness 
of creatio originalis.  The lack of creation and human 
history is both the realization of God’s absence and the 
invitation for his indwelling. History awaits its 
completion within the divine life.
History for Moltmann always is contingent, in process, 
and provisional.  The promise of dominium terrae points 
forward to its fulfillment by the Messiah. This need for 
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fulfillment, the necessity of becoming, lies at the heart 
of Moltmann's thought. When human beings were created, they 
already were deficient and needed the completion that only 
an intimate fellowship with God could provide. The human 
being who participates fully in the divine life when God 
arrives from the future must be understood to be 
significantly different than the original human being as 
she becomes God’s same Other. The human being of creatio 
originalis is forsaken, isolated, and threatened by the 
nothingness. At her core, she yearns to be more. In the 
creatio nova the human being is embraced and indwelt by the 
divine community. She becomes “God’s glory in the world –
Gloria Dei est homo” (GC 228). There is no lack as she is 
ful/filled by God. The human being finds her true identity 
within the reciprocal, perichorectic, fail-safe exchanges 
of philia. In summarizing, Moltmann says, "we can say that 
as God's image human beings conform to the presence of the 
Creator in his creation, and as God's children they conform 
to the presence of God's grace; but when the glory of God 
itself enters creation, they will become like God and 
transfigured into his appearance" (GC 228-29). The image 
always directs beyond itself to the reality to which it 
corresponds. Conforming to Christ as the image of God is 
not enough, one must become like God: "The imago per 
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conformitatem gratiae points beyond itself to the imago per 
similitudinem gloriae" (GC 229). 
The human as becoming has two distinct meanings for 
Moltmann, in synch with two concurrent and distinct 
directions. In the direction of creatio originalis,
history, and ordinary time, becoming is an ongoing movement 
of differentiation with the realization of forsakenness, 
futility, and the nihil. But in the countering movement of 
identification, creatio nova and perichoresis, becoming has 
an eschatological end in fulfillment; as humanity is drawn 
into the interpenetrating relationships of divine life. 
Humans, simultaneously, become unlike God as they 
eschatologically become like God. 
6j  The Ethics of Kenosis and Theosis
In making inner-trinitarian relationships the ideal 
for human relationality, Moltmann's ethics privileges the 
unity-in-diversity of perichoresis. Though philia
transforms, or “flips,” into agape for the sake of 
difference in the movement of history, agape again 
transmutes, or “re-flips” into philia for creation to be 
completed. The risk of kenosis is superceded and suspended 
by the safety of theosis. The perfect community is revealed 
as "the unselfishness in the eternal love and unity of the 
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trinitarian God is perichoresis: community in mutual 
interdependence and interpenetration" (UL 119-20). The 
focus on relationality leads Moltmann to conclude that "God 
is not subject, God is community" (UL 120). 
However, even as God's different Other, community is 
also the goal of creation. The problem for creation is that 
as God's different Other, it finds itself in a place of 
abandonment and forsakenness by God. In the space 
threatened by death and annihilation, humanity lacks both 
the safety and wherewithal for perichoretic relations to 
exist. Forsaken creation is too inherently distant from 
God, and in its distance too vulnerable to rejection, and 
even violence. The only way to perichoretic community for 
creation is to experience the redemption of God through 
Christ in the power of the Spirit. Creation in its original 
forsakenness is raised up into the divine community by the 
God who becomes vulnerable to suffering through the 
incarnation of the Son. Once humanity experiences life in 
the divine community by God's saving act, it can attempt to 
live kenotically in the midst of forsakenness.
As God comes from the future, theosis is not a healing 
restoration, rather theosis is the overcoming of creation’s 
limit so it may participate in the divine perichoresis. And 
with that overcoming, although creation is validated as 
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necessary to the process, the differentiations of creation 
are invalidated. Human beings are empowered to strive for 
perichoresis in forsakenness because of the model 
established by the sending of the Son. The sending of the 
Son to redeem creation reveals the kenotic nature of divine 
life as it becomes vulnerable to the different Other. God 
continues to give himself in spite of, and because of, the 
possibility of rejection. The gift of the Son opens the 
divine community to creation and reveals to creation the 
path it should follow. Like the Son, creation should exist 
kenotically for the different Other in spite of, and 
because of, the lack of assurance regarding the receptivity 
of the Other. Because God has not yet fulfilled his promise 
to dwell fully in creation, living kenotically for forsaken 
humanity means exposing oneself to the risk present in the 
face of the powers of evil and suffering.  Jesus Christ is 
the example to follow in this context. Jesus Christ humbled 
himself to the point of bearing death on the cross. So 
also, in the midst of evil, the followers of Jesus Christ 
are to make themselves vulnerable to the violent by 
reacting non-violently for the sake of the violent Other.
Moltmann's understanding of an ethics of discipleship 
as kenosis is consistent with the ethical impulses that 
eschatological theology had from the very beginning. In TH, 
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Moltmann emphasizes "the promised identity of man leads 
into the differentiation of self-emptying" (TH 91). He 
further explains "man does not gain himself by 
distinguishing himself from 'the world', but by emptying 
himself into it" (TH 92). Self-emptying was never to be 
seen as the end goal. Rather, it was part of the process of 
receiving his true self: "He gains himself by abandoning 
himself. He finds life by taking death upon him. He attains 
to freedom by accepting the form of a servant" (TH 92). 
Throughout his work on the crucified God and the 
development of a social doctrine of the Trinity, Moltmann's 
basic ethical stance has changed little.  Moltmann 
summarizes this position when he says, "true love is the 
unselfish surrender to another person or other beings for 
their own sake. Reciprocal kenotic love sustains the world. 
It depletes the world 'in reference to inherent existence' 
while it enlivens the world through the realization of 
perichoretic community" (UL 121). This understanding of 
ethics as kenosis is possible because Moltmann understands 
kenosis as intertwined with theosis in a process that 
yields perichoresis which is the very nature of God as 
Trinity.
Kenosis and theosis are identifiable as the two 
simultaneous, contradictory movements present in Moltmann's 
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understanding of reality. As shown by the analogy of 
relationality, both kenosis and theosis exist at every 
level of reality. Whenever the movement of reality is 
towards differentiation, there is a kenosis that creates 
the possibility of re-establishing unity. Whenever the 
transposition is made through the unselfish giving of 
oneself to the Other and the movement is towards unity, 
theosis exists as the processing unity which is shaped 
through the reciprocating interpenetration and indwelling 
of one another. In kenosis, agape love creates new 
possibilities out of difference. In theosis, philia love 
forms deeper and deeper connections in the context of 
(dis)similarity. As perichoresis develops, it concurrently 
validates and invalidates the differentiation that made 
kenosis necessary. Kenosis precedes and makes possible 
identification. This dialectic of kenosis and theosis is 
perfected at the ultimate level of reality within divine 
life. When God becomes "all in all," all of reality will be 
raised up into the divine perichoretic community. Here 
disconnection and forsakenness will be experienced no 
longer as God's presence fulfills his promise. From the 
future, God will come to complete himself and his creation.
6k  Choosing to be Guilty
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As the exploration of the theosis/kenosis dialectic 
demonstrates for Moltmann, the ethical choice – the way of 
Jesus Christ – is the way of self-emptying and non-
violence. Imago Christi requires, no questions asked, self-
sacrifice. However, strikingly and paradoxically - even if 
understandably in light of the exigencies of daily life -
after all the emphasis on living kenotically, Moltmann 
allows for, moreover adapts Bonhoeffer’s responsible action 
which he describes as “the readiness to incur guilt” (EH 
142).214 Where non-violence encounters the violence of a 
power-over, the question of the legitimate use of power 
comes to the fore. Although Moltmann's basic ethical stance 
requires that the follower of Christ kenotically give 
herself to the violent Other in the hope of redemption, 
Moltmann recognizes that in some instances, the goal of 
liberation from violence can only be initiated through 
violent resistance. In other words, Moltmann asserts "the 
principle of non-violent action does not exclude the 
struggle for power" (WJC 130). Sometimes, according to 
                                                
214 Diethrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (Translated by Eberhard Bethge. London, 
SCM Press, 1955), explains “When a man takes guilt upon himself in 
responsibility, and no responsible man can avoid this, he imputes this 
guilt to himself and to no one else; he answers for it; he accepts 
responsibility for it. He does not do this in the insolent 
presumptuousness of his own power, but he does it in the knowledge that 
this liberty is forced upon him and that in this liberty he is 
dependent upon grace. Before other men the man of free responsibility 
is justified by necessity; before himself he is acquitted by his
conscience, but before God he hopes only for mercy”.
207
Moltmann, there is a necessary "struggle for power," a 
struggle "to make every exercise of power subject to law" 
(WJC 130). Moltmann simultaneously argues that resistance 
to illegitimate force is an understandable use of power and 
that violent acts of resistance are never justifiable. 
Forceful resistance to violence may be necessary and 
understandable at times for Moltmann for the Christian 
life. However to say violent acts were justifiable, in any 
instance, would be to deny the ideal of non-violent action. 
In personal conversation, Dr. Moltmann explained that he 
carried two principles from his participation in WWII. 
First, he would never pick up arms again. Second, he would 
never allow a tyrant like Hitler to maintain power again. 
In spite of the contradiction, Dr. Moltmann felt he had to 
hold onto the way of non-violence, but he would "choose to 
be guilty" if the situation demanded it. 215
This position is consistent with Moltmann’s assertions 
regarding Christian political participation. In the face of 
tyranny, “resistance is called for… in order to safeguard 
the rights of the neighbor and to protect the powerless” 
(EH 130). He makes an even stronger statement when he 
declares “active resistance for the sake of the oppressed 
neighbor is not only a right but also a duty of the 
                                                
215 M. Bonzo, personal conversation in Tϋbingen during January, 1993.  
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Christian” (EH 129). This violence “cannot be approved but 
can be answered for” (EH 143). In the violence of active 
resistance “guilt remains guilt, but we can live with this 
guilt” (EH 143). As agape, active resistance is “selfless 
to the point of sacrific[ing] personal innocence” (EH 143). 
Violent acts of resistance may be understandable, but 
they certainly do not coincide with the norm of 
perichoresis. Nevertheless, in the face of an all-consuming 
violent Other, one can (must?), according to Moltmann, 
legitimately resist.216 In such cases for Moltmann, as Wiebe 
explains, it is "a matter of love being ready to incur 
guilt, for this is still violence that cannot be approved 
but that can be answered for."217 At this point, according 
to Wiebe, “the issue for Moltmann is no longer one of 
violence or nonviolence, but of the criteria which may be 
used to govern the justifiable use or unjustifiable use of 
power.”218
In a violent context, we can choose to be guilty by 
retaliating with violence; for example, to prevent further 
bloodshed of innocent lives. In retaliating, we may be 
justified in our actions and such actions are 
understandable; however, guilt is still suffered. Wiebe 
                                                
216 See EH, 129, 138.
217 Wiebe, “Revolution as an Issue in Theology: Jürgen Moltmann,” 110.
218 Wiebe, “Revolution as an Issue in Theology: Jürgen Moltmann,” 110.
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describes Moltmann's position as one that while giving 
preference to non-violence means we cannot begin with a 
"principle of non-violence" because we live in a world 
"where politics is a matter of power, distribution of 
power, and participation in the exercise of power."219
However, our stepping outside of the norm of perichoresis
in order to preserve ourselves results in the loss of hope 
for reconciliation between the self and the violent Other. 
Moltmann allows for a struggle in resistance.220 But the 
struggle is not ultimately to replace one form of 
oppression with another. Just as "love of an enemy can 
never be subjection to the enemy," (WJC 130) the struggle 
for legitimate use of power can never climax in the 
subjection of the enemy. 
Rather, in each instance, the intent is to create a 
climate in which there can be a free giving of oneself to 
the Other. For Moltmann, the norm for humanity is always 
the kenosis of Christ, for it is only in this way that 
trinitarian perichoresis can be imaged in the human 
community. Yet, because of Moltmann's knowledge of the 
millions of oppressed whom their oppressors have killed 
especially in this century, he allows for the possibility 
                                                
219 Wiebe, “Revolution as an Issue in Theology: Jürgen Moltmann,” 110.
220 See Moltmann EH, 129-138.
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of a violent resistance. In such cases, violence is 
returned for violence and the followers of Christ willingly 
incur guilt for the protection of the weak. But God can 
"transform human guilt into divine suffering" as he "bears 
not only the history of (the world's) suffering but also 
the history of human injustice" (HTG 50).
6l  Questions and Ambiguities
As Moltmann develops perichoresis and an ethics of 
discipleship, the relationships between difference and 
sameness, kenosis and theosis, and agape and philia reveal 
a dynamic reality that has a comprehensive coherence and 
even exquisite profundity about it. However, it also raises 
important and puzzling questions.221 The reality that 
Moltmann, in spite of his ethics of kenosis, allows for 
forceful resistance to violence is of crucial significance 
for our exploration. It means that his intention to provide 
                                                
221 These questions arise in spite of the recognition of Moltmann’s 
influence on liberation  theology, especially in the work of Boff and 
Sobrino.  Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives, 120ff. traces the 
influence of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity on social and political 
reality in liberation theologians. The Marxist connection with 
liberation theology also relies upon a dynamic (Hegelian) understanding 
of reality.  But it is not clear that key concepts like “God’s
preferential option for the poor” find more of resonance in the life of 
the Trinity instead of the kingdom of God. It seems that oppression 
understood as sin against the Trinitarian communion downplays the 
suffering of the human community.  See also Steven Phillips, The Use of 
Scripture in Liberation Theologies: an Examination of Juan Luis 
Segundo, James H. Cone, and Jürgen Moltmann (Doctoral dissertation, 
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1978)
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unequivocal ethical leverage for daily living is not as 
unproblematic as it appears in the first reading of 
“discipleship commits us to nonviolence.”222
Self-sacrifice is, for Moltmann, clearly the normative 
ethical response. This would seem to mean that an imitatio 
Christi requires self-sacrifice in any case of violence. 
The complexity of a kenotic ethics is understood when 
Moltmann presents the two views of the self. In creatio 
originalis, self-assertion is a choosing to be guilty and a 
forsaking of the Other. In the perichoretic Trinity, self-
assertion is natural, legitimate, and morally commendable. 
Since for Moltmann creation is both forsaken and indwelt, 
the question remains for human beings: when we act in self-
assertion are we to consider ourselves “guilty” or 
“justified”? 
Here we can sense the depth of the ethical dilemma in 
which Moltmann finds himself and we with Moltmann. Both 
being conformed to God and becoming like God entail a 
ceaseless self-giving. With this giving comes the 
promise/reality of a divine indwelling in the openness of 
the self. However a “choosing to be guilty” fits with 
neither conforming to God nor being like God. Yet it is a 
                                                
222 In “Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics,” Schuurman deduces, “Moltmann 
does offer some moral guidance toward a constructive social ethic, but 
I would argue that this positive guidance is not connected to or based 
upon his eschatology”(51).
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choice intentionally embraced by Moltmann. What does this 
“inconsistency” tell us about the cash-value of Moltmann’s 
ethical theory for the ethical conundrums of daily life?  
How does one know when to choose to be guilty? 
 In light of his understanding of self-assertion, is a 
choosing to be guilty ever a morally commendable position? 
It is certainly not clear. That being the case, we are left 
somewhat in the lurch as to which way to act. This 
ambiguity suggests the inability, or at least limited 
ability, of Moltmann’s position for providing ethical help 
for people of faith.223
In fact, Moltmann’s ambiguity at this point even 
suggests that his thought could be used to support a 
militaristic regime as well as asceticism or pacifism. What 
are the criteria which help us determine when we are 
justified to pick up arms and choose to be guilty? Or do we 
need to live with the reality that, although never
justified, sometimes we find ourselves with the only resort 
of armed violence? 
Another question becomes paramount in this discussion: 
Is the “end” (goal) of being human the termination of being 
                                                
223 Wiebe, “Revolution as an Issue in Theology: Jürgen Moltmann,” poses 
the issue, “If the criterion is Christ, it cannot come out of a self-
interpreting “situation..all ideas that make a claim to have authority 
apart from or over against Christ must be tested and seen for what they 
are”(120).   
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human (theosis)?224 Or is the end of being human 
accomplished in perichoretic communion? Or, as the thrust 
of our argument would suggest, are both true at the same 
time for Moltmann? In many ways, perhaps most, it may not 
make too much difference. But at least in a couple of ways, 
I suggest, matters of practical ethical significance are at 
stake. If essential to the difference which characterizes 
creation is godforsakenness and the suffering it entails, 
does not Moltmann come close (too close in my view) to 
constructing – his intentions notwithstanding- a theodicy 
which to a large degree ontologizes, and in that way, 
justifies suffering and evil as necessary and inevitable? 
This seems to amount to an eschatological justification of 
evil and suffering as they are transmuted, or “flipped,” 
into a greater good. 
Within the context of fallen creation, redeemed 
humanity becomes a contradiction of social order. Ethics 
are kenotic because creatio originalis’ lack does not allow 
the possibility of mutuality. Within the God-filled 
creation of the eschaton, humanity ceases to be a 
conforming image and becomes a partnering image in the 
                                                
224 Here I draw upon Jacques Derrida’s, “The Ends of Man” in After 
Philosophy: End or Transformation? Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, and 
Thomas McCarthy eds., (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1987) play with the 
meanings of end. It seems the eschatological end of humanity stands in 
contrast to the creational end of humanity for Moltmann.  
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divine community. As necessarily perichoretic, such 
relationships do not stand in need of ethical direction. As 
true as this may be when we are home with God in glory, in 
this fallen world, with its penultimate here and now, we 
still require ethical direction. 
Human beings which start out as God's (dis)similar 
Other in his original act of creation become God's 
(dis)similar Other in the fulfillment of the promise. As it 
is raised into the divine community, humanity moves from 
the realm of difference and freedom to the realm of 
sameness and necessity. Moltmann argues that "the 
eschatological becoming-one-with God of human beings is 
inherent in the concept of 'seeing', for the seeing face to 
face and the seeing him as he is transforms the seer into 
the One seen and allows him to participate in the divine 
life and beauty" (GC 229). The ultimate effects of 
"participation in the divine nature and conformity to God, 
flowering into perfect resemblance, are the marks of the 
promised glorification of human beings" (GC 229). The 
complication here is that “glorification” ironically has 
both the connotation of the suspension of being human and 
the surpassing of being human.
With this construction come some very real pastoral 
questions: When God’s suffering is conceived of in this 
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way, is God’s suffering, in the final analysis, real 
suffering? It seems to have a fail-safe quality to it 
because redemption and glorification are already built into 
creation’s story by God from the beginning.225 The Hell of 
suffering becomes only a temporary, but inherent, way-
station to theosis.  
A related concern has to do with the very real 
difference regarding the risk taken by God and the risk 
inherent to human life. In the kenotic actions of the Son, 
the kenotic way of being human is revealed. Kenosis implies 
risk and, for Moltmann, there exists analogy between human 
and divine risk. This analogy is possible because God takes 
human suffering into himself. The tension here between 
divine power and divine love is most radically felt. God's 
glory is understood as his ability to be vulnerable rather 
than in his infinite strength. But if God being almighty is 
linked with his vulnerability, his "almightiness" is 
limited because God's exposure to risk is limited. The risk 
God takes in experiencing suffering is, I would argue not 
truly a risk, because the God coming from the future always 
                                                
225  McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love, 144ff., argues correctly that 
Moltmann’s understanding of friendship involves self-giving love. She 
assumes this means agape for Moltmann. I understand both agape and
philia to be self-giving love. The difference is the context. Because 
of the predictable responses involved in the self-giving of philia 
there is little risk. The analogy between divine life and human 
community is harder to establish given this difference.
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has enough power to overcome suffering and death. It is 
true that in Moltmann’s understanding of divine love, God 
is selfless and “risks” himself for the sake of the 
suffering Other. Yet, that risk is wholly relativized by 
the fact that the kenotic movement of God is 
simultaneously, from the beginning, always countered by a 
theosis in which God is once again "all in all."  The 
limitation of the divine risk is noted by Jüngel, when he 
points out, quoting Barth, that "God gives himself, but 
does not give himself away.”226  God is never totally at 
risk in his self-gift because of the assured divine 
delimitation. Theosis always accompanies kenosis.227
However, for creatures the risk is never fail-safe. 
Oppressed people face real risk and can only hope for 
freedom from suffering through the actions of the divine 
Other. Their risk of suffering is more ambiguous, without 
built-in guarantees. However, in Moltmann’s theory, God’s 
sacrificial suffering is simultaneously countered by God's 
redemptive action.
The quandaries of Moltmann’s ethics, at this point, 
are many. However, they seem to follow from the fact that 
                                                
226 Jϋngel, The Doctrine of the Trinity, 84.
227 Ron Highfield , “Divine Self-Limitation in the Theology of Jürgen 
Moltmann: A Critical Appraisal,” rejects Moltmann’s theology of divine 
self-limitation because it conception of a God who must limit himself 
to create and to save “suffers under the prior limit of that very 
necessity” (68). 
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he begins with a creation that is not good, but forsaken. 
When one begins here -- in spite of all subsequent 
compensatory moves -- human inadequacies, ugliness and even 
sin become watermarks of humanity, not by the contingency 
of disobedience, but by the necessity of creation, even as 
concurrently, redemption from suffering and perichoretic 
community is the end of being human. 
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Chapter 7
The Ethics of Ambiguity:
Self-Sacrifice and Self-Assertion
Moltmann’s understanding of difference, as we have 
seen, is ultimately rooted in a cosmogony that views 
reality in terms of fundamental contradictory 
oppositions.228 Reality in its differentiation is driven 
towards its fulfillment by the tension between two 
simultaneous, opposing movements.229 Difference and unity 
are accounted for in terms of these contradictory 
movements. In the end, the tension between his final all-
inclusive and cosmically contradictory assertions that “God 
will be all in all” and “greater ontological differences” 
continues unresolved.230 Nevertheless, and simultaneously, 
in the eschatological direction, in the harmonic feast of 
                                                
228 Interestingly, Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, suggests 
that many of Moltmann’s much criticized tendencies may be a result of 
“too great a preoccupation with apologetic questions”(23). The tie 
between apologetics and metaphysics is evident in the history of 
Christian theology and philosophy. Moltmann’s appeal to a 
contradictory/harmonic monism can, I think, be seen as an apologetic 
move. While there may indeed be apologetical value, my point is that 
such a move may have unintended consequences. Dalferth, “The 
Eschatological Roots of the Doctrine of the Trinity,” sees Trinitarian 
thought as an attempt to move beyond Enlightenment theism and atheism 
and move beyond the modern speculative tradition. But I have argued 
that Moltmann’s thought is not a move beyond speculative thought, but 
has moved from the binary opposition of the Enlightenment by appealing 
to an ontology which reconciles opposites.   
229  For an account of Thomas’ understanding of difference as preceding 
opposition see Conor Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, 219ff.  
230 Milbank,“The Second Difference,” argues that “the very perfection of 
relation between Father and Son is in danger of obliterating the usual 
significance of personal relatedness”(230).
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Sabbath Redemption, kenosis transmutes into theosis in what 
could be called the triumph of glory. 
In this final chapter we will examine some of the 
implications of his cosmogony for ethical direction in the 
push and pull of ordinary life. A cluster of questions that 
have surfaced in our earlier discussions will serve as the 
backdrop for our considerations:
1) In view of Moltmann’s zimzum theory of creation as 
God-forsaken, is it possible for Moltmann to affirm 
fully the original goodness and worth of creation? Or 
does Moltmann’s cosmogony which, in and through its 
validation of finite diversity and differentiation, 
prioritizes infinite unity cast too long a shadow over 
finite creational diversity and creaturely 
distinctiveness?231
2. Does the inherent deficiency of created reality as 
godforsaken, which necessitates from the beginning 
redemptive fulfilling, entail that Moltmann is unable 
to do full justice to both the radical nature of sin 
and evil as the irresponsible turning away from God 
                                                
231   Levinas, “Ethics of the Infinite,” critiques any eschatology that 
fuses. He explains that “I am trying to work against this 
identification of the divine with unification or totality. Man’s 
relationship with the other is better as difference than as unity: 
sociality is better than fusion” (74). While Moltmann also wants to 
stress sociality, divine and creational, his eschatological focus 
suggests fusion.
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and God’s ways of love, as well as to the unmerited, 
gracious redemption through the death and resurrection 
of Jesus Christ? So despite Moltmann’s assertion that 
evil is contingent and non-necessary, when “the cross 
is at the centre of the Trinity… Before the world was, 
the sacrifice was already in God. No Trinity is 
conceivable without the Lamb, without the sacrifice of 
love, without the crucified Son” (TK 83) is it not 
also implied that, when all is said and done, sin and 
evil and concomitant suffering come with the creation 
as a necessary part of the cosmic fabric?232
All of these questions find their resonance in the focal 
concern of this chapter. Does Moltmann’s cosmogony lead, as 
he intends, to a practical theology with ethical guidance 
for daily living? One sizeable obstacle, which makes 
answering this question extremely difficult, is the fact 
that Moltmann’s ethics too often remains at the level of 
general principles and abstraction. Furthermore, even 
though his call to the self-sacrifice of kenosis is 
constant and impassioned, his recognition that sometimes 
(often? seldom? usually?) we need to be self-assertive and 
                                                
232 In his analysis of Moltmann’s position on suffering, Jansen, 
Relationality and the Concept of God, asks “Must God not suffer, 
whether he wills it or not? The concept of active suffering (God 
choosing to suffer) appears to remain a matter of choice rather than of 
necessity”(134).
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“choose to be guilty” seriously muddies the ethical 
waters.233
In the push and pull of daily life, it is my suspicion 
that Moltmann often leaves us ill at ease; ethically in the 
lurch, usually with heightened feelings of guilt for so 
often finding it impossible to walk the royal road of 
kenotic self-sacrifice.234
  Is the need and reality of “choosing to be guilty” 
in Moltmann’s thought the exception which proves the rule, 
or is this need for self-assertion built-in to his 
cosmogony as the dialectically oppositional complement to 
the call to constant self-surrender? In any case, 
Moltmann’s call to ethical kenosis is not without attendant 
ambiguities.235
                                                
233 Compare with Milbank, “Can Morality be Christian?” Studies in 
Christian Ethics 8:1, 1995, 45-59, who argues that a characteristic of 
Christianity is “the end of sacrifice.” See also Edith Wyschogrod, 
Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1990), 95ff., on saints and the 
renunciation of power. 
234 Again, Moltmann has inspired much reflection on many of these issues. 
One only need look at the essays by Volf, Sobrino, and Cone in The 
Future of Theology, which are written in honor of Moltmann, to see the 
work his thought has invited.
235 Ingolf Dalferth, “The Eschatological Roots of the Doctrine of the 
Trinity,” understands the doctrine of the Trinity to suggest an 
ontology which “is not a desriptive conceptual account of divine 
activity as such. It is an attempt to spell out the conditions and 
presuppositions without which the eschatological experience of the 
risen Christ could not be true”(168).  Furthermore, “the doctrine of 
the Trinity does not offer a concept of God but insists on the 
fundamental and irrevocable difference between God and all our 
models…”(169).  Dalferth seems to be pointing to the difference between 
a confessing of God as Trinity in faith and a conceptual grasping of 
the inner life of God. It is my contention that Moltmann blurs this 
distinction. See also Ingolf Dalferth, Existenz Gottes und christlicher 
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If the exception is, in fact, the route most people 
find themselves on in the hurly-burly of life, doesn’t that 
cast a considerable shadow over the viability and 
credibility of his kenotic ethics, or at least make it an 
idealistic ethics that remains out of reach most of the 
time for all but the most saintly among us? On the other 
hand, if in fact self-assertion is recognized as a 
necessary, if not laudable part of creational life, how can 
we avoid the conclusion that Moltmann’s ethics is, in 
effect and reality, an ethics of considerable ambiguity for 
people in the throes of life?
7a  Creation as “the Tragedy of Divine Love”  
Moltmann, as I have repeatedly underscored, begins by 
defining God’s act of creating as an act in which God 
suffers a self-limitation. Consequently, “the temporality 
of earthly creation does not reflect the presence of God—it 
reflects his absence” (COG 284). That dictates that from 
the very beginning, “in the primordial moment . . . before 
the creation of the world” (COG 282), whatever else shows 
up in history, “the deliverance or redemption of the world 
                                                                                                                                                
Glaube. Skizzen zu einer eschatologischen Ontologie (München: Chr. 
Kaiser, 1984). 
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is bound up with the self-deliverance of God from his 
sufferings” (TK 60).
Here, I suggest--despite all the virtues and 
breakthroughs which Moltmann’s theology incarnates--is the 
heart of the problem which specter-like haunts Moltmann’s 
thought at every turn.  
  The history of creation is for Moltmann to be seen 
as “the tragedy of divine love” (TK 59) because “for God, 
creation means self-limitation, the withdrawal of himself, 
that is to say self-humiliation” (TK 59). And even though 
Moltmann also insists with equal passion that “creation is 
part of the eternal love affair between God the Father and 
God the Son” (TK 59), temporal creation   never overcomes 
its initial handicap of being God-forsaken. With creation 
God’s self-humiliation begins, “the self-limitation of the 
One who is omnipresent, and the suffering of eternal love” 
(TH 59).  
Instead of positively affirming in faith that God as 
love calls creation into being, and since God is God, the 
realities of space-limitation (space only being a mode of 
creational existence) do not hold for God, Moltmann insists 
that “the creator has to concede to his creation the space 
in which it can exist”. Indeed, “if God were omnipresent in 
the absolute sense, and manifested his glory, there would 
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be no earthly creation. In order to make himself endurable 
for his earthly creatures, God has to veil his glory… 
Remoteness from God and spatial distance from God result 
from the withdrawal” (COG 306) of God. Analogously, “God 
[primordially] restricts his eternity so that in this 
primordial time he can give his creation time. God becomes 
the “space” of the world and gives creation “time.”
Consequently, “creative love is always a suffering 
love as well” (TH 59) and the fundamental dynamics of 
Moltmann’s cosmogony are set in place. Withdrawal, 
remoteness, forsakenness cannot be the last words. 
Derestriction, intimate indwelling, manifestation of glory 
and redemption are equiprimordial co-simultaneous movements 
  Not only God as the space of the world, but also the 
world as God’s space,”the spacial creation will then become 
an omnipresent creation”(COG 294). Not only earthly time as 
“the time of transience … a form of life into the form of 
death”(COG 283), and “the time of history” as “exile, as 
the far country  and remoteness of God”(COG 304), but “the 
temporal creation will then become an eternal creation, 
because all things will participate in God’s eternity”(COG 
294). The history of creation as the “tragedy of divine 
love” is transformed and overturned into the history of 
redemption and “the feast of eternal joy”(TK 59).
225
Instead of creation as a with-space, a space for 
moving with God, from the outset, creation is an opposed-
space, a space of “detachment from God” and for “freedom of 
movement over against God” (COG 306).236 Creation, it would 
appear, is as much original curse as original blessing. 
Indeed, Moltmann talks of “the first temporal and imperfect 
creation” (COG 91), a “creation aligned towards its 
redemption from the very beginning” (COG 264).    
The very existence of creation as creation is already 
a demerit, an absence, a distance from God, a distance that 
“needs” redemption. The original separation from God--
without any human intent or misdeed-- is already conceived 
to be an oppositional “movement against God.” No wonder 
that, in terms of     God’s primordial self-limitation, 
Moltmann talks of a hell in the primordial nihil, making, 
so to speak, a space for evil which precedes the fall. 
Separation from God is a cosmic fault-line running through 
creation, and sin and evil are accidents waiting to happen, 
only a matter of time, of “Chronos,” as “the power of 
futility” (COG 284) before they erupt (COG 306). The result 
is a “frailty of the temporal creation of human beings is 
like a detonator for the sin of wanting to be equal to God 
and to overcome this frailty” (COG 91).  Much later in the 
                                                
236 See Volf, “Creation, Eschaton, and Social Ethics.”
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same book Moltmann summarizes: “If God himself enters into 
his creation through his Christ and his Spirit… he will 
then overcome not only the God-forsakenness of sinners, but 
also the distance and space of his creation itself, which 
resulted in isolation from God, and sin” (COG 306). Again 
this would seem to make the fall into sin more of a 
function of creational finitude than human 
irresponsibility. In Experiences of God, he writes that 
“the enslavement under which the created being suffers is 
transience” (EG 111-12).
Indeed, when Moltmann in God in Creation speaks of the 
coelum naturae or heaven of nature which contains alongside 
of “constructive potentialities” which have “ontological 
priority before the kingdom of the world’s reality” (GC 
166) certain “potencies which do not belong to the human 
sphere but which yet have a destructive effect on that 
sphere”(GC 169), it is difficult to avoid wondering if evil 
is not in some way being woven into the fabric of creation.
7b  God and Suffering 
 For Moltmann, God’s creative love is inherently a 
suffering love. Indeed, “God and suffering belong together” 
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TK 49). For him, ”the suffering of God with the world, the 
suffering of God from the world, and the suffering of God 
for the world are the highest forms of his creative love” 
(TK 60). 
I regard Moltmann’s emphasis on God’s suffering as 
most welcome in contrast to the traditions that do not 
accept the passion of God. A loving God, it would seem 
clear, would suffer with his creation. However, for 
Moltmann, God does not just suffer on account of sin and 
evil. Instead God’s suffering begins in the act of creating 
which Moltmann conceives as a humiliating self-limitation. 
This seems most problematic and, in my view, skews the 
entire subsequent discussion of God’s suffering with and 
from creation. I see no reason to consider the original 
loving act of creation as a self-limitation which causes 
God to suffer. Rather God took delight in pouring out his 
love creatively, declaring that it was good, and walking 
with Adam and Eve in the cool of the day in the garden of 
this earth called Eden. In the overflow of creative love, 
God took a “beautiful risk” and was vulnerable.
Only when, in the mystery of sin and evil, humankind 
turned their backs on God and on each other, did God’s 
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vulnerable risk turn into suffering.237 God’s suffering, 
then, is a suffering-with and from a creation entangled in 
evil. As love, God could only reach out and keep on coming 
again and again, calling humankind and creation back to the 
ways of love and justice, and in the death and resurrection 
of Jesus Christ show that love is stronger than death. 
In other words, since for Moltmann creation is already 
a separating from God in which God “suffers,” Moltmann sees 
no other way then to place the cross and suffering 
constitutively in the heart of the Trinity. This, among 
other things, leads him to contrast the creative and 
suffering love of God for the other (and the like in the 
other) as agape with the engendering love of intra-
trinitarian love of the like for the like (and for the 
other in the like) called philia.
All of these moves and the distinctions they 
entail seem not only speculative, but would be unnecessary 
except for the fact that Moltmann begins with creation as 
self-restriction. Moltmann intends to develop a theory 
which does justice to the cross and resurrection. I am 
suggesting, however that Moltmann’s zimzum theory of 
creation not only fundamentally denigrates creaturely 
                                                
237 Walsh, “Theology of Hope,” states succinctly “Moltmann’s view of 
creation…does not sufficiently account for the fall”(67).
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history, reality and time, but, by making the act of 
creating itself a negative separation from God, makes it 
highly difficult, if not impossible, for Moltmann to do 
sufficient justice to both the radical separation from God 
that is at the heart of sin, as well as to the gracious, 
unmerited redemption of the world in Jesus Christ.
Putting it in other words: when Moltmann places 
the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ in the heart of 
God from the beginning, it would seem highly improbable, if 
not impossible, for Moltmann—no matter what the intention, 
no matter what the moves—to avoid leaving the impression 
that creation, and creational time and transience are from 
the outset in some way impaired, and even without the 
reality of sin and evil, need to be superseded and 
transformed. And it further raises the question if the 
built-in impairment of being human does not make actual sin 
and evil only a matter of time, in effect making humankind 
more victims of sin and evil than responsible agents of sin 
and evil. Separation from God which comes with being human 
and separation from God which is sin become inextricably 
entangled. 
Moreover, if “God and suffering belong together” not 
due to the reality of sin and evil, but because the 
separation involved in creating (even if it is in love) is 
230
in the nature of God, doesn’t this in a fundamental way 
make human suffering as separation and isolation from God 
an inevitable part of the cosmic machinery that is to be 
endured, in the hope of its relief in the coming 
redemption? However, suffering as separation from God 
because of our creaturely condition would seem in some way 
to “normalize”—it’s just part of created human nature—
suffering, and take away from its incongruity, 
gratuitousness, unjustness, and horribleness.
Although Moltmann, undoubtedly, personally and 
existentially recognizes how terrible human suffering often 
is, the fact that, in his theory suffering comes with being 
human as a built-in, inescapable feature of creation from 
the beginning--a necessary, inescapable phase even without 
sin and evil along the road to the ultimate glory of 
redemption – nevertheless serves to mitigate or anesthetize 
the sting of suffering. 
In Moltmann’s cosmogony suffering and evil are 
themselves redeemed, and not, as I would suggest is more in 
line with the biblical witness, that we are redeemed from 
suffering and evil. 
Placing the cross in the heart of the Trinity would 
also seem to downplay the seriousness of sin as humankind 
turning away from God and rejecting the way of love. After 
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all, “in the cross of Christ God took evil, sin and 
rejection on himself, and in the sacrifice of his infinite 
love transformed it into goodness, grace and election” (SL 
212). According to Moltmann, God “moulds and alchemizes the 
pain of his love into atonement for the sinner” (SL 136). 
Evils too are transformed into good, and sins are redeemed. 
Questions multiply.
Does this to do full justice to the reality of evil 
and its destructiveness? Does Moltmann in his final all-
embracing redemption not come close to finally defusing the 
radical antithesis between goodness and evil (even as he 
affirms it)?
By God’s “primordial self-restriction” (COG 333), God 
created a space in which creation can be different. In this 
forsaken, free space, creation's response to God's loving 
overtures was not guaranteed. In the agapic love for that 
which is unlike, there is the possibility of God's offer of 
himself being rejected by  creation. In this inter-mural 
relationship with a different Other, God is vulnerable, and 
suffers. God's very being as kenotic love seems to be at 
risk as creation refuses the gift. In this movement, an 
element of contingency, unpredictability, and risk is 
involved as creation refuses the gift.
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At the same time, the structure of Moltmann's 
cosmogony insists that God’s agapic kenosis for creation is 
superseded/surpassed by a theosis of creation. Because the 
God-forsaken space is in God, God can and does derestrict 
himself and refill the space. The risk turns out, 
eschatologically, not to be a genuine risk. The central 
promise highlighted by the eschatological movement is that 
God will refill the forsaken space, thereby transforming 
temporal creation into the “eternal creation” (COG 295).
In the divine perichoresis with its mutual indwelling, 
there is a constant openness to the Other in the continual 
giving of the self. Since, however, this is the 
giving/receiving of the same Other characteristic of 
philia, this is an intramural, rather than inter-mural, 
relationship that is relatively predictable, even ‘safe.’ A 
loving response can always be expected from the Others who 
are essentially one and the same – like for like. While 
there are the distinct persons of Father, Son, and Spirit, 
their differentiation always/already presupposes a deeper 
unity that grounds the divine community. It is a loving of 
the Other in the like. Within the Trinity, any self-
emptying through a self-gift is immediately responded to by 
a refilling self-gift by a (dis)similar Other in the 
dynamic nature of perichoresis. There is a constant 
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overflowing from one into an Other. The cycle of giving and 
receiving is perpetual, but it is within a self-same 
threesome!
Once more, the same cluster of problems we have been 
working with in this chapter again surface. The fact that 
promised redemption is not only expected, but necessary 
from the beginning, as well as the fact that theosis 
results in an “overriding harmony of the relations and of 
the self-transcending movements” (CG 103) would seem to 
call into question, lessen, if not nullify the risk God 
assumes in creating the world. From the very beginning it 
seems, this different Other has existed for the sake of God 
and for the sake of redemption. From the moment of its 
differentiation, creation has been on a journey of 
(re)identification and (re)unification with God through 
God's interpenetration and divinization of his different 
Other.
 While creation’s rejection of God is without doubt, 
real and poignant in Moltmann, it is not only the 
contingent, freely chosen rejection of and estrangement 
from God, but also, simultaneously,  a necessary 
penultimate stage in a process where God fulfills himself. 
In God’s case the risk of agapic love is superseded by the 
inevitability of philia love.
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This construction, I suggest, is not without its 
problems. If the philia love of God ensures the eventual 
return to God, God would seem to be finally immune from the 
risk of agapic love. Doesn’t this in effect take the heart 
out of the risk, turning it into a necessary but temporary 
storm on the road to the glory of eternity? Is that true to 
the biblical picture of God ruing the day he created, 
grieving at the mess? Doesn’t it skew the very nature of 
love as vulnerability and risk to insist that, already from 
before the beginning, the glory of the feast of redemption 
is a sure thing? 
It is one thing, in faith, to live in the certainty of 
the resurrection and the triumph of love. It is another 
thing to translate that faith certainty into a theoretic 
conceptualization which seems to eclipse the risk and drama 
of human time and history, embracing it and transforming it 
finally into the fail-safe eternity of God’s drama. No 
matter the qualifications—and Moltmann’s contradictory 
harmony monism always has built-in qualifications—when the 
suffering, sin, and violence of human life is in any way 
made a necessary part of  the cosmic drama which in the end 
will be embraced and transformed in redemption, Moltmann, 
in my view, is erecting a kind of eschatological 
verification theodicy.
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If before the creation, it is already in the cards 
that God’s suffering and concomitant creational suffering 
is but a penultimate stage in the process of redemption, 
doesn’t this serve, as we have noted already, to minimize 
the existential horror of human suffering by validating it, 
even as ultimately invalidating it.  Suffering would seem 
to be eschatologically justified, and redeemed. Rather, I 
would suggest, suffering is that from which we are to be 
redeemed, even as we are redeemed from sin and evil.  
7c  Difference as Opposition
In finally priortizing unity and harmony, Moltmann’s 
contradictory/harmony monism thematizes differentiation as 
a necessary but penultimate stage. In reality's movement, 
differentiation is a moving from the unity, but this 
movement-from is also reality's drive towards its goal of 
greater unity. Consequently, difference cannot be fully 
affirmed as good, but is considered a kind of evil 
necessary to reality's movement from unity to greater 
unity--what Milbank calls “necessary alienation.”238
Moltmann’s cosmogony emplots alienation inherently into the 
narrative of reality. As a result, the radical nature of 
evil and the uselessness of suffering are ultimately 
                                                
238 Milbank, ‘The Second Difference,’ 223.
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relativized because this alienation is not the result of 
sinful disconnection from God, but is an inherent part of 
the cosmic machinery necessary for the process.239 Without 
this tension of opposites, reality stagnates. 
Differentiation, as alienation from the unity, exists for 
the sake of greater eschatological unity. As reality 
reaches its goal of greater unity, alienation, suffering, 
and disconnection cease as oppositional boundaries are 
somehow transformed, flipped, into a new unity.   
As we have seen, particularly in the discussion 
regarding the act of creation, God stands in contradiction 
to any different Other. Even if Moltmann’s refined 
distinctions found in creatio originalis and creatio nova 
are honored, the difference of creation is still viewed as 
a detachment from God, an opposition, in that sense, a 
deficiency. However, when this lack is overcome in 
redemption, it would seem that genuine difference if not 
threatened, is certainly eclipsed. As (dis)similar in 
perichoresis, creation may not become the Son, but Moltmann 
does argue that it becomes a son. Becoming a son means 
dwelling in the divine community, as "the God-likeness that 
belongs to creation in the beginning becomes the God-
                                                
b239 Milbank, “The Second Difference,” concludes that Moltmann’s “tragic 
theology” embraces “a Hegelian theodicy in which necessary estrangement 
is justified by the final outcome” (224).
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sonship and daughterhood in the messianic fellowship with 
the Son" (GC 229). This promised glorification of the Other 
leads to "participation in the divine nature and conformity 
to God, flowering into perfect resemblance" (GC 229). 
Participation and perfect resemblance imply a kind of 
fusion, if not confusion, of identity and a 
transmogrification of boundaries.
7d  The Trinity as Social Program
Since, for Moltmann, creation in its forsakenness from 
the beginning awaits its redemption, he needs to find a 
place other than in creation to ground his ethics. So the 
Trinity becomes his social program and he locates the norm 
for human ethical life in divine relationality. For 
Moltmann the ultimate assurance of both creation's 
existence and creation’s return to God was the sending of 
the Son. In the incarnation, the Son, as both creator and 
redeemer, becomes a different Other so that the Father can 
love in a context of difference. Jesus Christ becomes 
different by a “whole and genuine emptying of his divine 
form and his divinity as well as his divine power” (UL 
119). It is "through the Son the divine Trinity throws 
itself open for human beings" (GC 243). This trinitarian 
openness in redemption means, that in Jesus Christ, God is 
238
“there for us in our guilt, to free us from its burden” 
(The Passion of Christ 22). The trinitarian community 
reveals itself to be "open" and "inviting," and at the same 
time all-embracing. The incarnation of Christ opens 
creation to an entirely different and contradictory 
direction, even as it reveals the way to eschatological 
union.
 In Christ, God is not only the revealer, but also the 
revealed. While the community of inner-trinitarian life is 
revealed to be the destiny of forsaken creation, in the 
Son, inner-trinitarian life is also revealed to be the 
ethical norm for human relationships within the
forsakenness.  The Trinity is to become the social program 
for humanity.
Divine love, agape, in the incarnation direction of 
differentiation is kenotic. Likewise, the ethical ideal 
revealed by the incarnate Son for forsaken creation is 
kenosis. The self-gift is to be a withdrawal of self for 
the sake of the Other. In self-emptying, the self is opened 
to the Other with the hope for reciprocation: "The promised 
identity of man leads into the differentiation of self-
emptying" (TH 91). Then again: "Man does not gain himself 
by distinguishing himself from 'the world,' but by emptying 
himself into it" (TH 92). To have the hope of the future 
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one must follow Christ which “involves a practical 
discipleship that follows the messianic path his own life 
took; and that means an ethic which has to be made 
identifiably Christian” (WJC 118). The pain or suffering 
that result from this act is transcended by the assurance 
that it is a necessary part of the process of redemptive 
theosis whereby everyone is reconciled to each Other and to 
God.
7e  Kenosis and the Exercise of Agape in the Face of Violence
In this emphasis on kenosis as the way to theosis and 
participation in the divine community, Moltmann aligns the 
way of creation with the way of Christ. God has revealed 
that faithfulness must remain kenotic even in the face of 
rejection. Following Christ means that in our context of 
isolation and violence we too must exercise creative agape.
 However, the presence of a violent Other deeply 
challenges Moltmann's hope of making inner-trinitarian life 
the norm for humanity. Here Schuurman’s analysis is apt:
“this way of rooting the necessity of the incarnation in 
the divine nature as love is a good example of Gustafson’s 
criticism that Moltmann’s theology is anthropocentric. God 
cannot be God without man.” The idea of God suffering 
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eternally is also hard to grasp and support.”240 What 
direction does trinitarian life give forsaken humanity 
beyond giving ourselves over to the redemptive process? 
When confronted with violence, the ideal of community can 
be held up and we can be urged to give ourselves lovingly, 
but unlike the divine life we have neither the knowledge of 
the Other's response nor the power to redeem (overcome) the 
Other. As we have noticed, in God’s case, the risk of 
agapic love is accompanied and finally superseded by the 
inevitability of philia love. How is this to work for 
humans? On the one hand, since the suffering and violence, 
however contingent, are inevitably taken up and redeemed in 
the feast of eschatological redemption,  humans are called 
to bear the sacrifices of ethical self-surrender in hope of 
the coming redemption. On the other hand, since suffering 
and violence need to be resisted as implicated in the 
dynamics of sin, humans are allowed to fight back, defend 
themselves, and “choose to be guilty.” 
How are we to square Moltmann’s allowing for a 
returning of violence in an act of self-protection with his 
impassioned call to self-kenosis? Does this point to a 
fundamental inconsistency in his ethics, or, as we suspect, 
                                                
240 Schuurman, “Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics,” 62.
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is this blatant contradiction simply part and parcel of the 
cosmically contradictory nature of Moltmann’s cosmogony.241
As we have explored, in Moltmann’s 
contradictory/harmony monism we find a consistent and final 
eschatological privileging of identity and unity at the 
expense of ontological difference and non-union in his 
“overriding harmony” (GC 103). Despite his insistence and 
desire to reconcile difference and unity, freedom and 
necessity, agape and philia, creation and new creation, and 
kenosis and theosis, in his thought, the validation of the 
first term in each opposing pair takes place by means of 
its simultaneous invalidation by and transcendence of the 
second term.
The end goal of a greater community between God and 
creation overrides/supersedes and, in effect, calls into 
question the full creaturely goodness of creational 
diversity. The penchant for being taken up in the divine 
community in Moltmann's cosmogony means that ultimately the 
space of creatio originalis is for the purposes of being 
filled and superseded. The question re-emerges: Does this 
conceptualization do sufficient justice to finite time, 
                                                
241  McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love, concludes that Moltmann’s idea of the 
social Trinitarian program does not “legislate a particular course of 
action in any given situation,”(147) but show a theological cohesion 
between divine life and concrete practices of believers.
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creaturely difference, and creational goodness, or does 
creation suffer an eclipse in the final redemption?
 What does seem clear is that creation as god-forsaken 
is never really a credible threat to God. God’s suffering 
of self-restriction is at the same time, always and already 
a process of de-restriction and redemption. Ironically, in 
Moltmann’s thought, the real risk for creation is not 
isolation and forsakenness in the alienation of sin, but 
the danger that creation loses its finite identity, 
transience, and particularity in the over-riding drama of 
redemption. 
7f  Perichoresis and Gender Relations
One area where the viewing of difference as opposition 
and the threat to diversity is obviously a cause for 
concern is in understanding gender relationships. As we 
have seen, (dis)similarity to God is found in human 
community. In the analogy between divine life and human 
life, there is “found in the differentiation in 
relationship, and the wealth of relationship in the 
differentiation" (GC 223).242 This differentiation in 
relationship "constitutes the eternal life of the Father, 
                                                
242 Paul Sponheim, Faith and the Other: A Relational Theology, 47ff., 
questions whether Moltmann’s appeal to the analogy of relation works 
against an understanding of humanity as fully embodied. 
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the Son, and the Spirit, and among human beings determines 
the temporal life of women and men, parents and children" 
(GC 223). In both creational and divine relations 
differentiation simultaneously accompanies the movement of 
identification and unity. The Son and Spirit had to be 
differentiated from the Father in order for the eternal, 
perichoretic divine relationships to exist. Yet, the 
fellowship experienced in these relationships is constantly 
overcoming the original differentiation to achieve a new, 
deeper divine unity. Creation had to be differentiated from 
God in order for it to exist in relationship with God as 
his different Other. Yet, through God’s giving of himself 
to creation, creation is fulfilled and experiences God’s 
indwelling and interpenetration. This is the ideal for all 
human relationality as the "socially open companionship 
between people is the form of life which corresponds to 
God" (GC 223). The result is that "the trinitarian concept 
of community is able to overcome, not merely the ego-
solitariness of the narcissist, but also the egoism of the 
couple" (GC 223).243
Moltmann also appeals to the Trinity to understand the 
relationship between "being sexually differentiated and 
                                                
243 And as evidenced by his previous critique of hierarchical 
understandings of human institutions (TK), Moltmann maintains that the 
trinitarian concept of community can also overcome the oppression 
present in the state and the church.
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sharing a common humanity" (GC 222). Through the revelation 
of the perichoretic community the similarity to God can be 
seen in "the sexual differentiation and community of human 
beings" (GC 222). The analogy of relationality establishes 
the connection between God and humanity. The community of 
humans is evident as "from the very outset human beings are 
social beings. They are aligned towards human society and 
are essentially in need of help" (GC 223). But the sexual 
similarity is not as evident. The question quickly becomes: 
"what is the nature of the God who in his image appears in 
male and female form?" (GC 223). He must turn to this 
question about humanity because he cannot begin with an 
assertion about humanity and project it upon God. As image, 
humanity can only be understood as indirect knowledge of 
God and not the grounds for an analogy. 
Sexual differentiation and human community do point to 
an acknowledgment that the similarity to God "can be lived 
only in human community." (GC 222) However, in retrospect, 
the similarity is recognized only inasmuch as the human 
community participates in trinitarian perichoresis.244
Trinitarian differentiation functions as a norm for human 
sexuality and cannot reflect a projection of human sexual 
                                                
244 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, gives his account of gender 
identity rooted in Trinitarian thought which includes a summary 
discussion of the critique and response offered by feminist
thought(167ff.).
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difference upon God. The model for living in community must 
come from God's direct self-revelation. The best way to 
describe the nature of "God who in his image appears in 
male and female form" according to Moltmann is "the later 
doctrine of the Trinity, which discovers in God difference 
and unity... so that it talks about the God who is in his 
very self community and a wealth of different 
relationships" (GC 223). The analogy presented by Moltmann 
understands that a similar play between the movements of 
differentiation and unity can be found in human 
relationality. The differentiation between sexes is a prime 
example for Moltmann as "sexual difference... belongs to 
the very image of God itself" (GC 222). In human sexual 
relationships, difference precedes and makes possible 
intimate relationships.  Cunningham explains that “the 
relational differences of the Three [describe] them all as 
not merely equal to, but ultimately indistinguishable from 
one another.”245  In such relationships, the fellowship 
overcomes the isolation as community forms. In the sexual 
relationship, there is no hierarchical lording over, but a 
complete giving and receiving of the Other. This complete 
giving and receiving constantly calls forth new levels of 
intimacy. This pattern of differentiation preceding and 
                                                
245 David Cunningham, These Three are One, 43.
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making possible a complete giving and receiving is not 
limited to the human sexual relationship. Humanity's 
understanding of true community comes from its knowledge of 
the perichoretic trinitarian relationships.
But has Moltmann really given us a model that honors 
gender difference? Perichoresis, as we have seen, does 
involve  (dis)similarity, but it is a dissimilarity among 
those with a shared essence.246 The perichoretic community 
may contain “a wealth of relations,” but, in the end, it is 
about otherness in likeness. This may be fitting in 
reference to the Trinity. But does it do justice to the 
difference and diversity of human relationships, i.e man-
woman, parent-child, teacher-student,government-citizens?   
Divine community may suggest the normativity of non-
hierarchical relationships characterized by reciprocity. 
However, without a holding to a basic sense of difference 
between those in relation, creational differences are 
bracketed, if not obliterated. 247 By attempting to ground 
                                                
246 Eugene Rogers, Sexuality and the Christian Body: Their Way into the 
Triune God (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), addresses the complicated issues 
surrounding sexual identity and divine life for trinitarian theology in 
his 
247 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You: Sketch for a Felicity Within 
History., trans. Alison Martin, New York: Routledge, 1996, 44.
As Irigaray states, “Between man and woman, there really is 
otherness” (61). Where Moltmann suggests a common humanity 
shared by the genders, an implication of Irigaray’s view of 
difference is the rejection of the “illusion of the 
reduction to identity” (61). Rather than the identity or 
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gender relations in some type of divine universal 
relationship, it seems difficult for Moltmann to avoid a 
charge of Irigaray that in such cases God “guarantees the
social order that corresponds to a particular era.”248
LaCugna makes a similar point in her critique of some 
feminist theologies.249 By appealing to God’s relational 
life “it seems that feminism, as much as patriarchy, 
projects its vision of what it wishes would happen in the 
human sphere, on to God, or onto a transeconomic, 
transexperiential realm of intradivine relations.”250
                                                                                                                                                
unity found in Moltmann’s view of differentiation, Irigaray 
wants to speak of recognition, of companions, and of “the 
transfiguration of desire for the other (as an object?) 
into a desire with the other” (139). Moltmann has inspired 
and interacted with feminist theology. For example, see 
Rosemay Radford Ruether, “Christian Anthropology and 
Gender: A Tribute to Jürgen Moltmann” in Volf, The Future 
of Theology.” Certainly Moltmann values mutuality among 
genders, the question is whether his understanding of the 
Trinity is an adequate source for reflection on these 
issues. Also see Serene Jones, “This God Which Is Not One: 
Irigaray and Barth on the Divine,” Transfigurations: 
Theology and the French Feminists, ed., by C.W. Maggie Kim 
et. al. (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 109-141.
248 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, trans. Alison Martin, New York 1996, 
44. As Irigaray states, “Between man and woman, there really is 
otherness”(61). Where Moltmann suggests a common humanity shared by the 
genders, an implication of Irigaray’s view of difference is the 
rejection of the “illusion of the reduction to identity”(61). Rather 
than the identity or unity found in Moltmann’s view of differentiation, 
Irigaray wants to speak of recognition, of companions, and of “the 
transfiguration of desire for the other (as an object?) into a desire 
with the other”(139).
249 See also Mark Medley, Imago Trinitas: Toward a Relational 
Understanding of Becoming Human (Lanham, MD.: University Press of 
America, 2002), 181ff.
250 LaCugna, God for Us, 274. 
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Both Irigaray’s and LaCugna’s cautions flow from a 
concern that neither the experience of creational 
difference be read upon the divine community nor divine 
similarity be read into human community. How does this 
relate to what is above it? It is true Moltmann would argue 
that he is doing neither.251 But in making the 
(dis)similarity of participants in the divine community as 
normative for human relations, I would argue, does not take 
seriously the firm boundaries of creational 
dissimilarities, gender differences being only one 
example.252
7g  The Problematic of Perichoresis as Social Norm                                
In Moltmann’s designation of creation as 
differentiated rupture, ontological fault-lines -- if not 
evil -- are built into creation's story with the 
concomitant need for God’s eschatological contradiction of 
creational difference in redemption. This is true even if 
the enactment of evil is contingent.  The unity of divine 
                                                
251 For example, see Susan Brooks Thistlewaite, Comments on Jürgen 
Moltmann’s “The Unity of the Triune God”” St. Vladimirs Theological 
Quarterly 28 1984,  states, “I would prefer the liberating content of 
Moltmann’s open and inviting understanding of the nature of God as 
triune, to the seemingly inclusive language which hides a fundamentally 
oppressive dominance in the Godhead”(182).
252  See Stanley Grenz’s, Is God Sexual? Human Embodiment and the 
Christian Conception of God” Christian Scholars Review XXVIII, 1998,
argument that we cannot locate the feminine in the Spirit for “such 
compartmentalization is inconsistent with the idea of 
perichoresis”(36).
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life, in the end, stands over against the difference of 
creaturely life. 
 In revealing himself as the divine community, God 
makes the future exist within Godforsaken creation. Here 
the perichoresis that is the "mutual indwelling" which 
results from "self-giving" of each member of the Trinity 
becomes the norm of all social relations. 
Perichoresis is found both in God in se and in God ad 
extra. Moltmann explains the origin and destiny of the 
Creator-creation relationship in terms of perichoresis. 
However, Creator-creation perichoresis seems more 
problematic as it must take into account the fundamental 
difference that allows for the distinction between God and 
non-God. The very difference that allows God to stand over 
against the creatio originalis is called into question by 
the call to creation to give itself freely and totally over 
to the divine community.
And here is a fundamental problem. For in distinction 
from the Trinity where otherness is in terms of a 
fundamental likeness, in inter-human relations we face that 
which is fundamentally unlike. Creaturely perichoresis
exists under a different set of conditions than that found 
within inner-trinitarian life.  Since mutual indwelling in 
God presupposes a likeness, the flow of mutuality is 
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between same Others and is characterized by a fail-safe 
predictability. However, when a human person gives of 
herself to a different Other, the response of the Other is 
neither predictable, safe, nor risk free. Rejection and 
violence are distinct possibilities in a creation 
characterized by strife and isolation. Nevertheless 
perichoretic communality demands that I must give myself, 
even (especially) to the violent Other, for here in lies 
the chance for redemption.253 Here hope re-enters the 
picture.  If my giving of self is rejected and destroyed, I 
still have the promise that God will ultimately overcome 
all such violence in his fulfillment of creation. The 
thrust of perichoresis is a call for the self's kenosis, a 
kenosis in which I constantly give my self over to the 
creaturely Other and to the divine Other. 
In creation understood as always/already in need of 
redemption, I don't have many options other than to cease 
being what I am (forsaken) in order to become Other 
(filled). In the end, in spite of his real concern for 
suffering, I am wary of Moltmann making deficiency (and the 
                                                
253 Schuurman, “Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics,” questions the very 
possibility of imitation when he states that “the entire idea of 
kenosis implies an original position of power and rights from which one 
selflessly descends. Thus it is hard to see what this idea means for 
one who is not in such a position—namely the poor and oppressed…Thus it 
is not clear what his word of action to the oppressed finally is, based 
on an ethic of imitation”(59).
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proclivity for evil) so intrinsic to creation that we are 
constantly trapped between the horns of sufferings for/from 
the Other or choosing to be guilty in self assertion.
7h  Reframing Perichoresis: A Dance of Beloved Partners
A way of reframing perichoresis in order to avoid the 
downplaying of creation and the related danger of 
emplotting evil into the fabric of creation has been 
suggested by Catherine LaCugna in her God for Us. Rather 
than locating perichoresis in “God’s inner life” which 
makes the economy of redemption the starting point for the 
discussion of the relationship between God and creation, 
LaCugna suggestively proposes that we begin “in the mystery 
of the one communion of all persons, divine as well as 
human.”254 According to LaCugna, “there are not two sets of 
communion – one among the divine persons, the Other among 
human persons, with the latter supposed to replicate the 
former.”255 Instead, there is “one perochoresis, the one 
mystery of communion [that] includes God and humanity as 
                                                
254 LaCugna, 274. See also Schwöbel’s,“Christology and Trinitarian 
Thought”, assertion that “the Christian community whose existence is 
part of the divine economy”(139).
255 LaCugna, 274. Ronald Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga, Trinity, 
Incarnation and Atonement: Philosophical and Theological Essays, Notre 
Dame, In.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989, explain that “Moltmann 
links the two communities – one divine and trinitarian, the other 
human, but eschatologically progressing toward the divine life – by a 
soteriology in which the divine creation, sending, passion, and 
glorification at once mirror the intratrinitarian life and graciously 
open it to the human community.”(6).
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beloved partners in the dance.”256 The recognition of the 
irreducibility of divine and human life and the emphasis on 
one communion opens the possibility for difference as non-
oppositional.257 Then, perichoresis can be experienced as an 
ongoing process of “withing”258 between God and creation 
instead of a simultaneous contradictory process of 
opposition and interpenetration. Then we have communion as 
a covenantal dance instead of an alternating 
opposing/overcoming dialectic exchange between kenosis and 
theosis, agape or philia.
7i  Ethics in a Fallen World  
Even with a reframing of perichoresis, the questions 
regarding Moltmann’s ethics will not have been answered. 
Although Moltmann, as we have seen, considers self-
sacrifice the ethical norm, we also noticed that he allows 
room for the exercise of self-assertive power in an act of 
self-protection which can be called a “choosing to be 
guilty.” This is in tension with and even contradicts the 
whole direction of his ethics. Our question is: does the 
                                                
256 LaCugna, 274
257  On this point I think LaCugna is consistent with what James K.A. 
Smith, Speech and Theology, London: Routledge, 2002, calls 
“incarnational logic”(153ff.). For Smith, theology avoids ontotheology 
by beginning in confession. Smith maintains the possibility of an 
“incarnational or analogical account” of theology which I take it can 
be extended to the Trinity.
258 See James Olthuis, The Beautiful Risk, Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001 
for an exploration into the reality of being with an other.
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need to make the exception of “choosing to be guilty” call 
into question the credibility of Moltmann’s project? Or is 
the call to constant struggle and self-assertion built 
ontologically into the heart of Moltmann’s ethics? In which 
case, his emphasis on the eschatological need for constant 
self-surrender and sacrifice is something that involves 
from the outset its opposite.
I suspect that one could argue either way. Whatever 
the case, we are left, it feels, somewhat, if not 
completely, in the lurch ethically. All we know is that God 
is going to win out and be all in all. Love is stronger 
than death. But what this translates into in the pull and 
press of daily life is surely ambiguous. Any self-sacrifice 
or suffering we endure will, looked at eschatologically, 
transform into glory. If this is not eschatological 
verification of suffering and evil, it certainly has much 
of that sound and feel.
Moltmann’s whole zimzum understanding of creation with 
its God-forsaken space, agape, and kenosis depend upon a 
cosmogony that defines difference as opposition. For the 
difference of Otherness ultimately to exist within the 
divine fellowship would mean opposition within the 
community. And it is opposition that is exactly what is 
overcome by God in theosis.
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 One dimension of Moltmann's understanding of creatio 
originalis in terms of opposition is that the relationship 
between human beings as creatures is what Olthuis has 
described as a "basic opposition between closed selves.”259
In Moltmann’s words, humanity's disconnection from God and 
from itself, which followed upon God's disconnection from 
creation, leaves humanity stuck in "God-forsaken, transient 
reality" (TH 18) where it is isolated, captive, and closed. 
In Moltmann's world, there can only be two possible modes 
of action, either one self-asserts and oppresses others or 
one self-sacrifices at the risk of being oppressed. In such 
a world a person either "exercises power and becomes 
dominant and independent -- that is selfish -- or one 
surrenders and becomes submissive and dependent -- that is, 
selfless."260
  The ethical direction given by God's revelation of 
his kenotic nature clearly dictates to the follower of 
Christ the answer to the question of whether she should be 
selfish or selfless. The ideal for follower of Christ is a 
constant self- giving. Hence, to return violence for the 
sake of self-protection is a wrong option, even though it 
                                                
259 James Olthuis, “Face-to-Face: Ethical Asymmetry or the 
Symmetry 
of Mutuality?” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 25, 1996, 469.
260 Olthius, "Ethical Asymmetry,” 469.
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may be necessary. The ethical ideal is to give (as 
emptying) yourself to the violent Other so that he may be 
restored to the community. 
In hope, the self is to be sacrificed so that the 
self’s Other is invited into the open community of God and 
creation.261 Christ has taught us that the community takes 
precedence over self-assertion. But such reconciliation 
comes at the price of losing oneself for the sake of the 
Other. However, as one loses oneself in God, the follower 
of Christ finds her "true" self in the perichoretic 
relations of God. Theosis always supersedes kenosis. The 
experience of loss is countered by the simultaneous promise 
of ultimate redemption. 262
As both faithful followers and God engage in agape, 
they experience the pain of excessive giving by emptying. 
Humanity endures suffering for the violent Other. 263 God 
endures suffering for the sake of the very existence of an 
Other different than himself. In Moltmann's cosmogony, in 
the end, presence, perichoresis, and harmony trump the 
                                                
261  See Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 299 n.7.
262  Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, reminds us that the end for Moltmann is 
not merely the liberation of victims but a community of love(104ff.).  
263 Wiebe’s,“Revolution as an Issue in Theology: Jürgen Moltmann” insight 
is helpful here. He asserts that “the gospel is not a moralistic 
program of nonviolence” but rather the issue is “the dignity, the 
personhood, even of the enemy”(114).
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counter movements of forsakenness, differentiation, and 
risk. 
Trinitarian ethics reflect this guarantee of presence, 
a being-in-creation as creation-is-in-God. Within this 
final guarantee of presence, trinitarian life models the 
redeemed ethical norms of perfect, predictable, self-giving 
and self-receiving. However, as we have already noticed, in 
the temporality of our life on this earth, this leaves the 
self with the difficult choice of being too central (self-
assertive and guilty) or too marginal (self-sacrificial but 
ethically obedient).
 Questions regarding the use of power, legitimate 
resistance, or developing a hierarchy of obligations are 
not really addressed in trinitarian ethics and one is left 
to his or her own devices. After all the theoretical 
maneuvering, as David Cunningham has pointed out, the 
specific implications of Moltmann’s trinitarian ethics are 
hard to draw out as his theological reflection remains “at 
a fairly high level of abstraction.”264  Moltmann has 
confessed that his theology is “not so much concerned with 
                                                
264 David Cunningham, “These Three,” 273. McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love, 
argues that Cunningham’s critique points to “Moltmann’s failure to 
develop an adequate doctrine of sin”(148). She thinks that by re-
working Moltmann’s doctrine of sin she can close the “gap” between 
Moltmann’s Trinitarian principles and his concrete proposals. However, 
in arguing that Moltmann emplots evil into cosmic history, he cannot 
avoid a weak doctrine of sin. To adjust his doctrine of sin is to 
change his cosmology at a foundational point. 
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correct doctrine but with concrete doctrine” (HTG 167). 
However, the idealism of his ethics seems anything but 
practical. As Cunningham puts it, “[Moltmann] rarely offers 
suggestions as to how the theoretical changes he advocates 
might be brought about in practice.”265
7j  Conclusion
The intent of this study was to explore 
Moltmann’s contention that the Trinity provides a moral and 
ethical program. This exploration turned out to be 
impossible without a thorough analysis of Moltmann’s use of 
philia and agape. Moltmann’s thought is creative and, at 
points, extremely helpful. His stress on a faithful 
following of the way of Jesus Christ in an ethics of 
discipleship is much appreciated. However, in the end, the 
distinctions he attempts to draw between philia and agape
offer little practical help for the specifics of the 
ethical life.  While Moltmann’s discussion of topics such 
as patriarchy, oppression, poverty, and justice raise 
important issues and offer some pastoral guidance for the 
                                                
265 David Cunningham, “These Three,” 43.
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church, the fruit of his investigations into the 
perichoresis of the Trinity as the norm for human relations 
is less available. Moltmann’s theoretical construction of 
the Trinity with its championing of self-sacrifice, even as 
it recognizes the need to some time incur the guilt of 
self-assertion, leaves us in ambiguity. As such, Moltmann’s 
cosmogony in the end disappoints in its ability to give 
guidance and direction in negotiating the countless 
dilemmas that are integral to a daily following of Jesus 
Christ.
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Summary
Indwelling the Forsaken Other: 
The Trinitarian Ethics of 
Jϋrgen Moltmann
After the Holocaust, in an age of increasing tensions, 
terrorism, and violence, what does it mean to live with 
hope? For Jürgen Moltmann, hope is made present when the 
church embodies a distinctively Christian ethic and lives 
counter-culturally in the midst of godforsakenness. The 
model for the church’s practice is the death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. Good Friday and Easter 
represent two different kinds of divine love for Moltmann. 
Agape is kenotic in character. In the sacrificial acts of 
Good Friday, divine love as agape “contradicts the 
contradiction” of a creation that has realized its 
forsakenness. But the negation of isolation, violence, and 
death is not enough. The fundamental relationships of 
creation must be (re)created.   
The resurrection of Jesus Christ reveals the mutual 
indwelling of the God the Father, Son, and Spirit. The 
community manifest in the life of the Trinity is 
characterized by philia. Philia is a love which seeks 
deeper and deeper connections amongst its members and 
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produces an abiding unity. The perichoresis experienced in 
inner-trinitarian life becomes the end for all of reality. 
Creation finds fulfillment as part of divine life. Divine 
love as agape has overcome any distance between God and 
creation and reconciles creation into the reciprocal 
relationships of divine philia. The church’s call, as those 
who have experienced this reconciliation, is to offer the 
hope of the philia of divine life to a hopeless world by 
acting in agape towards those who (violently) oppose God.
This study is a critical reading of Jürgen Moltmann’s 
ethics of discipleship. His turn to the inner life of the 
Trinity as his source for his reflections on the life of 
the church is not without problems. While the call to copy 
God in our relationships offers some general direction for 
our actions, it also raises several questions. Two 
important questions for this work are, "In what way are we 
to copy God?" and "What conditions make it possible to copy 
God?" In the end, I will argue, Moltmann’s answers to these 
questions are insufficient; and, consequently, he fails to 
protect the difference between Creator and creation in his 
analogia relationis. As a result, the ethical direction 
given by Moltmann’s work seems to be increasingly muddied 
and, at best, paradoxical.  
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The argument of this work develops in the following 
manner. Chapter one is an introduction to Moltmann’s 
thought in which I suggest that one way to reconcile the 
conflicting readings of Moltmann by various scholars is to 
see Moltmann’s underlying ontology as an example of 
contradictory monism. Reading him in this manner not only 
addresses various interpretations, but also helps to make 
sense of the opposing pairs of concepts that Moltmann uses 
throughout his work such as present/future, 
forsaken/filled, hope/despair, and importantly, for this 
work, agape/philia.
Chapter two will concentrate on explicating Moltmann’s 
critique of classical monotheism and the various attempts 
to make sense of the Trinity from a starting point which 
(over)stresses unity and immutability. After rejecting what 
he calls the “god of Parmenides,” Moltmann begins to craft 
a relational model of God appealing to a dynamic 
understanding of reality which manifests itself in 
perichoresis. In chapter three, the notion of perichoresis
as divine love is unfolded. Moltmann, again using his 
ability to assert contradictory states of affairs, 
differentiates between two types of divine love, philia 
(love of the same) and agape (love of the different). This 
distinction allows Moltmann to stress both the safe, 
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ongoing relations among the “same” members of the Trinity 
and the need for God to create a “different” other which 
comes to be in a forsaken place. Hence, creation is 
simultaneously within the perichoretic divine community and 
abandoned by God. 
Chapters four and five examine forsaken creation’s 
movement away from God which is concurrently God’s 
eschatological movement towards creation and the 
(re)filling of creation with his presence. Chapter four 
does so by looking at Moltmann’s doctrine of Jesus Christ 
and his take on the incarnation, crucifixion and 
resurrection. In the revelation of Jesus Christ, Moltmann 
most clearly sees the oppositional movements of reality. 
From the historical direction, Jesus Christ is the 
crucified God who displays the Hell of abandonment. From 
the eschatological direction, Jesus Christ is the risen Son 
who gives the promise of life to a creation which now lives 
in anticipation of God’s final arrival. In chapter five, 
God’s arrival in creation as a cosmic perichoresis is 
scrutinized. While reality is described by two 
simultaneous, oppositional movements, in this chapter I 
argue that, in the end, he gives privilege to the unifying, 
eschatological movement. Problems surface as Moltmann faces 
difficulties in asserting that there is room for creational 
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differences as he had previously argued that such 
differences were only possible if God withdrew and thereby 
ceded a space within the divine community. Without an 
adequate account of difference, the analogy between divine 
subjectivity and human subjectivity is severely weakened. 
Chapter six is concerned with the ethical implications 
drawn from intra-trinitarian life. Moltmann’s understanding 
of the church’s call to witness through an anticipatory, 
self-sacrificing, non-violent life is rooted in his model 
of God, his view of creation and the (dis)connection 
between them. However, his ethic allows for the possibility 
of self-assertion and even violence. When and how such acts 
are permissible is, to say the least, ambiguous. Even more 
unclear is how such acts are to be reconciled with the 
analogia relationis he has worked so hard to establish.
In the final chapter, I attempt to bring together the 
questions and concerns which have emerged throughout the 
study. In a world of violence and hatred, how does one 
embody the kenotic relations of the Trinity? When faced 
with violence, we are to give ourselves sacrificially away 
to the violent other not knowing what to expect. Such a 
counter-cultural move is the only way to work towards the 
reclamation of the (violent) other.
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 However, for Moltmann, sometimes in the mess of daily 
life and its violence, we can choose to be guilty and not 
be sacrificial. But when? Moltmann’s proposal of copying 
God provides, I propose, precious little detail here. 
In spite of the many genuine insights and helpful 
critiques in Moltmann’s work, in the end, attempting to 
locate a social program for human life within trinitarian 
life appears to create more problems than it solves. I will 
end by suggesting that we need a more radical re-thinking 
of the norms of human relationality in terms of God’s love 
with which we are gifted and to which we are called.
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Summary
Indwelling the Forsaken Other: 
The Trinitarian Ethics of 
Jϋrgen Moltmann
After the Holocaust, in an age of increasing tensions, 
terrorism, and violence, what does it mean to live with 
hope? For Jürgen Moltmann, hope is made present when the 
church embodies a distinctively Christian ethic and lives 
counter-culturally in the midst of godforsakenness. The 
model for the church’s practice is the death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. Good Friday and Easter 
represent two different kinds of divine love for Moltmann. 
Agape is kenotic in character. In the sacrificial acts of 
Good Friday, divine love as agape “contradicts the 
contradiction” of a creation that has realized its 
forsakenness. But the negation of isolation, violence, and 
death is not enough. The fundamental relationships of 
creation must be (re)created.   
The resurrection of Jesus Christ reveals the mutual 
indwelling of the God the Father, Son, and Spirit. The 
community manifest in the life of the Trinity is 
characterized by philia. Philia is a love which seeks 
deeper and deeper connections amongst its members and 
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produces an abiding unity. The perichoresis experienced in 
inner-trinitarian life becomes the end for all of reality. 
Creation finds fulfillment as part of divine life. Divine 
love as agape has overcome any distance between God and 
creation and reconciles creation into the reciprocal 
relationships of divine philia. The church’s call, as those 
who have experienced this reconciliation, is to offer the 
hope of the philia of divine life to a hopeless world by 
acting in agape towards those who (violently) oppose God.
This study is a critical reading of Jürgen Moltmann’s 
ethics of discipleship. His turn to the inner life of the 
Trinity as his source for his reflections on the life of 
the church is not without problems. While the call to copy 
God in our relationships offers some general direction for 
our actions, it also raises several questions. Two 
important questions for this work are, "In what way are we 
to copy God?" and "What conditions make it possible to copy 
God?" In the end, I will argue, Moltmann’s answers to these 
questions are insufficient; and, consequently, he fails to 
protect the difference between Creator and creation in his 
analogia relationis. As a result, the ethical direction 
given by Moltmann’s work seems to be increasingly muddied 
and, at best, paradoxical.  
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The argument of this work develops in the following 
manner. Chapter one is an introduction to Moltmann’s 
thought in which I suggest that one way to reconcile the 
conflicting readings of Moltmann by various scholars is to 
see Moltmann’s underlying ontology as an example of 
contradictory monism. Reading him in this manner not only 
addresses various interpretations, but also helps to make 
sense of the opposing pairs of concepts that Moltmann uses 
throughout his work such as present/future, 
forsaken/filled, hope/despair, and importantly, for this 
work, agape/philia.
Chapter two will concentrate on explicating Moltmann’s 
critique of classical monotheism and the various attempts 
to make sense of the Trinity from a starting point which 
(over)stresses unity and immutability. After rejecting what 
he calls the “god of Parmenides,” Moltmann begins to craft 
a relational model of God appealing to a dynamic 
understanding of reality which manifests itself in 
perichoresis. In chapter three, the notion of perichoresis
as divine love is unfolded. Moltmann, again using his 
ability to assert contradictory states of affairs, 
differentiates between two types of divine love, philia 
(love of the same) and agape (love of the different). This 
distinction allows Moltmann to stress both the safe, 
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ongoing relations among the “same” members of the Trinity 
and the need for God to create a “different” other which 
comes to be in a forsaken place. Hence, creation is 
simultaneously within the perichoretic divine community and 
abandoned by God. 
Chapters four and five examine forsaken creation’s 
movement away from God which is concurrently God’s 
eschatological movement towards creation and the 
(re)filling of creation with his presence. Chapter four 
does so by looking at Moltmann’s doctrine of Jesus Christ 
and his take on the incarnation, crucifixion and 
resurrection. In the revelation of Jesus Christ, Moltmann 
most clearly sees the oppositional movements of reality. 
From the historical direction, Jesus Christ is the 
crucified God who displays the Hell of abandonment. From 
the eschatological direction, Jesus Christ is the risen Son 
who gives the promise of life to a creation which now lives 
in anticipation of God’s final arrival. In chapter five, 
God’s arrival in creation as a cosmic perichoresis is 
scrutinized. While reality is described by two 
simultaneous, oppositional movements, in this chapter I 
argue that, in the end, he gives privilege to the unifying, 
eschatological movement. Problems surface as Moltmann faces 
difficulties in asserting that there is room for creational 
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differences as he had previously argued that such 
differences were only possible if God withdrew and thereby 
ceded a space within the divine community. Without an 
adequate account of difference, the analogy between divine 
subjectivity and human subjectivity is severely weakened. 
Chapter six is concerned with the ethical implications 
drawn from intra-trinitarian life. Moltmann’s understanding 
of the church’s call to witness through an anticipatory, 
self-sacrificing, non-violent life is rooted in his model 
of God, his view of creation and the (dis)connection 
between them. However, his ethic allows for the possibility 
of self-assertion and even violence. When and how such acts 
are permissible is, to say the least, ambiguous. Even more 
unclear is how such acts are to be reconciled with the 
analogia relationis he has worked so hard to establish.
In the final chapter, I attempt to bring together the 
questions and concerns which have emerged throughout the 
study. In a world of violence and hatred, how does one 
embody the kenotic relations of the Trinity? When faced 
with violence, we are to give ourselves sacrificially away 
to the violent other not knowing what to expect. Such a 
counter-cultural move is the only way to work towards the 
reclamation of the (violent) other.
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 However, for Moltmann, sometimes in the mess of daily 
life and its violence, we can choose to be guilty and not 
be sacrificial. But when? Moltmann’s proposal of copying 
God provides, I propose, precious little detail here. 
In spite of the many genuine insights and helpful 
critiques in Moltmann’s work, in the end, attempting to 
locate a social program for human life within trinitarian 
life appears to create more problems than it solves. I will 
end by suggesting that we need a more radical re-thinking 
of the norms of human relationality in terms of God’s love 
with which we are gifted and to which we are called.
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Samenvatting
De inwoning van het verlaten andere: de 
trinitarische ethiek van Jürgen 
Moltmann
(Translated by Harry Van Dyke)
Wat betekent het om na de holocaust, in een tijd van 
toenemende spanningen, terrorisme en geweld, te leven uit 
de hoop? Volgens Jürgen Moltmann wordt de hoop tegenwoordig 
gesteld wanneer de kerk een geheel eigen christelijke 
ethiek belichaamt en dwars tegen de eigentijdse stroom in, 
te midden van de godverlatenheid, haar weg zoekt te vinden. 
Voor haar praxis vindt de kerk haar model in de dood en 
opstanding van Jezus Christus. Bij Moltmann 
vertegenwoordigen Goede Vrijdag en Pasen twee soorten 
goddelijke liefde. Agape is kenotisch van aard. In de 
offerdaad van Goede Vrijdag “weerspreekt” de goddelijke 
agape “de tegenspraak” der schepping die zich van haar 
godverlatenheid bewust is geworden. Intussen, de negatie 
van isolement, geweld en dood is niet voldoende. De 
fundamentele relaties van de schepping hebben van node dat 
zij een (her)schepping ondergaan.
De opstanding van Jezus Christus is een openbaring van 
de wederzijdse inwoning van God de Vader, de Zoon, en de 
Heilige Geest. De gemeenschap die zich in het leven van de 
Drieëenheid manifesteert wordt gekenmerkt door philia. 
Philia is een liefde die naar steeds diepere banden tussen 
haar leden streeft en aldus een duurzame eenheid tot 
aanzijn brengt. De perichoresis die binnen het intra-
trinitarische leven wordt ervaren, wordt het doel van al 
het bestaande. De schepping vindt haar vervulling als 
onderdeel van het goddelijk leven. De goddelijke liefde als 
agape heeft elke afstand tussen God en schepping overwonnen 
en verzoent de schepping door binnen te gaan in de 
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onderlinge verhoudingen van de goddelijke philia. De kerk, 
wier leden deze verzoening hebben ervaren, vindt haar 
roeping in het aanbieden van de hoop van de philia binnen 
het goddelijk leven, en wel aan een hope-loze wereld. Dit 
doet zij door in agape te handelen jegens hen die 
(geweldadig) God tegenstaan.
Deze studie beoogt een kritisch verstaan van Jürgen 
Moltmanns ethiek van het discipelschap. Zijn wending naar 
het inwendig leven van de Drieëenheid als bron voor zijn 
beschouwingen over het leven van de kerk is niet zonder 
problemen. Zijn appl om God na te volgen in onze aardse 
verbanden verschaft ons wel een aantal algemene richtlijnen 
voor ons handelen maar roept ook een aantal vragen op. In
de volgende bladzijden worden twee belangrijke vragen aan 
de orde gesteld: Op welke wijze dient de navolging Gods te 
geschieden? en Welke zijn de voorwaarden die deze imitatio 
Dei eerst mogelijk maken? Uiteindelijk betoog ik dat 
Moltmanns antwoorden op deze vragen tekort schieten en dat 
hij vervolgens met zijn analogia relationis het verschil 
tussen Schepper en schepping onvoldoende handhaaft. Het 
gevolg is, dat de ethische richting die in Moltmanns oeuvre 
wordt aangewezen in toenemende mate onduidelijk en in het 
gunstigste geval paradoxaal overkomt.
Mijn betoog verloopt als volgt. Hoofdstuk 1 is een 
inleiding tot het denken van Moltmann, waarin ik opper dat 
één manier om de bestaande tegenstrijdige lezingen van 
Moltmann te verzoenen, is om diens onderliggende ontologie 
te zien als een voorbeeld van contradictoir monisme. Door 
hem op deze manier te lezen kan men niet alleen de 
uiteenlopende interpretaties ontwarren, maar verge-
makkelijkt men tevens het verstaan van de polaire 
begrippenparen die Moltmann door zijn hele oeuvre gebruikt, 
zoals tegenwoordig/toekomstig, verlaten/vervuld, 
hoop/wanhoop, en, van centrale betkenis voor de onderhavige 
studie, agape/philia.
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Hoofdstuk 2 is gewijd aan een uiteenzetting van 
Moltmanns kritiek op het klassieke monotheisme en de 
verschillende pogingen om de Drieëenheid te verstaan d.m.v. 
een (over)belichting van eenheid en onveranderlijkheid. Na 
de zgn. “God van Parmenides” te hebben afgewezen, 
ontwikkelt Moltmann zijn relationeel model van God, onder 
verwijzing naar een dynamische werkelijkheidsopvatting die 
zich in perichoresis openbaart. 
Hoofdstuk 3 geeft een toelichting op het begrip 
perichoresis als goddelijke liefde. Moltmann onderscheidt, 
al weer met gebruik van zijn vermogen om contradictoire 
standen van zaken te poneren, tussen twee typen goddelijke 
liefde: philia (liefde tot hetzelfde) en agape (liefde tot 
het andere of de ander). Dit onderscheid stelt hem in staat 
de nadruk te leggen op enerzijds de veilige actuele 
onderlinge verhoudingen tussen “dezelfde” leden van de 
Drieëenheid, en anderzijds Gods behoefte om het “andere” te 
scheppen dat in de verlatenheid terecht komt. De schepping 
leidt haar bestaan dus voortdurend binnen de spanning van 
de perichoretische goddelijke gemeenschap en de 
godverlatenheid.
In de hoofdstukken 4 en 5 onderwerp ik twee zaken aan 
een nader onderzoek: allereerst de beweging van de verlaten 
schepping bij God vandaan, die tegelijk Gods’ 
eschatologische beweging naar de schepping toe is, en 
vervolgens de (her)vulling van de schepping met Gods 
tegenwoordigheid. Hoofdstuk 4 doet dit door Moltmann’s 
christologie en zijn opvatting van incarnatie, kruis en 
opstanding onder de loep te nemen. In de openbaring van 
Jezus Christus ziet Moltmann de meest duidelijk 
manifestatie van de contradictoire bewegingen van de 
werkelijkheid. Historisch gezien is Jezus Chrstus de 
gekruisigde God die de hel der verlatenheid ten toon stelt. 
Eschatologisch gezien is Jezus Christus de opgestane Zoon 
die de belofte van leven schenkt aan een schepping die nu 
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nog leeft in de verwachting van Gods uiteindelijke 
(toe)komst.
Hoofdstuk 5 bevat een nader onderzoek naar Gods komst 
in de schepping als een kosmische perichoresis. Terwijl de 
werkelijkheid wordt beschreven als twee simultane 
contradictoire bewegingen, laat ik in dit hoofdstuk zien 
dat Moltmann uiteindelijk voorrang geeft aan de 
eenheidsstichtende eschatologische beweging. Problemen doen 
zich voor wanneer Moltmann met moeilijkheden te kampen 
krijgt als hij beweert dat er ruimte is voor creatuurlijke 
verschillen. Eerder had hij namelijk betoogd dat zulke ver-
schillen slechts mogelijk zijn als God zich terugtrekt en 
dusdoende ruimte schept binnen de goddelijke gemeenschap. 
De afwezigheid van een adekwate verklaring voor 
creatuurlijke verschillen binnen de schepping betekent een 
ernstige verzwakking van Moltmanns analogie tussen 
goddelijke en menselijke subjectiviteit.
In hoofdstuk 6 gaat het om de ethische implicaties die 
in het binnentrinitarisch leven besloten liggen. Moltmanns 
opvatting van de roeping van de kerk om te getuigen door 
middel van een de toekomst anticiperend, zelfopofferend, 
niet-geweldadig leven stoelt op zowel zijn Godsmodel als 
zijn scheppingsbeeld, en op het verband c.q. de afstand 
tussen God en schepping. Zijn ethiek laat echter ruimte 
open voor de mogelijkheid tot zelfhandhaving en zelfs tot 
het gebruik van geweld. Wanneer, en hoe, zulk handelen is 
toegestaan, is op z’n minst ambigu. Nog onduidelijker is, 
hoe zulk handelen te verzoenen is met de analogie 
relationis waarvoor hij zoveel moeite doet.
In het slothoofdstuk vat ik de kwesties samen die deze 
studie aan het licht heeft gebracht. Hoe belichaamt men de 
kenotische relaties van de Drieëenheid in een wereld van 
geweld en haat? Bij een confrontatie met geweld moeten we 
ons [volgens Moltmann] opofferen aan de geweldadige andere, 
zonder te weten wat ons te wachten staat. Zulk een 
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tegendraadse beweging is de enige manier om bij te dragen 
tot de herwinning van de (geweldadige) ander.
Van Moltmann echter mogen wij af en toe, temidden van 
de “mess” van het dagelijks leven met zijn geweld, kiezen 
om schuldig te zijn in plaats van opofferingsgezind. Doch 
wanneer mag dat? Moltmanns voorstel om God na te volgen 
geeft ons hier m.i. bedroevend weinig houvast.
Ondanks vele waardevolle inzichten en nuttige kritiek 
in het oeuvre van Moltmann, moeten we per slot van rekening 
constateren dat de poging om een sociaal programma voor het 
mensenleven uit het binnentrinitarisch leven af te leiden, 
niet geslaagd is te noemen. Het ziet ernaar uit dat deze 
poging meer problemen oplevert dan bevredigende oplossingen 
biedt. Tot besluit voer ik het pleit voor een meer radicale 
doordenking van de normen voor de menselijke 
relationaliteit op basis van de liefde Gods waarmee wij 
begiftigd en waartoe wij geroepen zijn.
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